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Anxiety as vibration: 
In search of a creative clinic through anxiety  
 
 
This theoretical research addresses the limits of ‘being’ and ‘becomings’ in 
psychoanalytic praxis from the perspective of anxiety, arguing for a psycho-
political intervention in the clinic. Combining medical humanities, art theory and 
psychosocial studies, I ask: What can anxiety do?   
Anxiety, for Lacan, is an affect that sits between desire and jouissance; it is an 
encounter with the Real that mobilises or squeezes the subject between a 
Symbolically-wrapped delineation of oneself, which hangs by a thread once the 
Imaginary fantasy of consistency fails, and the vastness and abyss that extends 
beyond oneself, the Real.  Interestingly, anxiety is shunted out of the DSM-III 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) when the biologistic and 
pharmaceutical paradigms of psychiatry gain strength over psychoanalysis after 
the 1970s, only to return as a companion to a biomedicalised depression. The 
affect of anxiety is, thus, pathologised and locked into a state of estrangement, 
without, however, opening up to possible new ways of living, revealing a mode of 
affective alienation Deleuze (1992) calls a ‘dividualisation’.  
In this piece I explore the possibilities of an encounter with the Real as a sphere of 
excessive affect in psychoanalysis, calling this meeting a vibration. Anchoring my 
enquiry on the art practice of Lygia Clark, I utilise vibration as a conceptual artifice 
when thinking of affects beyond an Oedipal frame, beyond ego-to-ego relations 
and a short-circuit of individualised bodily jouissance. Or, as Clark named it, 
beyond the ‘Plane’ into where lies the ‘full-void’. I ask: What can psychoanalysis 
do that addresses the battles of psychic suffering and, at the same time, decentres 
the modern humanist subject, opening possibilities for the creation of new ways 
of living, of new worlds? Anxiety is the affect I work with in the search for a 
critique of the dividualising residues in psychoanalysis of the Freudian and 
Lacanian orientation, moving towards an entangled, situated and creative clinic, 
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“The "full-void" contains all potentialities”  





What can anxiety do? 
 
 
The ubiquitous anxious sensation of dread, breathlessness, paralysation and panic 
has been at the centre of debates in psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and 
the target of wellness rituals over the last century. Measured by governments as a 
sign of populational lack of wellbeing, medicated en masse in primary care and 
heard as a common complaint of those arriving at a psychoanalytic couch – often 
after having tried other methods and therapies to ease their suffering – anxiety  
has been called a ‘silent epidemic’ affecting a fifth of the population in countries 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom (Cooke, 2013).  
 
In psychoanalysis, since Freud, anxiety is not something to ‘get rid of’ so fast, 
rather, it is an affect integral to psychic experience that functions as a signal of a 
threat to the ego (Freud, 1917, 1926). Being so, anxiety is considered, in Freudian 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis, a ‘compass’ in the mapping of the treatment (Miller, 
2007). Some clinical approaches within psychiatry and the psychologies, such as 
Positive Psychology, and even psychoanalytic orientations from a British and 
North-American tradition, find value in strengthening one’s ego defences against 
the hurricane that anxiety may feel like. In the Freudian and Lacanian orientations, 
however, making the ego more malleable, capable of riding the sweeping waves 
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from the unconscious that become apparent in anxiety, is the direction of the 
treatment in which anxiety is not a stranger to the self; instead, it is entangled in 
the life of the subject.  
 
In this thesis, I will argue that psychoanalysis of the Freudian and Lacanian 
orientations not only offers insights into what one’s anxiety is all about as it also 
opens possibilities for the constructions of new modes of living departing from the 
rupture to the self that characterises the experience of anxiety.  My work argues 
that psychoanalysis, when read through non-Oedipal lenses, informs not only 
what can be done to anxiety but also ‘what anxiety can do’.  
 
In looking for the clues to the possibilities of anxiety as an affect, I will trace a route 
into a creative clinic, one that holds on to psychoanalytic ‘vibrational moments’ 
where the affect of anxiety takes the subject away from an abyss-within into a 
horizon-beyond oneself. In doing so, I explore the possibilities of ‘being’ and 
‘becomings’ for psychoanalysis by thinking through the potentialities of rupture 
in the psychoanalytic clinic, and also, what to do with it: interpret rupture within 
structural frames or mobilise it into novel and collective ways of being, assembling 
it through the technique of co-poiesis, as we learn with the Brazilian artist Lygia 
Clark and with Félix Guattari’s praxis.  
 
In this thesis, I set psychoanalysis and its potential approach to anxiety as resting 
between a ‘dividualising’ (Deleuze, 1992) alienating modulation of affect – which 
relies on the Oedipal paradigm of domination and castration (Braidotti, 1994, 
2006a) –  and the plane of immanence Lygia Clark (1994) calls a ‘full-void’, which 
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vibrates through the subject what extends beyond oneself as an ethics of 
multiplicity and togetherness. Exploring the troubles and the promises of both a 
‘dividualising’ and a ‘vibrational’ model of psy, I posit the psychoanalytic 
unconscious in its moment of excess, rupture and too-muchness that characterises 
the affect of anxiety in Freud and Lacan as my object of study in search of a 
psychosocial creative clinic.  
 
  
From an abyss-within to a horizon-beyond 
 
 
When concluding the video-interview Une Politique de la Folie, from 1989, 
Tosquelles – the Catalan anarcho-syndicalist psychiatrist who founded 
Institutional Psychotherapy in France – leaves us with a ‘prophetisation’: that the 
proletariat should remain connected to the unconscious, rather than aim at 
gaining consciousness [rester branché sur l’inconscient et non sur la prise de 
conscience] en route to emancipation. Freud, Tosquelles (1991) argues, initially 
thought that the subject could become conscious of their unconscious and 
unknown problems, formulating a truth that would relieve suffering. Yet, Freud 
himself, Tosquelles suggests, changed his mind by the 1930s, disenchanted with 
the focus on gaining consciousness in favour of gaining unconsciousness. It is no 
secret that his was a Lacanian flavoured Freud, or a ‘French Freud’ (Turkle, 
1978).1 Is the psychoanalytic unconscious, however, an abyss-within the subject or 
a horizon-beyond oneself?   
 
1 Tosquelles was a colleague and mentor of Jean Oury at the hospital in Saint-Alban. Oury 





In Freud’s 1933 New Introductory Lectures, Lecture XXXI ‘The Dissection of the 
Psychical Personality’, we find a final version of the famous line and 
psychoanalytic motto he first presented in The Ego and the Id, in 1923: Wo Es war, 
soll Ich warden. “Where Id was, there ego shall be,” in the original English 
translation by James Strachey.  What Freud was proposing was that 
psychoanalysis’ “intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more 
independent of the super-ego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its 
organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id” (Freud, 1933a: 
80). Whilst this very passage can attest to the psychoanalytic contract with a 
certain kind of subjective adaptation – one that would  allow a liberation of oneself 
from an imposing super-ego in the production of a more autonomous, ‘strong’ ego, 
generating an individual of liberties, less repressions and perhaps very suitable 
for the demands of a global neoliberal capitalist society –  it can equally attest to 
the contrary of adaptation to internalised morality.  This very passage also reads 
as a definition of the psychoanalytic project and clinic as an expansion, a 
modification of the sense of self, making it less stiff and nailed onto the Law, 




and Oury are major influences in the praxis of ‘schizoanalysis’, which is a twist Guattari 
proposed along with Deleuze of psychoanalysis, institutional psychotherapy and radical 
politics. Tosquelles and Jean Oury used to distribute copies of Lacan’s doctoral thesis in 
psychiatry at the clinic in Saint Alban. They also quizzed new practitioners on their 
knowledge of the French psychoanalyst’s work (Dosse, 2010). 
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In the nuance of the ambiguity of this passage rests my bet with psychoanalysis. 
What does psychoanalysis do, or what can it do, that addresses the battles of 
psychic and psychosomatic suffering and, at the same time, decentres the modern 
humanist subject, opening possibilities for the creation of new ways of living, of 
new worlds? Can the psychoanalytic clinic of anxiety, thus, move from the level of 
an alienating subjective ‘estrangement’ to an ‘entanglement’, as I address in this 
thesis?  It is in this midst that I anchor my research question:  What can anxiety 
do?   
 
Anxiety, to Freud, Angst, was different to fear (Furcht) for it had no object. It is a 
suffering, a discontent, an affect without a clear reason or focus that mobilises 
both psyche and soma. Angst, in Strachey’s translation of Freud into English 
becomes ‘anxiety’ and not ‘anguish’, a move he justifies both in terms of the 
medical history of the term anxiety and of its Latin root evoking choking, making 
of anxiety a powerfully descriptive word for the sensation of this affect. He writes:  
“There is, however, a well-established psychiatric, or at least 
medical, use of the English ‘anxiety’, going back (so the Oxford 
Dictionary tells us) to the middle of the seventeenth century. Indeed, 
the psychiatric use of the two words brings to light their parallel 
origins. ‘Angst’ is akin to ‘eng’, the German word for ‘narrow’, 
‘restricted’; ‘anxiety’ is derived from the Latin ‘angere’, ‘to throttle’ 
or ‘squeeze’; in both cases the reference is to the choking feelings 
which characterize severe forms of the psychological state in 
question. A still more acute condition is described in English by the 
word ‘anguish’, which has the same derivation; and it is to be 
remarked that Freud in his French papers uses the kindred 
word ‘angoisse’ (as well as the synonymous ‘anxiété’) to render the 





The word ‘angoisse’ rather than anxiété (the word utilised by Lacan, in which 
Freud’s translations first appeared in French) could also be more accurately 
translated as ‘anguish’ in English. In other Latin-rooted languages, such as 
Spanish, Portuguese and Italian, the choice in translation of both Freud and Lacan 
match ‘anguish’ more closely in the words angústia and angoscia. Yet, the 
translation of Lacan’s seminars into English also works with ‘anxiety’ and this is 
my choice in this thesis, echoing Strachey’s remarks about the medical history of 
‘anxiety’ and the potency of a ‘grammar’ of psychic suffering for this research. As 
it navigates translations and a telling medicalised history that marks its 
psychoanalytic journey, anxiety is a central theme in psychoanalytic literature and 
one I am venturing into in search of the creative potencies of psychoanalysis.  
 
Lacan, in 1957, at the height of his structuralism, interprets Freud’s aphorism –
Wo Es war, soll Ich warden – with a slight twist, one he believed to be of a more 
truly-Freudian inclination than that of the then dominating Ego Psychologists, 
Melanie Klein, and, in a broad sense, British analysts – those he accused of 
‘Freudery’ [fofreudisme]. Instead of focusing on strengthening the ego, his version, 
as he writes in ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since 
Freud’ is: “Where it was, I must come into being” (Lacan, 1957 [2006]:435). Lacan 
sees the Freudian discovery as a lesson that tells us we cannot ignore the “radical 
eccentricity” of the self within itself.  Not too long after, in his Seminar VII, The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis, delivered between 1959-1960, Lacan discusses this 
aphorism once again, now to posit the ethics of psychoanalysis as beyond the 
morality of the super-ego, or of the morality of the Symbolic, and instead, involving 
an encounter with one’s desire.  In his words: “That ‘I’ which is supposed to come 
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to be where ‘it’ was, and which analysis has taught us to evaluate, is nothing more 
than that whose root we already found in the ‘I’ which asks itself what it wants” 
(Lacan, 1959-1960 [1997]:7). The kind of ethics psychoanalysis mobilised in its 
clinical course was, to Lacan, an ethics of the Real.  The Freudian contribution to 
the field of ethics, thus, is this encounter and a positioning of the subject vis-à-vis 
the Real; in Lacan’s words:  
“More than once at the time when I was discussing the symbolic and 
the imaginary and their reciprocal interaction, some of you wondered 
what after all was "the real." Well, as odd as it may seem to that 
superficial opinion which assumes any inquiry into ethics must 
concern the field of the ideal, if not of the unreal, I, on the contrary, will 
proceed instead from the other direction by going more deeply into the 
notion of the real. Insofar as Freud's position constitutes progress here, 
the question of ethics is to be articulated from the point of view of the 
location of man in relation to the real” (Lacan 1959-1960 [1997]:11). 
 
Anxiety, as Lacan teaches in his Seminar X Anxiety, delivered between 1962-1963, 
is precisely an affect that sits between desire and jouissance (Lacan, 1962-
1963[2014]:175); it is an encounter with the Real that mobilises or squeezes the 
subject between a Symbolically-wrapped delineation of oneself, which hangs by a 
thread once the Imaginary fantasy of consistency fails, and the vastness and abyss 
that extends beyond oneself, the Real.  Interestingly, it is anxiety precisely that is 
shunted out of diagnostic manuals and statistics when the biological and 
pharmaceutical paradigms of psychiatry gain strength over psychoanalysis after 
the late-1970s with the publication of the DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) in the United States. This encounter with the Real is 
then mediated by an ideological grammar, inaugurating a politics of affect that 
resonates on the possibilities of an ethical standing in relation to this abyss 
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beyond oneself. The experience of anxiety, so central to the psychoanalytic course, 
is pathologised and locked into a state of estrangement, without, however, 
opening up to possible new ways of living. This, as I observe in my research, 
reveals a type of alienation, an affective alienation Deleuze (1992) calls a 
‘dividualisation’. Perhaps Tosquelles would see it as a state where you gain neither 
consciousness nor unconsciousness; rather, one that is bound to a modulating 
external grammar, without roots, branches and leaves – let alone an ever-changing 
rhizome for an unconscious.  
 
When Lacan, in 1957, characterises the unconscious as the Other’s discourse 
(Lacan, 1957 [2006]:436), subjectivity is explicitly oriented in relation to an Other 
that is equated to the Law, to language and to a radical alterity. The Other is an 
‘other’ not limited to identification or a projection of the level of the ego, but a 
wider presence carved into the Symbolic realm towards which a dialectical 
relation leaves a gap for the subject to come into being. If the unconscious is the 
Other’s discourse, the Real is subsumed within its limits and ‘being’ leaves not 
much room for novel ‘becomings’. If the Real is a real of ‘being’ and not of 
‘becoming’, then it reveals a subtle and yet still alienating disconnection. This is 
what Guattari, as I work with in this thesis, found troublesome in Lacanian 
structuralist psychoanalysis and wished to take further in his clinical practice and 
conceptual work. This transposition echoes my critique of the process of 
subjectivation, relationality, sociability and overall bio-politics anchored in a 
modern humanist and patriarchal framework found in the roots of 
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psychoanalysis, in which a struggle for recognition by the Other modulates and 
locks all possibilities of being within its orbit. 
 
Guattari learns from Lacan that desire is not ‘individual’ and that subjectivity is 
not individual either (Sauvagnargues, 2016). Whilst Lacan’s ‘transidividual’ 
unconscious from the early Rome Discourse (Lacan, 1953) presents us with a 
notion of desire that goes beyond the relational Imaginary-to-Imaginary/ ego-to-
ego field of possibilities – or really opening to a world beyond identification so 
clearly in his critiques of Ego-Psychology, for example – we still find an 
unconscious trapped into the universalism of ‘lack’ that derives from his 
structuralist interpretation of Freud.  Rosi Braidotti, across her many publications 
and teachings (see Braidotti, 2011),  composes an argument for a ‘nomadic 
subject’ – one project that reflects the demands of post/decolonial and eco-
feminist ethics, not reliant on human exceptionalism and the universalist ‘Same’ 
of modern humanism, nor on lack and castration –  which is constructed from her 
alignment, as a feminist scholar, to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘becomings’, or devenir. 
The Guattarian engagement with psychoanalysis, alive in his clinical practice, 
moves beyond Lacan as it does not trust in the theoretical domination of the 
universal signifier, not reducing “the signifying assemblage as a symbolic order 
and [assuming] the place of the father as a master signifier, the Other that found 
the symbolic order” (Sauvagnargues, 2016:144). Guattari shows us that this 
reliance on the master signifier of the father is not neutral, but a mechanism of 
production of a certain modulation of desire: this mode of production, 
reproduction, extraction and separation dubbed by the Brazilian psychoanalyst 
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Suely Rolnik (2017) as ‘the pimping of Life’. Following such critique, or holding 
onto this ethical disposition, we find that the orbit of the Other and its embedded 
universalisms does not suffice as a ground in which to account for the Real, for 
ruptures, affects and excesses; once such orbit does not suffice for any more 
radical decolonial or eco-feminist emancipatory psycho-politics beyond the 
‘pimping of Life’ (Rolnik, 2015, 2017, 2019; Preciado, 2018).   
 
In this sense, ‘gaining unconsciousness’, or encountering the Real that appears in 
anxiety entails opening up to common ‘becomings’, reorienting the clinic towards 
the production of a co-poietic sinthôme.2  In doing so, I diverge from the (feminist 
and queer-informed) suggestion of the Argentinean psychoanalyst Patricia 
Gherovici (2018), who, in her critique of hegemonic treatment methods such as 
CBT (Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy) proposes further ‘castration’ as an analytic 
solution to anxiety. Instead of just renouncing the possibility of ‘having it’ within 
a phallic episteme of sexual difference, I set out to map possibilities that veer away 
from the Oedipal order altogether. In this axis – Oedipus, affective alienation and 
interpretation – I look for an alternative route to the status of ‘rupture’ in the 
psychoanalytic clinic. Moving, thus, from a clinic of the estranged ‘dividual’ to an 
entangled, situated subject. As such, by embracing ‘vibration’ I move away from 
Oedipal configurations in this proposition of a creative clinic of anxiety; and, 
 
2 Sinthôme is a neologism rewriting the symptom, which Lacan introduces in Seminar 
XXIII. It consists of a creative solution in the montage of the excesses of jouissance 
beyond the logic of Oedipal castration. As such, it does not call for the clinical technique 
of interpretation, as it rests outside the structural diagnosis, calling for a singular clinical 
engagement via constructions and punctuations, or the ‘cut’ in the session. 
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although this research is not mainly focused on questions of feminism in and out 
of psychoanalysis, I hope this clinical and conceptual discussion is fruitful to the 
overall thinking about gender in psychoanalytic praxis. 
 
Between ‘dividuals’ and the ‘full-void’ 
 
In order to approach the question ‘What can anxiety do?’, I explore the possibilities 
and impossibilities of this encounter with the Real, this excessive affect, in 
psychoanalytic praxis. And I do so by naming this encounter a vibration. Anxiety, 
according to this hypothesis, vibrates through me that which extends beyond me 
or my grasp. In this thesis, I arrive at vibration via the work of the Brazilian artist 
Lygia Clark and her critique of the ‘limits of the Plane’ and the possibilities of a 
frontier ‘full-void’, as her understanding of the common bodily unconscious in her 
‘Structuring of the Self’ (1976-88) series.  
Vibration is the conceptual artifice I utilise in order to be able to think of affects 
beyond the individual, beyond the Oedipal frame, beyond Symbolic-Imaginary 
realms, beyond ego-to-ego relations and a short-circuit of bodily jouissance. As 
such, Clark’s ‘full-void’ reorients the Real. Vibration, as we learn with Suely Rolnik 
(2000), is the ethical capacity of affect recombination, creativity and a model of 
political ontology that is in tune with contemporary epistemological, ecological 
and political demands – namely, an interdependent, entangled horizon of 
subjectivity and bio-politics.  Vibration is a term I mobilise not only from the 
artistic practice of Lygia Clark, but also in its roots in Deleuze and Guattari’s rich 
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commentaries on psychoanalysis, which I am bringing to a discussion on the 
contemporary status of anxiety.   
Anxiety as vibration is an understanding of anxiety as not just a matter of a 
‘transindividual’ subjectivity (which necessarily depends on recognition vis-à-vis 
the Other), rather, it allows me to conceptualise an entangled, affected subject. By 
doing so, I offer a psycho-political frame for the clinic that moves beyond the 
affective alienation of ‘being’, seeking in the rupture of anxiety not only a ground 
for a dialectic recognition, rather, working with the rupture of anxiety as compost 
for a ‘common’ ground.  As a theoretical contribution, it is a move that enables me 
to work within psychoanalytic praxis whilst going beyond the level of ‘critique’ 
and embarking on the possibilities of ‘creativity’. As Braidotti puts it, in an 
interview: “Critique ties you to the present (diagnosis, resistance, cartographies) 
but creativity is the future. Creativity projects you into where we’re going next. 
Critique and creativity imply different temporal frameworks” (Braidotti, 2013). 
My psychosocial thinking is situated thus within this double vision of both critique 
and creativity, a tension I hold on to throughout this thesis.  In this sense, 
Tosquelles’ militant political ‘prophecy’ entails a creative gaining of 
unconsciousness and this is the anchor of my research thesis.  
 
Creativity is also a matter of research methodology and, in this thesis, I am 
committed to a transdisciplinary technique that opens the inquiry to the 
possibilities of ‘vibration’ – of asking questions without being circumscribed to a 
neat theoretical viewpoint, gauging the possibilities of something new. Mixing 
slow detailed close-readings and dynamic critical interdisciplinary analyses, I 
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draw on medical humanities, art criticism, feminist theory as well as 
psychoanalysis and philosophy. This approach, which reflects what Guattari 
(2000) calls an ‘ecosophy’, is my own take on ‘psychosocial studies’, where 
subjectivity is harnessed to material and immaterial conditions of production. In 
addition, several of my interlocutors speak from the Latin American Southern 
Cone, Brazil, more specifically. Brazilian analysts, thinkers and artists offer words 
and associations to my research, reflecting not only my own history but a version 
of psychoanalytic praxis that has been strongly informed by Anti-Psychiatry, 
Institutional Psychotherapy and the legacy of Franco Basaglia and Guattari 
(Amarante and Nunes, 2018). Such a clinical approach is fundamental to my own 
clinical practice, which has developed in consonance to the  years of this research, 
mostly within specialised community practices working with psychosis, at the 
Psychosis Therapy Project, in London; or children with early suspicion of autism, 
at the Maison Verte; and, more recently, offering psychosocial support to  
LGBTQI+ asylum seeking people in the Third Sector, in addition to private 
practice.  
 
By theorising anxiety as an entangled vibration, this affect assumes a possibility 
of opening a way into a ‘gaining of unconsciousness’ (Tosquelles, 1992), acting, in 
this research, as the threshold between subjective, theoretical and clinical critique 
and creativity. In sum, I mobilise anxiety as the looking-glass, in order to think 
through a psychoanalytic praxis beyond the ‘pimping of Life’ (Rolnik, 2017).  
Anxiety is the affect I work with in the search for a critique of the dividualising 
residues in psychoanalysis of the Freudian and Lacanian orientations, moving 
towards a possible creative clinic, inspired by Guattari and Lygia Clark, where 
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rupture is co-assembled, rather than in-dividualised  within the psycho-politics of 
alienation grounded in the orbit of the Oedipal Other. Creativity opens the affect 
of anxiety, in its clinical and conceptual manifestations, into the germination of 
new modes of living, into sinthômes.  My research objectives meet my finding in 
the formulation of anxiety as a vibration from estrangement to entanglement. The 
conclusion lays on a practice that works not with interpretation but with co-poiesis 
– a poetic, collective, generative construction that departs from affect, resisting 




In search of a creative clinic 
 
Chapter 1 articulates the trajectory of diagnosing anxiety through the operations 
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) since the mid- twentieth century, and 
its relation to the rise in the diagnosis of depression as well as the rise of 
psychopharmaceutic drugs during this same period.  This journey of identifying 
and treating anxiety reveals a relation that I am calling an ‘estrangement’, once the 
diagnostic culture around what is named ‘anxiety’ is framed by a logic of 
categorisation and control of the body.  Thus, by delineating the space occupied 
by anxiety in contemporary discourses in, but also outside, the clinic, this chapter 
demonstrates the relation between the contemporary status of anxiety, as 
informed by its recent history within the field of psy, and contemporary forms of 
governmentality. My thesis is that anxiety is constitutive of subjectivity and as 
such, an ‘estrangement’, as will be clarified in this chapter, can be understood as a 
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relation that echoes Deleuze’s concept of ‘modulation’, bringing anxiety close to 
us, yet, devoid of its potentialities as a singular affect. In Chapter 1 I trace a 
contemporary political history of anxiety diagnosis, it is a chapter that follows a 
critical medical humanities approach, unpacking the movements of the inclusion 
of anxiety in diagnostic manuals in psychiatry and contemporary effects of a 
culture of ‘feeling good’ in which biomedical jargon meets consumerism. In this 
chapter I observe the process of ‘estrangement’ from the affect of anxiety which is 
revealed in a politics of affect that is alienating, dividualising. 
 
 
Chapter 2 brings the debate over to the radical potentiality of psychoanalysis by 
starting to trace Freud’s conception of his understanding of anxiety across key 
texts, ranging from late 19th century letters to a ‘lecture’ in the 1930s.  The aim of 
this chapter is to trace exactly the grounds offered by Freud through a close 
reading of his main texts on the topic of anxiety, in particular ‘Inhibitions, 
Symptoms and Anxiety’, from 1926, that influenced Lacan’s own work on the 
subject almost four decades later.  It is in this essay that the notion of anxiety as a 
signal is described in detail. What is also of interest in Freud’s developments of 
anxiety as a signal to something dangerous is that he first starts with the realistic 
dangers, so dangers to the body, to life and then moves on to dangers that are more 
subjective, related to the ego, to the preservation of some integrity.   This chapter 
reads the Freudian foundations on anxiety with attention to the subsequent 
understanding of the body in relation to tension, the drives and, more importantly, 




After a close reading of Freud’s trajectory on his theory of anxiety, I will offer a 
contrasting analysis of Lacan’s interventions on this topic in Chapter 3.  Most 
noticeably in his Seminar X, which focused on anxiety and departed from Freud’s 
1926 piece, Lacan’s understanding of this affect mobilises the Real and the objet a, 
two central concepts in the understanding of an excessive bodily vibration that 
this thesis is elaborating, The Lacanian anxiety brings to light an ‘excess’, but 
differently to Freud, who was accounting for an economic dynamic of 
accumulation of tension under his logic of discharge as being the central 
mechanism of the psychic apparatus.  Lacan’s ‘excess’ is also marked in this kind 
of reminder of singularity evidenced in anxiety, and this has been eternalised in 
the often-cited passage from Seminar X that “the true substance of anxiety, is that 
which deceives not” (Lacan, 2014:76). This chapter will focus on Seminar X and 
the emergence of the objet a in relation to a structural lack, or gap, in the Lacanian 
subject. An emphasis on anxiety in relation to the Real, the body and on possible 
readings of this ‘lack’ as a positive – and vibrational – gap will be offered in this 
chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 marks a break in my theoretical encounter with the Real of the body in 
the affect of anxiety in Lacan’s work. In order to push the still ‘dividualising’ 
borders of Lacan’s work on anxiety, I mobilise the resource of the art practice of 
the Brazilian artist Lygia Clark. In order to be able to question negativity and the 
drive in psychoanalysis, I work with Suely Rolnik’s (2000) concept of the 
vibrational body, which she developed in light of Clark’s work. ‘Vibration’ appears 
as a term linked with affect, one that helps me to not fall for ‘emotions’ or for 
unlimited positivity in the plane of immanence, but holding on to the subject, to 
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the body, to affects that are entangled yet not explained by structuring universalist 
interpretations.  In sum, it is a chapter that sets the ground for me to be able to 
query psychoanalysis further.  
 
This chapter explores the elastic boundary between performance art and 
psychotherapeutic practices in the work of Lygia Clark in her series ‘Structuring 
the Self’ (1976-88). Lacan’s late teaching concept of the ‘speaking body’ and 
Guattari’s ‘chaos’ are debated in relation to the poetic potential of a vibrating body, 
opening questions about contemporary forms of resistance that concern the 
politics of the psychosocial field. Chaos, here, is proposed as the strategy to 
operate both clinically and creatively in a space of liminality, rather than 
succumbing to the limits of language and transcendentalism, or being restricted 
to biological and materialist accounts of the body.  The vibrations of chaos brought 
about through encounters of bodies in and of the world, as proposed by Lygia 
Clark, may be understood as the eco-feminist field of necessity and possibility for 
contemporary clinical practices informed by psychoanalysis.  
 
In Chapter 5, I take the vibrational body described by Rolnik into a trip towards 
its foundations. I follow the notion of vibration back to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
writings, letting it slowly paint the picture of their model of the subject – one that 
was directly ‘for and against’ Freud and Lacan. Vibration appears as echoing the 
ethical capacity of ‘affect’. In this sense, this chapter provides me with an updated 
and contextualised reading of pillars of affect theory that may have reduced affect 
to emotion. Digging deeper into Deleuze and Guattari’s empiricist roots of their 
philosophical ethics, we find the body as resonating the vibrations of the world. 
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As a consequence, and under this light, the affect of anxiety appears as marking an 
experience that is more than a conscious or emotional/imaginary wrapping of 
what is beyond representation. Anxiety thus appears as a point of 
interconnectivity and offering a serious ground for a psychoanalytic clinic of 
affects.  
 
In Chapter 6 I delineate the question of vibration in relation to ‘being’ and 
‘becomings’, situating my research question and hypothesis in relation to the 
theoretical body of work I explored in the previous chapters.  This chapter defends 
the idea that the psychoanalytic view of anxiety goes against the logic of 
contemporary hegemonic discourses in psychology and psychiatry, in which 
anxiety is treated as a generator of ‘disorders’ in its own right or as an isolated 
symptom to be ‘cured’ or ‘managed away’. For Lacan, as much as for Freud, anxiety 
is not ‘the problem’, let alone ‘a problem to be eliminated’ in the search of some 
‘cure’.  What the trail of anxiety reveals to us in the psychosocial analysis of its 
journey in and out of the clinic from mid to late twentieth century until the current 
moment is an affective-politics, or an affective domination, that steers the subject 
away from any possibility of living with their anxiety, their affects or conceiving 
life beyond the curtain or the veil of fantasy. Working with anxiety as an affect of 
‘excess’, however, is not a conventional or unproblematic position 
psychoanalytically, especially when it touches the very onto-epistemic 
foundations of Freudian and Lacanian thought.  The creative clinic, therefore, 








‘You’re on Earth. There’s no cure for that.’  




During the first months of the recent/current Covid-19 pandemic, prescriptions 
for antidepressant, anti-anxiety and anti-insomnia drugs were reported to have 
risen by 21% in the United States. 3 In the United Kingdom, early reports also 
suggested demand increased between 10 and 15% for antidepressant drugs in 
pharmacies in the first months of the crisis (Sharma, 2020).  The Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) reported that half of the British population experienced ‘high 
anxiety’ during the weeks of Spring 2020 lockdown (ONS, 2020).  Anxiety, 
interestingly, is the sole category for measuring negativity in wellbeing in the UK 
since the ONS implemented such tracking in 2010, cancelling out ‘happiness’, 
‘worthwhileness’ and ‘life satisfaction’ (ONS, 2021). Whilst uncertainty, 
vulnerability and stress, coupled with precarity, lace the impoverishment of 
overall wellbeing in critical times, what would be the line dividing a pathological 
disorder and a healthy, if anything, reaction to torment in light of troubling 
 
3 According to the Report ‘America’s State of Mind’, published in April 2020 by the 
private healthcare provider Express Scripts, anti-anxiety benzodiazepines prescription 
rose 34% during the first month of Covid-19 crisis, whilst antidepressant SSRI/SNRI 
pills saw an increase in 18% of prescriptions filed by health care provides across the 
USA. Retrieved from: <https://www.express-scripts.com/corporate/americas-state-of-




circumstances?  In order to gauge the status and politics of the contemporary 
pathologising (and individualising and de-politicising) of anxious distress and the 
possibilities of our relation with it, we must begin by asking other elementary 
questions. If anxiety is negative, then how much anxiety is too much? And how 
could we measure it? The classification of psychological suffering stumbles upon 
the challenge of quantifying the ‘un-quantifiable’ through the systematic 
categorising and description of affective and mental states and their 
transformation into illnesses and disorders. 
 
In this chapter, I will explore the affect of anxiety through a critical recent history 
of its diagnosis and treatment in the context of psychological care. By unpacking 
the strategies employed by mainstream psychiatry in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) since the mid- twentieth century, it is possible to 
unveil the dynamics of a reduction of the subject to a productive-biomedicalised 
body in the last five decades.  Such a process, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
echoes a mode of governance that finds its realisation not only in the clinic but 
also in contemporary modes of consumption and discourses and policies of 
wellbeing. What becomes apparent is a process of quantification, qualification and 
management of affects; or, as I propose here, an affective-politics that assembles 
body and psyche in a particular mode of alienation – an ‘estrangement’. Such a 
diagnostic culture, inaugurated in the late-1970s, is framed by a logic of 
categorisation and control of the body, which becomes a particularly complex 
locus of ‘dividualisation’ (Deleuze, 1992), a concept Deleuze utilised to address the 
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mode of subjective production of the contemporary society of control, entailing a 
loss of the possibility of experience of subjective truth in symptoms that anchor 
the psychoanalytic conception of anxiety.   Deleuze’s mapping allows us to grapple 
with the current efforts of management of anxiety and management of the body 
that culminates in what pharmaceutical lobbying calls ‘a silent epidemic’ (Cooke, 
2013), with circa 20% of the USA population, for example, experiencing 
‘pathological’ or ‘not-normal’ levels of anxiety. 4 Such mechanisms and fantasies of 
taming and controlling the body through consumption, public policy or 
medication, relate to Michel Foucault’s archaeology of ‘biopower’, once the study 
of power and the body in his work entails the investigation of the “modes of 
objectification which transform human beings into subjects” (Foucault, 
1982:777).  Foucault (1982) summarises the three ‘types’ of objectifications in 
this process of subjectivation explored throughout his life’s work.  They are: “the 
modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of sciences” (Foucault, 
1982:777); ‘dividing practices’ in which the “subject is either divided inside 
himself or divided from others” (Foucault, 1982:778); and “the way a human being 
turns himself into a subject (Foucault, 1982:778).  Language, scientific knowledge, 
discourse, governmentality and subjectivation are features of my analysis of the 
status of anxiety, revealing a dividualising biopolitical modulation of affect – or, a 
 
4 The ‘Press Room’ of the ‘Anxiety and Depression Association of America’ have 
announced that almost one fifth of the USA population is afflicted by ‘Anxiety disorders’ 
(ADAA, 2021), this data matches the National Institute of Health  statistics and 
measures, arguing that anxiety is  a ‘great market potential’ to those that can profit, 




systematic estrangement that anchors care, further alienating suffering from its 
singular and contextual roots. 
 
In summary, what this chapter asks is: What has been done to anxiety? In 
answering it, I demonstrate that the manner of ‘recognition of’ and ‘relation to’ 
one’s anxiety within the contemporary therapeutic and extra-therapeutic 
discourses promotes an ‘estranged’ relation to anxiety.  This will lay the ground 
for the next chapters, offering the context over which psychoanalysis, specifically 
in the Freud-Lacan tradition, will be discussed in terms of its possibility of offering 
something ‘else’, meaning, another way of relating to one’s anxiety, diverging from 
the ‘isolation’ and ‘control’ or even ‘erasure’ dynamics of treatment identified in 
this chapter, towards possible ‘entanglements’ – where subjectivity is 
psychosocial. My enquiry works with the hypothesis that despite psychoanalysis 
being one of the discourses that has, arguably, facilitated the emergence of a 
‘capitalist subject’ (Foucault, 2008a, 2008b), it can also possibly offer something 
outside this regime of power and maybe, even, something ‘against’ such power 
dynamics, one in which modes of suffering and symptoms are deeply intertwined 
with one’s subjective positioning, history and context. This possibility will be 
traced in the following chapters in more detail.  In short, by tracing the 
development of the process of estrangement of anxiety from the mid and late 
twentieth century to the current early decades of the twenty-first century, we are 
opening the way to answering not only ‘what to do with anxiety’ but ‘what can 
anxiety do’ – the latter being the central preoccupation of my research, which 
takes a psychosocial route into possible answers.  
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Unwanted anxiety: the historical framework of pathologising anxiety.   
 
The British Office for National Statistics (ONS) has been putting into practice a 
governmental policy-planning programme entitled “Measuring National Well-
being” (MNW) since November 2010.  By asking a set of four questions, their aim 
is to “develop and publish an accepted and trusted set of National Statistics which 
help people understand and monitor well-being” (ONS, 2018)  and by ‘wellbeing’ 
they understand: “‘how we are doing’ as individuals, as communities and as a 
nation, and how sustainable this is for the future” (ONS, 2018). The project follows 
the contemporary tendency that Christian Dunker, a Brazilian psychoanalyst, 
describes as a move guiding public policy through a ‘diagnosis’-based modus 
operandi (Dunker, 2015). “To diagnose,” he writes, “has become one of the 
activities most specifically valued in our current form of life, mediated by the so-
called symbolic analysts” (Dunker, 2015:20)5.  If we look into the four questions 
being asked by the ‘Quality of Life Team’ to thousands of citizens in the UK in the 
past decade, the connection between that and a ‘diagnostic culture’ becomes 
clearer. They are: 
““Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays?” 
“Overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life 
are worthwhile?” 
“Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?” 
“Overall, how anxious did you feel yesterday?”” (ONS, 2018).  
 
Whilst ‘positivity’ is measured in terms of happiness, satisfaction and purpose, the 
sole question qualifying ‘negativity’ of the wellbeing experience is measured by 
 
5 My translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original publication.  
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the appearance of anxiety.  Feeling anxious, it seems, connotes a status of ‘ill-
being’.  
 
Such a qualification of anxiety as negative and undesirable reveals crossings 
between the universes of inside and outside the clinic that have merged 
discourses, governmentality, treatment and consumption into the same 
‘diagnostic’-logic in which wellbeing, or feeling well, feeling good, means not 
feeling anxious.  Dunker calls this logical/ideological expansion a “diagnóstica” [in 
Portuguese], a term he summarises as the ‘diagnosis-like’ frame offering the 
“condition of possibilities of diagnostic systems” (Dunker, 2015:20) to a context 
that is outside the initial scope of such diagnostic logic.  A “diagnóstica”, for 
Dunker, is characterised by a system of framing, recognising and cataloguing other 
aspects of life that exceed clinical diagnosis and treatment but still remaining in a 
format informed by the same dynamics that frame the clinic, or the contemporary 
medico-scientific and therapeutic field of psy (Rose, 1996). In this sense, anxiety 
is inserted within the public cultural discourse following a process of 
pathologising and symptomatic isolation that is present in the psychiatric 
diagnostic context. As such, this logic seeps into the public sphere as a measure 
and indicator of an ‘unwanted’ status of being, as seen in the ONS wellbeing 
questionnaire. Anxiety is being produced by the “diagnóstica” that frames it at the 
same time.  Under such lenses, the grammar of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) allows us to grapple the mechanisms of 




In the early to mid-twentieth century, owing to the psychoanalytic influence in 
psychiatry, the widespread nonspecific naming of the modern sense of discontent, 
or Unbehagen, was ‘neurotic anxiety’. In this period “anxiety and its sibling 
condition, ‘neuroses’, became the central themes of what came to be called the 
stress tradition” (Horwitz, 2010:113), thus revealing a certain trend of 
‘pathologising’ anxiety, despite anxiety being considered a common affliction of 
the Post-World War II world.6 However ubiquitous or familiar to the post-war 
subject, anxiety was also the main category for discriminating in the clinic what 
was ‘normal’ and what was ‘pathological’ in that same period. Depression, at that 
point, as Horwitz (2010, 2013) defends, was ‘in practice’ – and by that he means, 
in the practice of psychiatrists in the United States – more commonly associated 
with the psychotic sphere and was a characteristic diagnosis reserved for severe 
melancholic cases of hospitalised patients.  This trend will come to a halt towards 
the later decades of the twentieth century precisely, as we will see in what follows, 
due to a disappearance of the influence of psychoanalytic theory in the field of 
mainstream psychiatry.  Before the 1980s, psychiatric diagnoses “reflected the 
centrality of the ‘psychoneuroses’, which were grounded in anxiety” (Horwitz, 
2010:115) and the first two editions of the DSM, from 1952 and 1968 respectively, 
 
6 Despite anxiety already being a popular term before the First World War, according to 
Horwitz (2013) it becomes a synonym for distress only in the mid-twentieth century, he 
writes: “The ubiquity of anxiety in the post–World War II era was attributed to the 
horrors of the war, the development of nuclear weapons, and the potentially 
catastrophic tensions of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Not just worry about global problems but also the results of everyday stressors—
whether problems with spouses and children, parents and bosses, or overwork and 




are considered to be the most flavoured by psychodynamics – the type of 
psychotherapeutic knowledge that takes into account the dynamic unconscious of 
psychoanalysis.  From the third edition onwards, however, there is an increased 
trend in further categorising mental illness in search of a ‘reliable’ efficiency in 
diagnosis that culminates in the fifth and most recent edition of the manual, the 
DSM-V, from 2013, with its bulk of over nine hundred pages of ‘disorders’ and 
their respective diagnostic checklists (Vanheule, 2014; Ehrenberg, 2009; 
Herzberg, 2009). This change in approach will reshape the status of anxiety and, 
consequently, promote a biological narrative of depression in the turn of the 
twenty-first century.  It also presents us with a paradigm shift in regards to the 
quantification of the body, psyche and affect, maintening the status of ‘ruptures’ 
and suffering as ever more individualised and alienated from the one suffering and 
their context. 
 
The process of mapping and categorising mental states and affects and 
transforming them into recognisable symptoms is at the heart of the birth of the 
DSM, making it into a quantifying dispositif par excellence, informing what Felicity 
Callard (2014) calls a ‘mediated’ relation to diagnosis. The DSM emerges as a 
‘promise,’ at least, of a more ‘pragmatic’ and ‘detailed’ approach to substitute the 
then existing diagnostic forms, which were mostly based on prototypical 
descriptions and hypothetical case-studies rather than ‘checklists’. The 
prototypical approach was already seen in earlier key texts of psychiatry such as 
Philippe Pinel’s A Treatise on Insanity, from 1806, wherein distinctions of 
‘treatable’ and ‘untreatable’ patients and principles of moral and medical 
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treatments of what he called insanity were laid out systematically. This was 
despite the fact that Pinel had “a single view of madness, characterised by many 
symptoms” (Ehrenberg, 2009:36), rather than ‘different types of madness’, as we 
can see in a psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approach that divided, at a basic 
level, psychoses and neuroses as different structures.   In the early twentieth 
century, Pinel’s approach was still dominant in psychiatry, making use of clinical 
vignettes of patients’ cases that guided doctors by some type of comparison.  
Psychoanalysis relied on clinical analysis and conjectural ‘judgement’, rather than 
on a clear-cut dividing line between what caused or classified a symptom as 
pathological or even as a symptom in the first place (Vanheule, 2014).  A similar 
reliance on the doctor in question was present in the traditions that favoured a 
prototypical approach. It was in part as a promise to facilitate these individual 
judgements on the side of the doctor that the first major manual of mental illness 
was published in the United States by the APA in 1918.  The ‘Statistical Manual for 
the Use of Institutions for the Insane’ was published ten different times (Horwitz 
and Wakefield, 2012; Dunker, 2015) before being substituted by the first edition 
of the DSM, in 1952.   
 
At the time, however, different authors would already have diverging opinions on 
mental illness, and founding heavy-names of the discipline such as Emil Kraepelin 
and Eugen Bleuler, for example, presented contrasting views over the focus either 
on biological components or, rather, more ‘holistic’ aetiological approaches.  
Psychiatry was a mixed field and “in the 1950s and 1960s, while psychoanalysis 
occupied the commanding heights of American psychiatry” (Scull, 2019:133), the 
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first edition of the DSM was published.  This first edition “reflected the movement 
of psychiatric practice from state mental hospitals to outpatient treatment and 
thus paid more attention to the psychoneuroses” (Horwitz and Wakefield, 
2012:93) instead of psychosis, the latter being more frequently ‘reserved’ to 
hospital wards. The paradigm of the asylum and of a medicalised culture that 
excluded the insane from society, as explored in depth in Foucault’s (2008b) work 
on psychiatric power and biopolitics, starts cracking from this point onwards. 
Anxiety, therefore, was a common handle in clinical practice in the mid-twentieth 
century due to the influence of psychoanalysis and what we may call ‘everyday’ 
madness and suffering (Crocq, 2015, 2017). Anxiety was seen not a disorder in 
itself, but as a signal of something else that had to be treated on a contextual and 
individual basis. 
 
The influence of North American psychiatry is politically relevant because such 
paradigmatic frameworks have reflected systems of classification and of 
quantification across the globe.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the then dominant group 
at the American Psychiatric Association (APA), under the auspices of Adolf Meyer, 
conferred their psychodynamic preference on the manual, and such 
psychoanalytic ‘flavour’ was not lost even with the changes imposed by the 
following second version of the DSM, published in the late 1960s (Scull, 2019).  
The second edition was published after the release of the 6th edition of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD), published by the World Health 
Organisation that had been formed in 1948; this sixth edition inaugurated the ICD 
model existent to date. Envisaging a pairing of the DSM with the ICD-6, as this was 
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the first of its kind to list mental health disorders, the APA launched the DSM II. 
The 1968 edition “did not make any major changes in the account of the anxiety 
disorders or in the pivotal role of anxiety in psychopathology. It maintained 
anxiety as the key aspect of the psychoneuroses” (Horwitz and Wakefield, 
2012:95). Anxiety was still a central component of the frame that conferred a 
diagnostic platform to the then dominant diagnoses at the period, but that was 
about to change in the next decade.  
 
A contrasting view to the usually widely accepted understanding of the influence 
of the DSM-III in the boom of psychopharmaceutic treatment is offered by Metzl 
(2003). In his book Prozac on the Couch, he argues that it was the Freudian 
psychoanalytic culture of ‘blaming’ anxious suffering on poor or disturbed 
mothering that contributed a vocabulary to the popularisation of tranquilizing 
pills through women’s magazines in the United States in the 1950s.  Arguing that 
“anxiety was the pressure of keeping intact the structure in which the doctor 
prescribes and the patient ingests” (Metzl, 2003:124), Metzl localises in 
psychoanalysis the roots of later biological psychiatry in which the doctor 
prescribes the pill that cures. Whilst Metzl offers a compelling critique of the 
gendered language of both the media and of psychoanalytic texts, rightly 
identifying the misogyny and biologism of Freudian and post-Freudian writing, 
little context of the psycho-politics of diagnosis is provided. Therefore, whilst 
carving a rather convincing argument about who gets excluded and on what 
grounds from ideals of normality, sanity or wellbeing, Metzl too-quickly diagnoses 
psychoanalysis without looking, for example, to other countries where the 
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psychoanalytic discourse might have been equally or more widespread in the 
early twentieth century. The author also fails to critically address the 
contributions of Freudian ideas about psychotherapeutic ‘talking cures’, where 
psychic life is implicated in discourse rather than reduced to a purely medicalised 
solution.  Consequently, neither his understanding of ‘Freudian biology’, nor of the 
specificities of anxiety versus depression as paradigms of suffering are 
particularly clear.  For as much as the hegemonic power of psychoanalytic 
discourses within psychiatry in the USA until the 1950s is noticeable, it can hardly 
account for the rise of depression in the following decades, as we will see next. 
 
 
The DSM-III and the disappearance of the diagnosis of anxiety 
 
 
The third edition of the DSM, published in 1980, inaugurated a decisive distancing 
from the psychoanalytic approach and, with that, managed to re-signify the status 
of anxiety. This proved to be critical in inaugurating a novel kind of quantification 
of affect, favouring biological explanations of psychic distress and giving birth to 
depression as the illness of the century (Verhaeghe, 2008). To comprehend the 
motor of this change from the ubiquity of anxiety towards mass-depression 
diagnoses there are some elements to consider of the politics of psychiatry at the 
time and also the influence of products being marketed by the pharmaceutical 
industry (Scull, 2019). Such factors had an important role in producing the 
‘grammar’ of anxiety in the last half of the twentieth century. What we see as a 
drastic change implemented in the DSM-III is a moving away from the prototype-
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based model and an introduction of the checklist-logic of diagnosis.  A group of 
biological psychiatrists based at Washington University in St. Louis led by Robert 
Spitzer and known as neo-Kraepelinian – for their biological inclination – was 
tasked with the formulation of the third edition of the manual; their core interest 
was to define psychiatry as a medical discipline (Shorter, 2005). This alignment 
with the medical discourse was achieved by the introduction of a new system 
based on a list of criteria, “Spitzer’s task force was a political animal, and its aim 
was to simplify the diagnostic process by reducing it to a tick-the-boxes approach” 
(Scull, 2019:172). This system inaugurated in the third edition of the manual is 
still guiding its current version, the fifth, since such a checklist approach that 
classifies, qualifies and quantifies is seen as more ‘scientific’ than narrative models 
of treatment that preceded it.   
 
 
In this new model, anxiety no longer features as an aspect of psychic experience 
and neurotic distress, rather, each ‘type’ of suffering is allocated into an individual 
category. Anxiety now is divided into subcategories of phobias, separation anxiety, 
panic disorder and so on (Shorter, 2005; Harrington, 2019), leaving the category 
of General Anxiety Disorder, or GAD, as the only nonspecific category of diagnosis. 
GAD could only be ‘ticked’ however, when no other type of anxiety was present. 
This move alone demarcates a significant effort in qualifying the affect of anxiety. 
Conversely, the broad category of Major Depressive Disorder, or MDD, appears as 
the go-to general diagnosis of distress (Mojtabai and Olfson, 2008).  The results of 
this ‘grammatical’ shift are critical. Whilst the numbers of diagnoses of depression 
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in the USA during the 1960s accounted for roughly one third of the diagnoses 
related to anxiety, in the 1980s depression overtook anxiety. This trend only 
intensified in the following years and according to the USA National Centre for 
Health Statistics, by the early-2000s the proportion of anxiety versus depression 
diagnoses shifted completely: from about fifty million overall yearly diagnoses of 
mental health a year, over twenty million were of depression whilst only six 
million were diagnosed as anxiety (Herzberg, 2009).    
 
 
Depression travels, then, as we are able to trace historically, from belonging 
mostly to the melancholic and hospitalised world all the way into ordinary 
experience. It moves from being a peripheral category into being a dominant 
diagnosis of the ‘stress tradition’ (Crocq, 2015, 2017).  Alongside the moving away 
from the anxiety-paradigm of the psychoneuroses that marked so heavily the 
psychodynamic approach of the earlier versions of the DSM, by the late 1970s 
‘depression’ as an overarching category itself also appears to “fit the 
professionally desirable conception of a severe and specific disease that could be 
associated with biological causes” (Horwitz, 2010:123).  Therefore, it served well 
the then dominant group within the hegemonic forces of the psy-field, whilst it 
also brought the roots of ‘discontent’ close to the body, to the organism. The new 
‘malaise’ favoured biologism, in contrast with a hard to measure psychoanalytic 
neurotic anxiety, and it also served, by consequence, the thriving pharmaceutical 




The Social life of Depression:  considering facilitating factors of the rise in 
the diagnosis of Depression.  
 
 
Beyond the United States and beyond the close-circuit of psychiatry comparable 
currents were being established.  The sociologist Alain Ehrenberg, writes of a 
similar flow across the Atlantic, in France, demonstrating analogous shifts 
between anxiety and depression from the mid to the end of the twentieth century. 
He points out that “according to the credes (Centre d’études et de documentation 
sur la santé), between the beginning of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, 
the rate of depression increased 50 percent in France” (Ehrenberg, 2009:181).  
What Ehrenberg offers as an interesting contextual analysis of the soaring 
numbers of depression diagnoses and, consequently, the changes in the meaning 
of anxiety as a symptom or a disorder, is the accompanying ideological shift 
marked by the definition of the subject of depression and its supposed ideal 
counterpart, the ‘autonomous’ and ‘emancipated’ subject. The rise of the 
autonomous individual from the late 1970s that was being slowly announced 
through the cultural shifts that followed the Second World War is, according to 
Ehrenberg, an important factor in the emergence of depression as a 
representation of a depleted individual that finds itself powerless, facing a 
demand of ‘autonomy’ and ‘emancipation’ that was accompanied by a contrasting 
sense of ‘freedom – however illusory and constricted this ‘freedom’ to be oneself 
was and still is. In this context, anxiety appears only as a consequence of this 
overall sense of ‘unfitness’.  It appears as an anxiety signalling the possibility of 
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failure to truly correspond to such demands (Ehrenberg, 2009), yet, peripheral if 
compared to depression.  
 
 
The changes in (some parts of Western) society that followed the 1960s – e.g. 
countercultural movements, civil rights movements, recognition movements, etc.– 
in various forms in different territories and contexts is, for Ehrenberg, a driving 
power behind a new, as he puts it, “strange obsession with being entirely oneself” 
(Ehrenberg, 2009: 135). Depression, as a polar opposite of such aspirational 
emancipation, appeared as a convenient representation “to describe the problems 
raised by this new normality” (Ehrenberg, 2009: 135), the ‘normality’ being 
therefore ‘emancipation’.  For, as he points out, “individual sovereignty was not 
only a relaxation of external constraints; everyone could also take the concrete 
measure of the inner burden it brought into being” (Ehrenberg, 2009: 135). If 
Freudian psychoanalysis marked the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century neurotic subject, characterised by repression and guilt in its Victorian and 
bourgeois Viennese universe, the late twentieth century saw a different problem 
emerging, and that was, for Ehrenberg, the omnipotence that shadowed 
emancipation.    
“After the Second World War, depression separates itself from 
melancholia. Depression travels between two versions of the 
difficult task of being well: (1) anxiety, which indicated that I am 
crossing into forbidden territory and am becoming divided, a 
pathology of guilt, an illness of conflict; and (2) exhaustion, which 
tired me out, empties me, and makes me incapable of action – a 




These two versions of wellness accompany the emergence of a new 
era of the self, who is no longer either the complete individual of the 
eighteenth century; or the split individual of the end of the 
nineteenth century; rather, she is the emancipated individual. 
Becoming ourselves made us nervous, being ourselves makes us 
depressed. The anxiety of being oneself hides behind the weariness 
of the self” (Ehrenberg, 2009: 43-44). 
 
 
Brazilian psychoanalyst Maria Rita Kehl has a complementary insight into the 
matter of the rise of depression in the twentieth century and in her book O Tempo 
e o Cão (or ‘Time and the Dog’, in English), she depicts the depressed subject as 
occupying the place of the melancholic in previous centuries. Depression is, 
according to Kehl, a ‘positioning’ – or a ‘choice’, in the psychoanalytic sense – of 
the subject in face of an ‘impossible’ Other, representing a “social symptom”. She 
argues that “the potential of analysis of the social bond represented since antiquity 
by melancholies has nowadays been relocated to the field of depressions” (Kehl, 
2015:49).7 The contrast between melancholia and depression taken up by Kehl 
follows a Lacanian reading of Freud’s work on melancholia, that situates it, as she 
explains in the book, ‘more to the side’ of psychosis (Kehl, 2015) than neurosis, as 
Freud had initially marked melancholia – and psychosis – as ‘narcissistic 
neuroses’.  In this manner, to Kehl, in simple terms, the melancholic ‘in its time’ 
was subjected to a fundamental loss marked in the relation with a ‘mOther’ that 
was not desiring, not castrated, thus, not offering a ‘place’ for this subject.  
Subjectivity and the Other in a period that we could perhaps succinctly call 
‘modern’ were crossed by the discontent of melancholia, of the loss of this 
 
7 My translation of the Brazilian Portuguese original book. 
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possibility of having a place in the world, according to Kehl – a view shared in a 
way by other feminists, nonetheless (Sprengnether, 1995). The depressed, in her 
view, is claiming a ‘place’ in light of a different Other in our times. Furthering such 
acknowledgement of a sort of ‘social life of depression’, Kehl observes that “the 
rise in the incidence of the so-called ‘depressive disorders’, since the last three 
decades of the twentieth century, indicates that we should try to question what do 
the depressions have to say to us, from the place that was previously occupied by 
the old manifestations of melancholy, as symptoms of the contemporary forms of 
‘mal-estar’ [the Portuguese translation of Freud’s Unbehagen]” (Kehl, 2015:49). 
Indeed, statistical patterns of diagnosis are revealing of shifts in society; however, 
the production of the diagnostic categories must be considered carefully as 
actively productive of such shifts. This means that studies considering the rise in 
certain patterns of diagnosis need to also acknowledge the fact that the politics of 
generating the manuals, categories and checklists utilised in diagnoses will be 
reflected in the collective experience such studies are analysing. For instance: 
peaks in diagnoses of depression can offer clues to the interpretation that society 
is ‘more depressed’; however, this straightforward analysis is superficial if it does 
not take into account the factors informing these mass diagnoses. In this sense, 
Kehl’s book bypasses the equally statistical and data-rich analysis observed by 
Horwitz (2010), for instance, that the rise in ‘depression’ followed from a previous 
mass pathologising of anxiety and pointing out that anxiety, therefore, cannot 




Kehl brings in anxiety only as a part of depression, openly limiting her attempts at 
elaborating on the impact of psychiatric diagnosis or even the pharmaceutic 
industry over the rise in the numbers of ‘depressed people’ across the globe.  
Diverging slightly from Ehrenberg, whilst quoting similar patterns of diagnosis in 
Brazil8 to those of France and the USA, Kehl’s ‘negative’ of the depressive subject 
is the capitalist ‘productive subject’. Depression, depletion and under –or no –
productivity are the markers of what is unacceptable or at least undesirable to the 
maintaining of the capitalist system in its neoliberal turn (Sadowsky, 2021).  In 
this light, a state of ‘excess’, the opposite of ‘depletion’, could be interpreted as 
more favourable to this neoliberal project. However, by looking through anxiety 
carefully, as the next chapters will do, in the psychoanalytic writings of Freud and 
Lacan, a paradoxical state of excess [of tension], that may prompt one to act at the 
same time as generating a total lack of action, in stillness, is found as pertaining to 
the sphere of anxiety. An anxious subject is not necessarily productive, nor 
necessarily unproductive… We may perhaps say that the anxious subject is a 
subject that does not ‘fit’ into a particular capitalist project perfectly, yet, it does 
not ‘not fit’ either.  To explore these paradoxical remarks, it is useful to 
comprehend not only what it ‘means’ to be categorised or diagnosed as depressed 
or anxious, rather, we must not separate this questioning from enquiring into 
‘how’ these categories are formulated and what revolves around such ‘grammar’. 
 
8 Kehl describes the patterns of diagnosis of depression in Brazil as follows: “In Brazil, 
circa 17 million people were diagnosed as depressive in the first years of the 21st 
century. According to a reportage of the newspaper Valor Economico, in regards to the 
twentieth anniversary of Prozac, the market of antidepressants has been growing in the 
country by 22% each year, what represents an annual gross movement of 320 million 




 Kehl’s approach via the ‘undesirable’ subject for neoliberal capitalism has 
important theoretical resonances and interesting clinical value. As she explains in 
this piece, in the clinic, encountering depressed subjects has become increasingly 
more frequent and it is by offering them a different set up to negotiate their 
relation to this initially ‘impossible’ Other, as well as to re-inscribe their jouissance 
in this relation of desire and demand that analysis can offer something potent in 
the face of depression. However, this focus on the ‘depressed’ subject, as if this 
category has some ‘objective bearings’ on reality, leaves the debate around anxiety 
aside or at least in a peripheral space as if it ‘suddenly’ vanished from collective 
experience upon the rise of the diagnosis of depression. It is crucial, thus, when 
still engaging with the reverberations of capitalism and social arrangements in the 
clinic, to understand the project of privatisation of suffering and its naming, 
framing, categorisation and qualification up close, mapping its relation to profit 
and private and public institutions, as well as the ideological echoes of such 
“diagnóstica”. In other words, it is crucial to consider the grammar for such 
inscriptions and recognition of suffering.  
 
Quantifying affect: from discontent to medication  
 
As early as the 1950s and 1960s, experimentations with psychopharmacological 
drugs and the modulation of anxiety can be observed. Felicity Callard (2016), 
offers a comprehensive study of the relation between agoraphobia and the still 
popular category ‘panic disorder’ in the collaboration between the north-
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American psychiatrists Donald Klein and Max Fink.  Klein was part of the DSM-III 
taskforce, where anxiety is, for the first time, dissolved into different categories. 
His particular contribution was that his work on medicalising and defining what 
‘panic’ looked like, in contrast with agoraphobia and a more ‘general’ anxiety, 
informed the alliance between segmentation of symptoms, drug effects and a new 
status for anxiety. Callard (2016) recounts Klein and Fink’s treatment of patients 
between the years of 1958-59 with Imipramine- “the first tricyclic antidepressant” 
(Callard, 2016:214); such experiments led Klein to argue “that drug action allowed 
the observation of two ontologically distinct kinds of anxiety (anticipatory anxiety 
and panic) that had been conflated in earlier models and theorisations of anxiety” 
(Callard, 2016:204). Psychopharmaceutic, or this artificial pharmacological 
paradigm, was thus introduced as an anchor to a biological psychiatric definition 
of symptoms, disorders and, overall, affect and anxiety. 
 
The ‘fall’ of anxiety thus hardly represents the diminishing of anxious states in the 
experience of individuals, rather, it is a ‘fall’ reliant not solely on diluted socio-
political changes and their production of subjectivity, but also on the politics of 
the systems of diagnosis and treatments and their representation of 
contemporary capitalist interests. The publication of the DSM-III and the shift 
towards a biological cause of distress facilitates a ‘chemical imbalance’ narrative 
that was accompanied by mass marketing campaigns aimed at both the general 
public and clinicians as well as profitable drug patents (Shorter, 2009; Whitaker, 
2010). The most famous case study of the sort is the 1987 pill launched by Eli Lilly: 
Prozac.  Within ten years of its launch, 10% of the North American population was 
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already taking it (Segal, 2017). In the USA, in 1988, the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) launched the ‘Depression Awareness, Recognition, and Treatment 
Program’ (DART), and Prozac (fluoxetine) featured in 8 million brochures and 
200,000 posters sponsored by its manufacturer (Segal, 2017). The serotogenic 
rebalance becomes the pharmacological promise of the following decades, giving 
Prozac many successful companion drugs known as Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitors (SSRIs), such as citalopram, escitalopram, sertraline or paroxetine.  
Highly promoted through marketing, these drugs are still dominant in 
prescription not only for MDD as well as ‘anxieties’ and even GAD. Well known for 
not causing side-effects and addiction as harsh as those caused by earlier 
tranquilisers and anxiolytics such as Miltown (meprobamate), Valium and 
Librium (benzodiazepines), popular during the 1950s and 1960s, SSRIs benefit 
from a reputation of being ‘effective’ and even ‘harmless’. 9  
 
What is curious is that anxiety returns ‘blurred’ within depression through 
psycho-pharmaceutical treatments named ‘anti-depressant’ (Herzberg, 2009). 
Such is the terminology factor in the fall and rise of certain diagnosis that in an 
article in The Guardian, from June 2017, the then dean of The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, Dr Kate Lovett, is quoted affirming that: “Antidepressants are used 
in the treatment of both depression and anxiety disorders. They are an evidence-
based treatment for moderate to severe depression and their prescription should 
 
9 More recently, the dangers of withdrawal and of severe side-effects of SSRI and SNRI 
antidepressants have been researched, impacting public health recommendations of 
disclosure of withdrawal harm upon prescription in general medical practice.  
Only in 2019 the Royal College of Psychiatrists (2019) officially took a critical position in 
relation to withdrawal of antidepressants in their recommendations to NICE. 
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be reviewed regularly in line with clear national guidance” (Campbell, 2017). 
Under such discourse, as stressed in the ‘scientific’ tone of an adjective such as 
‘evidence based’, contemporary antidepressants work in a ‘versatile’ fashion, both 
when you are ‘up’ or ‘down’, anxious or depressed.  The first patented drug to 
benefit from this shift back to a ‘new age of anxiety diagnosis’, in which anxiety 
returns in a biologised form was Paxil (paroxetine), approved in the United States 
in 1999 for the treatment of Social Anxiety Disorder, known as SAD, and in 2001 
for General Anxiety Disorder (Rose, 2006). The product, only a decade later, 
generated three billion dollars in sales a year (Horwitz, 2010) and a good part of 
such ‘success’, especially in the USA, is due to the heavy television advertising of 
the drug promoted by GlaxoSmithKline (and its pre-merger name SmithKline 
Beecham) “suggesting to individuals that their worry and anxiety at home and at 
work might not be because they are just worriers but because they are suffering 
from a treatable condition. ‘Paxil . . . Your life is waiting’” (Rose, 2007:213) read 
the adverts.  
 
When the then SmithKline Beecham pharmaceutic company was seeking FDA 
(USA Food and Drug Administration) licensing for Paxil, social anxiety disorder 
was still not as widely known by the general public and to tackle this problem, the 
company “launched a public advertising campaign called “Imagine Being Allergic 
to People.” The campaign included the “cobbling together” of a patient advocacy 
group called the Social Anxiety Disorder Coalition” (Harrington, 2019:568). A 
similar PR strategy  to promote the ‘chemical imbalance’ narrative of mental 
distress was employed by Pfizer in 1999, when marketing the SSRI Zoloft for 
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PTSD, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, for which they hired the public relations 
firm Chandler Chicco Agency to form the advocacy group ‘PTSD Alliance’ 
(Harrington, 2019). Other drugs have been approved for the treatment of anxiety 
in its many categories as stated in the most recent editions of the DSM since the 
late 1990s. Zoloft (sertraline) and Effexor (venlafaxine, officially a serotonin and 
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor, or SNRI) have also been marketed for PTSD 
and GAD respectively.  The DSM-III and following IV and V breakdown of anxiety 
into different disorders amplified the market scope for Big Pharma, accordingly, 
“the strategy of repurposing old drugs for new disorders (that, in many cases, 
people had not known they had) was highly successful. U.S. sales of SSRIs picked 
up again dramatically, peaking in 2008 with revenues of $12 billion” (Harrington, 
2019:571). 
 
The profitability behind the shift towards a checklist-approach of diagnosis also 
reveals a tragic unethical mingling of Big Pharma and governing bodies.  For the 
latest edition of the DSM, for example, the DSM-V, “it was reported that the 
pharmaceutical industry was responsible for half of the APA’s $50 million budget, 
and that eight of the eleven-strong committee which advised on diagnostic criteria 
had links to pharmaceutical firms” (Davies, 2015:124). The ethically problematic 
conflict of interests present in the structure that creates diagnostic criteria, funds 
research and, in general terms, produces the ‘grammar of suffering’, reveals “the 
entanglement of psychic maximization and profit maximization” (Davies, 
2015:124), crossing through the vocabulary available for identifying and 




There are other links between this model of diagnosis and the operative global 
financial capitalist system, once a manual such as the DSM comes to operate as a 
neo-colonising discourse through the imposition of its frameworks of 
categorisation of psychic experience (Sadowsky, 2021).  This relation is clearer if 
we look into the DSM’s presence around the world. Despite being a North 
American psychiatric manual, the DSM has its scope and influence more ‘globally’.  
If at the start of the DSM project and with the DSM-II in particular, there was a 
preoccupation in matching the ‘international’ standards of the ICD, after the third 
edition of the DSM, the ‘power’ shifts hands. With the publication of the DSM-III, 
in 1980 things move to the opposite direction and the ICD goes on to follow the 
trends in diagnosis already present in the DSM.  Until the ICD-9, from 1975, the 
umbrella-terms of ‘psychosis’ and ‘neurosis’ were present.  In the following 
version of the international manual, the first post-DSM-III, the ICD-10, from 1992, 
a longer list of very specific and detailed types of ‘disorders’ appears, reflecting 
the ‘categories’ checklist system (Shorter, 2009).  Despite the gaps in publishing 
time, both manuals present a similar development of the trends in diagnosis, 
especially in terms of moving away from a psychodynamic-influenced language 
and a shift towards further divisions and categories. Ingrid Palmary and Brendon 
Barnes (2015) comment on the ‘hegemonic’ power of the North American 
psychiatric manual in their study of critical psychology and diagnoses in African 
countries.  Reproducing colonial dynamics, as seen in Nigeria for example, the 
DSM, “was consistently used in such a way that the clinician could devalue the 
meanings given by the client and focus only on those parts of the narrative that 
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were congruent with the way mental health was understood in the DSM” (Palmary 
and Barnes, 2015:398). They add: “In this way, Western psychological knowledge 
is reproduced as the true focus whilst local knowledge is rendered irrelevant or at 
most a cultural variation” (Palmary and Barnes, 2015:398). 
  
This ‘imported’ and ‘exported’ grammar of suffering that is at the core of the 
project of the ICD for public health, whilst crossed by the logic of the DSM also 
represents a colonising “globalisation of the manners of suffering” (Dunker, 
2015:23) that accompanied the globalisation of financial capital within the 
neoliberal ideology.  The subject ‘of’ neoliberal capitalism becomes, through such 
diagnostic systems and multinational pharmaceutical corporations, a ‘global’ 
paradigm, and the potentiality of affects such as anxiety or the possibilities 
involved in experiencing psychic distress are erased systematically by the 
hegemonic practices in the field of psy, serving the ‘powers’ of ‘globalised’ 
financialisation of human capital.  Affect is divided and conquered in a neo-
colonising effort. 
 
The connection of this diagnostic culture to neoliberalism goes further and 
deeper, as we are taken to an affective-politics that produces a biologised 
negativity in anxiety and profits from it (Guéry and Deleule, 2014).  In this manner, 
when we accept that the DSM provides categories for recognition of distress, “it 
must be recognised that this language is not neutral and value-free but rather 
reflects a dominant ideological rhetoric of the specific epoch, in this case the crisis 
in welfarism and the emergence of neoliberalism” (Cohen, 2016:79).  
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Neoliberalism and a broader “culture organised by the criteria of 
performance/production” (Dunker, 2015:23) sees a reverberation in the field of 
psy through the relationship established with medication. What are these pills for? 
“Cure, palliative treatment or doping?” (Dunker, 2015:23). To put it simply: where 
do we draw the line between the use of a substance to ease a painful 
difficulty/suffering and eliminate ‘all’ suffering’ and discomfort? Or even, when 
does medication become what doping is to an athlete, an aid to up one’s 
performances and increase benefits? Therefore, a ‘diagnostic grammar’ – 
informed and formed by the ‘alliances’ between hegemonic powers in the field of 
psy and neoliberal productivity and consumption standards – provides not only a 
possible manner of experiencing a discontent-turned-disease, as well as it 
delineates the ‘exclusion’ of modes of suffering from its grammar. Anxiety, in the 
shift in diagnosis observed since the 1980s, turns into a ‘stranger’.  The initial 
mass-pathologising of anxiety, followed by its breaking down into specific 
categories and diagnostic ‘submission’ to depression, as well as its ‘management’ 
through medication, accompany a cultural arrangement that is also observable 
outside of the clinic.  
 
Wellness or Hellness  
 
An individualist concept of ‘wellbeing’ has permeated neoliberal times as our 
attitudes towards ‘being not well’ reflect the logic of quantification, categorisation 
and, ultimately, financialisation of late-capitalist ideology.  Such an arrangement 
of ‘wellbeing’, extrapolates Foucault’s account of modern governmentality as 
developed since the late eighteenth-century under the paradigm of interiority and 
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self-reference that permitted biopolitical subjectivation (Foucault, 2004) and 
towards which psychoanalysis is also allegedly a contributor. The effort to ‘feel 
good’ in one’s body is, in the contemporary context, also framed by the disciplinary 
and controlling assumption of the totality of conscious speech as promoter of 
attitude and behavioural changes – an assumption heavily questioned by 
psychoanalysis, which relies, on the contrary, precisely on the potential of 
representational lacunae, or gaps in language, which constitute the unconscious 
(Lacan, [1960]2006). Freud taught us to take symbolisation and narrative with a 
‘pinch of salt’, being more concerned with what lies underneath a complaint.  In 
current wellbeing discourse, ‘mind and body’ are articulated in such a manner that 
digital apps, checklists, as well as medication and even some ‘yoga pants’ have 
become the vocabulary to address bodies that are not ‘balanced enough’ and in 
need of management. All the while Big Pharma and the trillions of dollars-worth 
‘wellness industry’ revel in profits (Cederström and Spicer, 2016; Reaney, 2014).  
 
Alongside the solutions offered by Big Pharma, therapeutic practices based on 
self-monitoring, thinking ‘positive’ and setting clear ‘goals’ such as Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and Positive Psychology have thrived under the logic 
of isolating symptoms and de-politicising suffering (Scull, 2019; Binkley, 2011). 
Currently, in the United Kingdom, guidelines for treating General Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) promote the use of SSRI drugs as well as self-monitoring and individual or 
group self-help based on the principles of CBT (NICE, 2011). For Pilgrim (2008), 
“these socially mute technologies risk individualising distress and disconnecting 
it from its biographical and social origins” (Pilgrim, 2008:258), promising, 
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however, a ‘quicker fix’. A more ‘effective’ or simply put, ‘cheaper’ and easy to 
measure approach to therapy than long term psychotherapy, CBT has been part of 
the NHS since the New Labour government of Tony Blair, promoted by his advisor 
from the London School of Economics, Richard Layard (Layard and Clark, 2014). 
The notions of ‘efficiency’ and ‘productivity’ unfold both in terms of governmental 
spending and of a mode of management of the self that delineates a problem based 
on the patient’s complaint and works towards a clear goal that involves ‘thinking 
and behaving’ differently in order to rid oneself of an unwanted symptom (Pilgrim, 
2008).10  In other words, “Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is based on the 
claim that the cause of distress lies in the individual’s maladaptive thinking, or 
cognitive processes” (Proctor, 2008:233). Its wide implementation in public 
mental health is a ‘win-win’ situation, except that it reinforces the isolation of 
symptoms and of the individual and one’s competence in just ‘acting’ and 
‘changing’ one’s own patterns that are causing suffering. Such suffering is often 
costly to the state and, under this logic, should be ‘easily’ and strategically dealt 
with. Beck and Ellis, the founders of CBT in the United States, were concerned with 
efficiency, avoiding the time consuming psychodynamic treatment, accordingly, 
their “primary interest was not about researching ordinary cognitive functioning 
(the norm in academic departments of psychology during the 1980s) but was 
 
10 In October 2007, the BBC (2007) reported on the announcement of increased funds 
for CBT which would widen the access to ‘talking therapies’ across the UK. It reads: 
‘Health Secretary Alan Johnson said by 2010, £170 m a year would be spent—allowing 
900,000 more people to be treated using psychological therapies. These are just as 
effective as drugs, says the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence. The plan 
will pay for itself as people return to work and stop needing benefits, an expert said.’  
The discourse is remarkably centred around an economic argument for such investment 




about altering dysfunctional conduct” (Pilgrim, 2008:251).  Beck’s Depression and 
Anxiety Inventories (BDI and BAI, respectively), specifically, are clinical tools that 
comprise of 21-point checklist of surface symptoms that can be tackled in about 
ten minutes, not including any social, political, environmental or contextual factor 
for diagnosis of depression or anxiety. BDI and BAI, in their current formats, are 
widely used in primary care.11It is not surprising that in the UK, unemployed 
people were offered CBT therapy “to help put Britain back to work” (Stratton, 
2009).  
 
As a paradox, yet reflecting the logic of such a therapeutic approach, governments, 
corporations and independent institutions have been investing in measuring 
‘happiness’ exponentially in recent years, despite data on soaring inequality, 
precarity and mental health issues under austerity that circulate in the press 
(Segal, 2017). Economic problems and economic solutions to increase ‘happiness’ 
naturalise the paradigm of human capital even further, departing from a 
privatisation of suffering towards self-productivity management. Layard himself 
publishes his own Happiness book in 2005. ‘Happiness’ or ‘well-being’ seem 
secondary in such measuring policies once questions such as “what are these 
‘sufferings’ telling us” are, if not ignored, bypassed by productivity metaphors.  
Cederström and Spicer comment on the rise of ‘happiness officer’ jobs and 
‘wellness contracts’ in corporate institutions and universities, which are turning 
 
11 A simple ‘Evidence Search’ for Beck’s Depression Inventory in the NICE guidelines and 
policies research repository online (https://www.evidence.nhs.uk/) in June 2021 
counted with over 600 UK clinical articles on BDI from 1997 to 2021, such is the use of 
these parameters in Britain today.  
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‘being happy’ compulsory (Cederström and Spicer, 2016). ‘Happiness pulses’ and 
‘happy city’ projects also echo such ‘happiness is the new black’ trend that leaves 
precisely the ‘meaning’ of what is considered as ‘happy’ out of the debate, as seen 
in a number of academic and theoretical critiques of the neoliberal ‘culture of 
happiness’ (Ahmed, 2010; Binkley, 2014; Davies, 2015; Cederström and Spicer, 
2016; Segal, 2017). Overall the ‘push to happiness’ is grounded in Positive 
Psychology, a strand in the field of psy that aims at providing a ‘management’-
based system of achieving ‘happiness’ and that has been increasingly popularised 
in the twenty-first century. Utilising what is promoted as ‘the most current 
techniques of psychological treatment’ (Binkley, 2011:373) this approach takes 
psychology away from the constant focus on ‘negative’ affects and preaches the 
regime for achieving a desired state of happiness. The founders of Positive 
Psychology are Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, whose works had 
been focusing on adaptive behaviour and depression and the popular concept of 
‘flow’ (present in many guides to Mindfulness, and meaning a total immersion and 
focus in one activity such as exercises, crafts, etc.), respectively (Binkley, 2014). 
The pair met in 1997 and, as Seligman was elected to the prestigious post of 
president of the American Psychological Association, they have secured significant 
research funding across the USA, the UK and beyond for their work on 
popularising literature, tools, courses and guides (Binkley, 2014). Their work on 
Positive Psychology is presented on the back of their identification of ‘Positive 
Personal Traits’ such as ‘optimism’, ‘courage’, ‘faith’, ‘work ethic’ and so on as 
factors that lead to ‘great’ mental health. Their project envisaged that ‘fostering 
excellence’ should be the job of psychology as a whole in order to ‘prevent’ mental 
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illness, in their words, as even ‘normal’ people need examples of positivity, as 
‘building optimism’ can ‘prevent depression’ (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 
2000:12).  
 
In psychoanalytic terms, wellness culture presupposes an ideal-self, an Imaginary 
body, in the Lacanian sense of the term, towards which all such fantasies of an 
ideal state of plenitude and control are projected.  In this conceptualisation, if we 
consider the promises of an ideal, purified and efficient self present in such 
discourses of consumption, there is a type of ‘collective’ fantasy being composed, 
and fantasies can only but leave something hanging out of them, something that 
will not fit into the frame of this projected ideal of selfhood.  In a Lacanian view of 
this relation to fantasy, the cyclical attempt at fulfilling a fantasy and embodying 
an ideal that is impossible to ever be attained will open space for a failure, and this 
very failure will make way for anxiety.  This opens up to a paradoxical cycle. On 
one hand there is the ubiquitous invocations for an individual ‘work’ on one’s 
wellbeing, which passes through for example, mass medicalisation, to Positive 
Psychology all the way into wellness trends. On the other hand, we can see these 
discourses promoting an ‘easily-reachable’ type of ideal wellbeing or ideal ‘tuning’ 
of the body and mind. However, by understanding this ‘ideal’ as a fantasy, thus, 
one that leaves the subject to face the impossibility of ever feeling so ‘good’, we 
can see this ‘fantasy of control’ opening the way to anxiety and then more anxiety.  
Therefore, it might be possible to trace a seemingly paradoxical cycle in which the 
subject is caught: from discontent to wellness; from such recourse to failing to feel 
as good as promised; from there to more anxiety and then back over to another 
 
 57 
wellness tool… maybe another medication or a different diet this time. 
Metaphorically, wellness can easily become hellness.  
 
Psychoanalytically, the process of continuous and repeated frustration present in 
the case of the ‘management’ discourses of the field of psy and wellness culture 
promoting a logic of a possible and ideal ‘feeling-well’, operates as an object that 
takes the space of a lack. As Salecl argues, based on Lacan, “anxiety is not incited 
by the lack of the object but rather by the lack of the lack, i.e. the emergence of an 
object in the place of lack” (Salecl, 2004:32).  When this object fails to fulfil its 
promise, the subject is confronted with the depth of their anxiety, unable to situate 
themselves facing the desire of the Other. In the case of such discourses around 
wellbeing, it is interesting to trace, as per Salecl’s logic, the repetition of this cycle 
once the ‘ideal’ object appearing as an impossible ideal comes in precisely as a 
model of feeling ‘better’, feeling ‘balanced’, ‘producing enough’ – thus, an antidote 
to its own problem (Salecl, 2010).  As a promise, this state of ‘feeling well’, 
presupposed when all discontent is turned into disease, categorised and offered a 
remedy, for example, as in the biological and DSM-style psychiatric practice, turns 
out to produce further discontent.  
 
The discourses of ‘management of the self’ present in all these spheres – from 
diagnosis, to treatment and consumption – also reveal a typical characteristic of 
neoliberal capitalism: a constant praise and calculation of the ‘individual’ that at 
the same time leaves no space for the ‘singular’. That is, the very promotion of a 
‘fit-efficient-pure-controlled’ model for consumption or as goal and standard in 
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Mental Health care presupposes that this ideal operates as a model that would 
work for ‘everyone’, cancelling or at least limiting the possibilities of singular 
potentialities, unique to each subject.  The diagnostic-culture of our times, 
considering diagnosis and the promotion of wellbeing under such logic, reinforces, 
paradoxically, a state of constant anxiety that echoes a somewhat subjective 
precarity that anchors the mode of governance of contemporary capitalism. It 
comes to no surprise that by the end of 2020, according to The Guardian, the 
anxiety toll of Covid-19 saw 6 million new prescriptions of  antidepressants in the 
UK only from July to September, 2020; and an overall spending of £139 million in 
antidepressants in 2020; £113 millions of which were in the SSRI Sertraline alone, 
(Rabeea et al, 2021). Meanwhile, the NHS reported a drop in 235,000 referrals for 
talking therapy in the first semester of 2020 (Duncan and Marsh, 2021). One of, or 
the biggest health crisis of a generation is, as we can see, tackled at the individual 
level by pills promoted through the serotogenic imbalance discourse (or, the 
premise that one’s ‘brain’ does not produce correct amount of serotonin), rather 
than by exploring the nuanced distress of this crisis (which is also ecological and 
political) singularly and in context.  
 
Estranged from anxiety: Modulation and wellbeing in the contemporary 
experience of anxiety 
 
What the assemblage of wellness, psychiatric diagnosis, medicalisation of psychic 
experience and ultimately quantification of affect reveal is an affective-politics 
that accounts for body and psyche in a particular mode of alienation. Under the 
current affective-politics we can identify pharmacological corporations and 
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governmentality replicating a modern scientific view of the body: described, 
divided, quantified and qualified. However, the demands for taming affective 
experiences are coupled with mechanisms of consumption and identification that 
result in post-modern technologies of subjectivity. This double-alienation that 
entails a colonisation of affect seen through the trail of anxiety is interestingly 
elucidated in Deleuze’s mapping of the birth of the dividual (1992). Whilst 
Foucault delineates the modern individual as a locus of reproduction of a 
disciplinary society based in exclusions and division that took shape during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Deleuze proposes that this modern 
individual has been further reduced into a dividual, the locus of reproduction of 
the society of control – one not based on exclusion, but based on identification, 
participation and endless quantification (Dosse, 2016). The shift into what he calls 
a society of control encompasses a transformation of ‘molds’ into ‘modulations’ of 
subjective production (Deleuze, 1992), as I will move into elaborating next. When 
thinking the trail of anxiety through this prism we can find concomitant ‘mold’ and 
‘modulation’-like qualities of the current psy-discourse. This particular encounter 
of dispositifs is precisely what qualifies the current affective-politics.  
 
Wellbeing and governance have not become connected only in the last decades. 
On the contrary, it is an old modern alliance as it was particularly elaborated by 
Foucault in ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ lecture series from 1978 to 1979. In these 
lectures, he points to the fact that, ‘wellbeing’ is a term that emerged in the 
eighteenth century as a ‘symbol’ of state power in its full effectiveness, thus, 
having been crucial in ideological control and the mechanisms of biopower since 
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the dawn of modernity (Foucault, 2008b). Social regulation through the care of the 
body is, under this prism, bound to capitalism as the refinement of ‘life-sciences’ 
is historically linked to what Foucault calls the ‘liberal art of governing’ (Lazzarato, 
2013).   Deleuze calls such dispositifs ‘molds’ (1992) and defines their logic as 
follows: 
“The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that 
designates the individual, and the number or administrative 
numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass. This is 
because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these 
two, and because at the same time power individualises and masses 
together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a 
body and molds the individuality of each member of that body” 
(Deleuze, 1992:5)   
 
In this sense, the project of the DSM as a whole could be compared to a ‘mold’ as it 
offers a homogenisation of whatever heterogeneity is present in the forms of 
discontent and suffering experienced in society. The DSM and the raison d’être of 
efforts in categorising and identifying aetiological frames for mental illness 
marked across the field of psy, as seen in this chapter, provide a ‘name’, a ‘number’, 
and a ‘diagnosis’ through which an individual can be ‘positioned within a mass’. 
Such reduction of the multiplicity in manners of suffering to the same common 
‘grammar’ – and as Dunker (2015) remarks, a particularly ‘normative’ grammar – 
generate an imposition of uniformity on symptoms based on a contemporary 
western paradigm of pathology, resulting in a “neutralization of the critical 
potential that psychological symptoms bring to the understanding of a determined 
social context, as the role that symptoms have always played” (Dunker, 2015:35). 
In other words, psychiatry emerges as a discourse of ‘morality’, distinguishing 
what ‘normal’ and desirable looks like (Birman, 1978). Furthermore, there is also 
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a neutralisation of the potential to “produce new modalities of the social bond” 
(Dunker, 2015:35) carried by ‘discontents’ in their singularity and multiplicity.  
Another ‘mold’-like characteristic of the diagnostic-culture inaugurated in the 
1980s can be observed in its biological, or organicist, traits that “reduce discontent 
to sensorial pain and suffering” (Dunker, 2015:33), thereby reducing the subject 
to the ‘fleshy’ body. 
 
In the ‘modulation’ of ‘societies of control’ that unfold in the twentieth century, the 
picture is slightly more complex yet not too dissimilar.  Deleuze describes the shift 
as follows:  
“In the societies of control, on the other hand, what is important is no 
longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a 
password, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are 
regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of 
integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of 
control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. 
We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. 
Individuals have become ‘dividuals’, and masses, samples, data, 
markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze, 1992:5) 
 
 
One manner of illustrating what Deleuze means by ‘modulated dividuals’ is the 
‘quantified self’ movement in relation to wellbeing. Noting that people usually 
refuse or at least do not collaborate with reporting on their mental health for 
research, Davies (2015) cites the digital platforms and devices operated by 
companies such as Google or Nike through which users are ‘happily’ willing to 
offer details, “and report on various aspects of their private lives – from their diets, 
to their moods, to their sex lives” (Davies, 2015:221). Such ‘enthusiasm for self-
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surveillance’ is welcomed by corporations that are now investing in novel health 
and fitness products (e.g. Fitbit, Strava or even the Apple Watch) that “can be sold 
alongside quantified self apps, which will allow individuals to make constant 
reports of their behaviour (such as jogging), generating new data sets for the 
company in the process” (Davies, 2015:221). Data thus becomes a ‘password’ and 
offers recognition in the digitally informed social sphere.  At the same time, each 
tap, each word, each interaction is translated into chunks of big-data that, in its 
turn, bounces back in the form of targeted advertising operated through 
algorithms on the web.   
 
In this sense, the alliance between the DSM-model and the pharmaceutical 
industry, which relies heavily on marketing, echoes the ‘modulation’ of 
experience. Consumption of medication becomes the ‘password’ and the body, the 
fleshy body, is modulated as ‘medication adjustments’ operate by isolating parts 
and functions of the body, creating “artificial zones of contention, excitation, 
anaesthesia and separation that work as protective walls against discontent and 
zones of exception against suffering” (Dunker, 2015:28). ‘Dividuality’ and the 
modus operandi of the society of control are evidenced in the new function of 
psychopathological diagnosis under the current diagnostic-culture explored in 
this chapter. Instead of representing a force of exclusion from social life, as the 
asylum did for example, the consumption of medication(s) justified by a 
systematic categorisation of affects, symptoms and manners of suffering and being 
provide, as a modulating mapping of the fleshy body, a type of ‘fantasy’ of 
recognition in the model of a ‘password’.  As Dunker summarises, without making 
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reference to Deleuze’s ideas, “if previously the psychopathological diagnosis could 
mean a terrifying and at times irreversible inclusion in the juridical-hospital frame 
or moral-educational exclusion, now it seems to have become a powerful and 
disseminated means of determination and recognition, if not even a means of 
destitution of the responsibility of a subject” (Dunker, 2015:33). A diagnosis can, 
under the paradigm of productivity, offer a form of relief from such a burden.  
 
Deleuze, however, leaves an impression that in the present time, Foucault’s 
‘disciplinary societies’ were being substituted by this new order of control, as if 
one followed the other.  This ‘misunderstanding’ is, as defended by Gerald Raunig, 
in part due to the nature of Deleuze’s text itself (Raunig, 2009). ‘Postscript on 
Societies of Control’, the text, is extremely short, barely reaching five pages of 
length, and written in a very poetic – and apocalyptic, if one may add – style.  What 
Raunig stresses is that ‘modulation’ “is the name of this merging of discipline 
society and control society: as the aspects of discipline and control are always to 
be seen as intertwined” (Raunig, 2009). Thus, the seeming linearity of temporal 
sequence open for interpretation in the original text is one of its ‘weaknesses’.  
Deleuze’s text reads as follows:  
“But everyone knows that these institutions are finished, whatever the 
length of their expiration periods. It’s only a matter of administering 
their last rites and of keeping people employed until the last 
installation of the new forces knocking at the door. These are the 
societies of control, which are in the process of replacing the 





Indeed, this passage evokes a temporal linearity that does not translate in the 
shifts from enclosed confinement of institutions towards an open and multiple 
form of ever-changing casts. Rather, as Raunig points out, what we experience in 
the twenty-first century and what characterises modulation is “an accumulation 
of both aspects” (Raunig, 2009), a simultaneous presence of both models, 
intertwined and intercalating. Social subjugation and ‘forced adaptation’ – the 
hetero into homogeneous, from mass to individual – accompanies the “modes of 
self-government in a totally transparent, open milieu, and discipline through 
personal surveillance and punishment couples with the liberal visage of control as 
voluntary self-control” (Raunig, 2009) that ‘modulates’ a ‘dividual’.  
 
The encounter of modulating-molds and of dispositifs of subjective production and 
reproduction explicated in this chapter and found in tracing the trail of anxiety in 
mainstream psychiatric discourses allows us to elucidate, even if a little, the 
current arrangements of colonisation of psychic experience and affective life. 
Given this cartography of anxiety and the place of an anxious dividual in it, we can 
ask whether the dividual can speak. If anxiety is the compass that can lead us to a 
world beyond the veils of fantasies, if it can push novel arrangements of the social 
bond, it seems that an anxious dividual is left at the cliff-edge of an existential 
abyss that only grows deeper at the hands of hegemonic psy-discourses.  
 
The antagonism present in this ideological organisation of a ‘society of control’ is 
interestingly situated in the body of the ‘anxious dividual’ of the contemporary 
and revealed in the relation of a ‘modulating estrangement’ to one’s anxiety.  The 
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system of diagnosis and management of the body and its affects, whilst crossed by 
ideological power, produces an ‘impossibility’ towards living with one’s anxiety.  
As this first chapter has delineated, anxiety travels from a mass-pathologised 
status to an ideology-informed disappearance within the diagnostic system and 
makes a return in the form of a highly medicalised and isolated symptom. The 
ever-expanding DSM editions and the ‘checklist’ approach in use operate as 
‘molding watchwords’. At the same time, the consumption discourse of care of the 
body and mind, present in wellness culture, elevates the treatment framework of 
elimination and management of anxiety via the care of the body to the function of 
what Deleuze calls a ‘modulating password’.  Such discourses, in and outside of the 
clinic, debated in this chapter are dividualising, as within their modus operandi 
there is no space left for the possibility of singularity. Whilst they offer a series of 
‘fixing tools’ centred on the body, these discourses presuppose, at the same time, 
a ‘same’ form of suffering that should be common to all dividuals they are 
addressing with their modulating ‘grammar’. In such a quantifying culture, the 
subject is locked out of from the possibility of seeing what is beyond the lifting of 
curtains of fantasy, as Freud and Lacan proposed (Verhaeghe, 2014). The 
management of anxiety ‘away’ from one’s body is, therefore, the logic of the 
relation of ‘estrangement’ this research will move into questioning, within a 
psychoanalytic approach.  
 
The drive, the unconscious and the ‘transindividual’ aspects of psychic life and the 
self, as the next two chapters will explore, are what set psychoanalytic theory and 
practice aside from other discourses of mental health and wellbeing that are 
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ideologically divergent within the field of the broad psychological discourses of 
the contemporary context.  Such dividing differences are evidenced in the 
understanding of the symptom and, by consequence, of suffering and the mind-
body riddle. A key difference between, for example, Cognitive-Behavioural 
Therapy and psychoanalysis would be the more simplistic cause and effect 
relation in the former, which is based on clinical techniques proposed by Ellis and 
Beck and successors in the United States from the 1960s onwards, where a 
thought becomes a recurrent ‘automatic’ cognitive route leading to specific 
behaviours and patterns of feeling (Rose, 2018). Beyond this direct causality, what 
becomes definitive in the divide between these approaches is the reliance on a 
‘knowing’ and conscious awareness in the process of offering a narrative of 
oneself, that meaning, a clinical reliance on the patient bringing a problem and 
that being accepted or assumed as the actual ‘problem’, usually leading to a change 
in behaviour in order to ease, deal or in a more unfortunate case scenario simply 
aim at getting rid of such a ‘problem’.  With the transindividual unconscious at 
work and the drive as cornerstones of psychic life, psychoanalysis complicates 
such views of re-educating consciously one’s thoughts and behaviours – as 
Positive Psychology assumes – simply because a psychoanalytic narrative of 
oneself implies a very powerful not-knowing and its reverberations, being thus a 
challenge or impossibility to the project of measuring and categorising of 
evidence-based experimental psychological traditions. 
 
 
Anxiety, as the next chapters will explore in further detail, is understood in 
psychoanalytic literature from the Freudian and Lacanian orientation as the affect 
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of excess. Instead of isolating anxiety by turning it into a symptom or disorder and 
systematically attempting to ‘eliminate’ one’s anxiety, psychoanalysis listens to 
anxiety and to what it may be possibly telling of the positioning of the subject in 
question in relation to their experience. However, the tools of interpretation, the 
social and subjective models of psychoanalysis and, further, psychoanalysis’ very 
onto-epistemic foundations, enclose anxiety to an ‘abyss within’, as I will move 
into arguing next. A modern humanist, patriarchal and colonial inheritance still 
permeate both theory and praxis. My objective is to think beyond such hauntings 










In the first pages of ‘An Autobiographic study’, from 1925, Freud narrates his 
collaborative work with Breuer, hinting at a divisive trait between the two 
doctors’ personalities when writing: “The theory which we had attempted to 
construct in the Studies remained, as I have said, very incomplete; and in 
particular we had scarcely touched on the problem of aetiology, on the question 
of the ground in which the pathogenic process takes root” (Freud, 1925b:23). The 
ground, the basis, the context. Freud was concerned with what allowed for psychic 
processes to take place, and this was a matter dealt with in a number of his texts, 
when both internal and external realities were negotiated in manners that would 
permit certain traits, actions and, ultimately, symptoms to emerge. Psychoanalysis 
speaks of a subject harnessed to the world and in its theories and practices, 
psychic structure and the lived experience carry the same weight.  
 
Anxiety, which is not a symptom, but an affect, is mostly acknowledged through 
its appearance on the body, confusing any delineated spaces of the symptom, 
affect, internal and external worlds, psyche and soma. This affective riddle is 
studied in detail in what follows. In this chapter, I offer close critical readings of 
Freud’s key theoretical formulations of anxiety, which are revealed in a contrast 
with mainstream psychiatric nosology. I work with less popular nineteenth 
century texts and letters known as ‘pre-psychoanalytic’ works, all the way through 
to Freud’s 1930s final remarks on the topic of anxiety. Through the method of 
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close readings, it is possible to grasp the nuanced transformations of Freud’s 
theories of the ‘grounds’ of anxiety across four decades, in the build-up to my 
thesis of anxiety as vibration – or anxiety as an affect of rupture that vibrates 
through the subject and beyond oneself, an affect of entanglement. The pieces 
selected operate as an archive, offering insight into the ‘grounds’ of anxiety; their 
importance is given by how ‘anxiety’ is the kernel of the psychoneuroses in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. The following close readings of Freud will enable me to 
rescue specific ‘vibrational moments’ in his theories of anxiety, in which an anxiety 
that is not relying on Oedipus is more apparent both at the very beginning of his 
writings and at the very end, as follows.  
 
Freud’s works on anxiety 
 
 
Already in Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess, an attempt to unravel the 
complexities of anxiety (angst, in the German original) was being traced. The 
mechanisms of this affect and its connections to a discharge of libido, repression 
and fear followed Freud’s works over decades, from the end of the nineteenth 
century to his last years of his life in the early 1930s, marking different stages of 
the development of his theories on anxiety, which emerges as a direct neurotic 
repression and moves towards a more refined understanding of the importance 
and variations of this puzzling affect.  In the seminal ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety’, 1926, Freud’s delineation of the aetiology and symptomatology of 
anxiety presents the first important shift in this understanding, as his clinical 
experience was then able to suggest that “it was anxiety which produced 
repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which produced 
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anxiety”(Freud, 1926:108-109). Anxiety, at a point that succeeded his works on 
the libidinal economy surrounding the life and death drives in ‘Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle’ (1920), was seen as a form of psychic protection against 
threats to one’s integrity. It is precisely over the variations of such threats, their 
origin and their relation to the manifestation of a subsequent anxiety that Freud 
mapped concepts such as realistic anxiety, neurotic anxiety, moral anxiety, 
primary anxiety, castration anxiety and signal anxiety. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, it is only in the mid-1920s that the Oedipal metaphor marks the 
Freudian theory of anxiety in relation to castration and, consequently, sexual 
difference.  Anxiety seemingly wears many hats in the Freudian oeuvre, all of 
them, as will be explored in this chapter, as an ‘excess’ – either in the form of an 
abyss within or of a vast horizon beyond the limits of the ‘I’ (the Ich, ego). In what 
follows, I stay as close as possible to Freud, grasping his rationale and logic 
according to his own words, moving into a clear understanding of Lacan’s 
contributions to the topic in the next chapter – and, subsequently, a debate on the 
limits of psychoanalytic theory to contemporary praxis. 
 
Letters to Fliess and late 19th century  
 
 
Two letters, known as drafts A and B, pose important points in Freud’s early 
theories on anxiety, specifically anxiety neurosis. In draft A1, from 1892, a text in 
bullet points, sexuality and repression already form his hypothesis. In draft B, 
from the same year, 1892, Freud was working on an aetiology of neuroses, and 
chronic state and an attack of anxiety are mentioned as two different 
manifestations of anxiety that can be combined in symptoms that revolve around 
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the body (i.e. hypochondria, agoraphobia, etc.) and the sexual noxa (Freud, 
1892b:183). According to Freud, the latter means events or circumstances that 
disrupt some sort of ‘natural’ flow of sexual satisfaction. It is, however, only a 
couple of years later that Freud elaborated in more detail his work in progress on 
the equation of neurosis, sexuality, repression and anxiety. In an 1894 short letter 
to Fliess, known as Draft E, Freud takes his friend through his thinking process. 
There he explores anxiety neurosis, which he at first and for the next coming 
decades understands as linked with sexuality. Sexuality, as it will unfold across his 
work, starts off as a bodily excess he names ‘libido’ and moves, later, into a 
modification of the idea of ‘castration’ in relation to the ‘phallus’, where anxiety is 
placed. 
Freud writes: “All I know about it is this: It quickly became clear to me that the 
anxiety of my neurotic patients had a great deal to do with sexuality; and in 
particular it struck me with what certainty coitus interruptus practiced on a 
woman leads to anxiety neurosis” (Freud, 1894a :78). Coitus interruptus, which 
was a common practice at the time, over half a century before the popularisation 
of the contraceptive pill, caused particular anxiety, both in men and women 
(following the heteronormative view of sexuality displayed in these letters). 
However, this first observation soon after called for revision, since anxiety would 
appear even in people not worrying about pregnancy. Another factor emerges in 
Freud’s early observations that will carry a certain weight in his theories of 
anxiety, that of its connections with the physical body, at this point solely linked 
with sexual satisfaction.  Freud spells out the following: 
“[…] anxiety neurosis affects women who are anaesthetic in coitus just 
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as much as sensitive ones. This is most peculiar, but it can only mean 
that the source of the anxiety is not to be looked for in the psychic 
sphere. It must accordingly lie in the physical sphere: it is a physical 
factor in sexual life that produces anxiety” (Freud,1894a: 78). 
 
Freud reports having followed a variety of cases in which sexuality and anxiety 
would be connected, ranging from a ‘virginal anxiety’ until the “anxiety of men who 
go beyond their desire or strength, older people whose potency is diminishing, but 
who nevertheless forcibly bring about coitus” (Freud, 1894a:79).  However, he 
does not provide any detail of such cases. Yet, such wide range of cases were, to 
him, connected by “an accumulation of physical sexual tension” (Freud, 1894a:79) 
that lead to anxiety via a ‘detour’ of such accumulation and its discharge, in which 
this accumulated tension is ‘transformed’ into anxiety.  There is, thus, right from 
the start of his understanding a path forming through a physical excess that is left 
unsatisfied firstly physically, but for reasons that could be physical or not, and 
then accumulated and psychically transformed into something else; this 
something else would be the manifestation of anxiety symptoms. Anxiety and the 
drive are early partners in psychoanalytic thinking. 
The physicality of anxiety was stressed in this very early text and as Freud was 
developing his work on melancholia at the time of writing this letter, he offered an 
interesting parallel between these two states, which are demarcated precisely by 
the duality of psychic and physical.  
“Quite particularly often, melancholies have been anaesthetic. They 
have no desire for coitus (and no sensation in connection with it), but 
they have a great longing for love in its psychic form — one might say, 
psychic erotic tension; where this accumulates and remains 
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unsatisfied, melancholia develops. This, then, would be the 
counterpart to anxiety neurosis. Where physical sexual tension 
accumulates — anxiety neurosis. Where psychic sexual tension 
accumulates — melancholia” (Freud,1894a:80). 
Melancholia, here, is enticed by an external presence that results in an internal 
response being quantitatively re-balanced, since “for that purpose any reaction 
suffices that diminishes the inner psychic excitation by the same quantum” 
(Freud,1894a:80). Anxiety, on the other hand, derives from an internal source of 
tension that lies in the body – sexual drive, hunger, thirst – and the difference here 
being that only very ‘specific’ things could quench and satisfy these needs, 
preventing their occurrence again in ‘the organs concerned’ to each need.  By 
tracing this path, Freud provided an interesting theory of psyche-soma. 
Connecting body and psyche, a type of ‘threshold’ appears.  Only when such 
threshold is reached, affective states are able to deploy psychic connections, 
entering, as he puts it, “into relation with certain groups of ideas, which then set 
about producing the specific remedies” (Freud,1894a:80). The drives are the 
motor of psychic activity. 
Sexual libido is seen as somewhat independent from the psyche at the same time 
as it depends upon a psychic origin.  Anxiety emerges when either one’s psychic 
reality, for example a defence mechanism that interrupts the possibility of this 
libido transformation “as it should be” from psyche/body to body back to psyche, 
or when something just physical proves to be the ‘noxa’ (coitus interruptus as a 
practice, or a bodily malfunction, etc.)   Anxiety arises through “the accumulation 
of physical tension and the prevention of discharge in the psychic direction” 
(Freud,1894a:82). Why anxiety, specifically, is what Freud leaves as an open 
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question at the end of this letter, when he provides an answer that is, in a certain 
way, rather flimsy. Anxiety, he argues, arises, instead of anything else, as its typical 
symptoms resemble the very act of discharge of the accumulated sexual tension, 
by which he means, anxiety symptoms resemble the sexual act, so anxiety 
symptoms become a substituting route of discharge:  
 “Anxiety is the sensation of the accumulation of another endogenous 
stimulus, the stimulus to breathing, a stimulus incapable of being 
worked over psychically apart from this; anxiety might therefore be 
employed for accumulated physical tension in general. Furthermore, if 
the symptoms of anxiety neurosis are examined more closely, one finds 
in the neurosis disjointed pieces of a major anxiety attack: namely, 
mere dyspnea, mere palpitations, mere feeling of anxiety, and a 
combination of these. Looked at more precisely, these are the paths of 
innervation that the physical sexual tension ordinarily traverses even 
when it is about to be worked over psychically. The dyspnea and 
palpitations belong to coitus; and while ordinarily they are employed 
only as subsidiary paths of discharge, here they serve, so to speak, as 
the only outlets for the excitation. This is once again a kind of 
conversion in anxiety neurosis, just as occurs in hysteria (another 
instance of their similarity); but in hysteria it is psychic excitation that 
takes a wrong path exclusively into the somatic field, whereas here it 
is a physical tension, which cannot enter the psychic field and therefore 
remains on the physical path” (Freud,1894a:82). 
Much of this letter gave origin to an expanded paper published that same year 
under the title ‘On The Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome From 
Neurasthenia Under The Description ‘Anxiety Neurosis’’ (1894).  As the title 
suggests, this text is concerned mainly with setting an aetiology and mechanisms 
particular to neurasthenia (a popular diagnosis of the time) and what he was 
referring as ‘anxiety neurosis’, the latter being the transformed discharge of 




Anxiety neurosis was here being called as such “because all its components can be 
grouped round the chief symptom of anxiety, because each one of them has a 
definite relationship to anxiety” (Freud, 1894b:91). The clinical symptoms 
identified by Freud in this paper of what would consist of an anxiety neurosis 
were:  
1) General Irritability;  
2) Anxious expectation – which he saw as central to neurosis, once “we 
may perhaps say that here a quantum of anxiety in a freely floating 
state is present, which, where there is expectation, controls the choice 
of ideas and is always ready to link itself with any suitable ideational 
content” (Freud, 1894b:93);  
3) Anxiety attacks that are sudden and not linked to a train of ideas and 
a more general anxiousness, that appears as a feeling of anxiety that 
the patient feels as linked to a bodily function, this emerging in 
complaints “of ‘spasms of the heart’ ‘difficulty in breathing’ ‘outbreaks 
of sweating’ ‘ravenous hunger’ and such like; and, in his description, 
the feeling of anxiety often recedes into the background or is referred 
to quite unrecognizably as ‘being unwell’ ‘feeling uncomfortable’ and 
so on” (Freud, 1894b:93);  
4) Different types of anxiety attacks, for example, accompanied by 
breathing problems, or heart beating problems, or even ravenous 
hunger; 
5) pavor nocturnus or night terrors on adults and children; 
6) Vertigo; 
7) Phobias related to chronic anxiousness or vertigo, ranging from 
physiological dangers to locomotion dangers and apparent in phobia 
of thunderstorms in the first case to agoraphobia in the latter, for 
example; 
8) Digestion activities disturbances;  
9) Paraesthesias; 




Such symptoms could be easily ‘confused’ with that of neurasthenia, a condition 
popularly diagnosed after George Miller Beard, an American neurologist, 
described it as a problem or weakness of the actual ‘nerves’ (Berrios, 1996). Freud, 
in this paper, recognizes the potential similarities in diagnosis of cases of 
neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis, but he moves on to clarifying the difference 
between the two as resting precisely on the specific sexual origins of anxiety 
neurosis. What he adds in this paper, furthering from his earlier letter to Fliess, is 
that in many cases of anxiety neurosis, sexual desire is also lessened, adding this 
other layer to the ‘origins’ of anxiety since “the mechanism of anxiety neurosis is 
to be looked for in a deflection of somatic sexual excitation from the psychical 
sphere, and in a consequent abnormal employment of that excitation” (Freud, 
1894b:108).  In neurasthenia, Freud signals, it can be that the ‘unloading’ is not as 
adequate (masturbation as a replacement for the ‘normal coition’, is the example 
he provides); yet,  “anxiety neurosis, on the other hand, is the product of all those 
factors which prevent the somatic sexual excitation from being worked over 
psychically. The manifestations of anxiety neurosis appear when the somatic 
excitation which has been deflected from the psyche is expended subcortically in 
totally inadequate reactions” (Freud, 1894b:109).  By pairing, once again, the 
symptoms of anxiety and the physical aspects of sexual interactions (which, in this 
logic, must include another person, or an other), Freud “depicts the symptoms of 
anxiety neurosis as being in a sense surrogates of the omitted specific action 
following on sexual excitation” (Freud, 1894b:111).  
Freud will then move into differentiating, for the first time, the affect of anxiety 
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and anxiety neurosis. Elaborating on the function of anxiety, Freud claims that the 
‘regular’ affect of anxiety offers a certain protection against something external 
that cannot be dealt with accordingly. Anxiety neurosis thus is a response to an 
internal excess, whilst the affect of anxiety has external bearings. He writes: 
“The psyche finds itself in the affect of anxiety if it feels unable to deal 
by appropriate reaction with a task (a danger) approaching from 
outside; it finds itself in the neurosis of anxiety if it notices that it is 
unable to even out the (sexual) excitation originating from within—
that is to say, it behaves as though it were projecting that excitation 
outwards. The affect and its corresponding neurosis are firmly related 
to each other. The first is a reaction to an exogenous excitation, the 
second a reaction to the analogous endogenous one. The affect is a state 
which passes rapidly, the neurosis is a chronic one; because, while 
exogenous excitation operates as a constant force, in the neurosis, the 
nervous system is reacting against a source of excitation which is 
internal, whereas in the corresponding affect it is reacting against an 
analogous source of excitation which is external” (Freud, 1894b:112).  
If we make a simple parallel between what Freud proposes here and the rise in 
reports of anxiety by the ONS in the UK during the first COVID-19 lockdown, as 
seen in Chapter 1, for instance, a less pathologised approach unfolds. The affect of 
anxiety is, if anything, under such Freudian lenses, a healthy reaction to 
overwhelming external circumstances. Such affect, rather than a ‘stranger’ within, 
qualifies an entanglement with the world, or a deep psychic, bodily, libidinal 
connection with it. If a complex symptomatic presentation is developed in relation 
to such anxiety, then the singular layers of one’s drive and its bearings in the 
subjective positioning of the patient in the world are also involved in a complaint 
of high anxiety. In both cases, neurotic or not, anxiety is an affect of entanglement 
and depth, rather than of surface and estrangement – as qualified in the 




Two months after the publication of ‘On The Grounds’, in the January 1895 issue 
of the journal Neurologisckes Zentralblatt, Leopold Löwenfeld, a German 
psychiatrist, published a critique of the paper. Freud responds in the same year 
with the essay ‘A Reply to Criticisms of My Paper on Anxiety Neurosis’ (1895), 
picking up on his conclusions that followed from clinical observations.  
“I arrived at the proposition: anxiety neurosis is created by everything 
which keeps somatic sexual tension away from the psychical sphere, 
which interferes with its being worked over psychically. If we go back 
to the concrete circumstances in which this factor becomes operative, 
we are led to assert that [sexual] abstinence, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, sexual intercourse with incomplete satisfaction, coitus 
interruptus, deflection of psychical interest from sexuality, and similar 
things, are the specific aetiological factors of the states to which I have 
given the name of anxiety neurosis”  (Freud, 1895:124). 
 
Löwenfeld had challenged the above logic by providing cases in which anxiety 
neurosis emerged from singular events of fright, not sharing the sexual path 
suggested by Freud. Freud responds by claiming he did not doubt his colleague’s 
cases, neither other ‘official academic medicine’ cases as possibilities of refusal of 
his hypotheses; he doubted, however, the very kind of interpretation being 
provided to cases by these other practitioners. So, he writes, 
“if anyone wants to prove to me that in these remarks I have unduly 
neglected the significance of the stock aetiological factors, he must 
confront me with observations in which my specific factor is missing—
that is, with cases in which anxiety neurosis has arisen after a psychical 
shock although the subject has (on the whole) led a normal vita 




Freud defends the psychoanalytic method as – it seems, at least in contrast with 
neuropathological methods – the only one capable of providing in depth enough 
interpretations that would not only prove his theory of anxiety neurosis right as 
really unveil symptoms once “it is impossible to pursue an aetiological 
investigation based on anamneses if we accept those anamneses as the patients 
present them, or are content with what they are willing to volunteer” (Freud, 
1895:129). In other words, the complaints of a surface level symptom 
presentation cannot be treated as the totality of this symptom. Rather, the 
Freudian method will trace the grounds and dynamics of symptom-formation in 
the unconscious.  
These very early writings on anxiety, when considered together, propose two 
interesting entries into the notion of ‘vibration’ I am carving through this thesis: 
1) its relation to the drive and 2) its internal and external sources of stimuli.  
Whilst reading Freud’s almost stereotypical pairing of any symptomatology with 
sexuality (and an essentialist heteronormative view of such) is rather frustrating, 
the addition of libido, satisfaction, discharge and the overall dynamics of the drive 
are fundamental to his contribution to the field of psy. The subject appears as one 
that is marked by jouissance, rather than simply being a one-dimensional social 
subject guided by morality. When attributing to anxiety a relation to libidinal 
excess, Freud proposes a treatment that is fundamentally contrary to the method 
of symptom isolation and ‘checklist’ proposed by mainstream psychiatry. The 
subject presented here not only enjoys as they also are harnessed to the world and 
its contingencies and stimuli. Anxiety, as seen in these early texts is also 
‘naturalised’ rather than ‘pathologised’, appearing as a dynamic relation to the 
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body, the unconscious and stimuli (both as a regular affect and in anxiety neurosis, 
as seen above). Another nuance I find interesting here is the non-reliance on 
sexual difference observable in these works. Elaborated before Freud delineated 
the Oedipus Complex, these texts do not propose different unconscious positions 
and symptom formation for ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather we are dealing with a 
threshold of excess that mobilises the body and psyche in anxiety. Guattari, as I 
will discuss in Chapter 4, rescued these letters and Freud’s ‘energetic model’ of the 
unconscious in the later years of his thinking precisely because of their non-
reliance on Oedipus.  
 
Introductory Lectures:  Lecture XXV, 1917 
 
In the final part of his Introductory Lectures, about two decades after his initial 
works on anxiety neurosis, Freud provides an updated and objective account of 
his theory of anxiety. He sets out by proposing that whilst most people must have 
already experienced the ‘sensation’ or the ‘affect’ of anxiety, there is something 
particular in the experiences of anxiety of neurotics, and to this he will dedicate 
this lecture. This affect is seen by Freud as particularly complex for “there is no 
question that the problem of anxiety is a nodal point at which the most various 
and important questions converge, a riddle whose solution would be bound to 
throw a flood of light on our whole mental existence” (Freud, 1917:393). This 
shared experience of anxiety both in a ‘normal’ and in a ‘pathological’ state is given 
more structure in this lecture, once Freud offers a distinction between ‘realistic’ 
and ‘neurotic’ anxieties.  
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Realistic anxiety, whilst being “connected with the flight reflex and […] regarded 
as a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct” (Freud, 1917:394), accounts 
for a rather rational manifestation. It makes little sense if we think that in such 
occasions of imminent danger, being anxious does little to help avoiding such 
danger, and quite the contrary, can bring about a paralysis and lack of action that 
could be the opposite of self-preservative.  However strange this may seem, Freud 
points out that it is preparedness for the danger that increases one’s attention and 
motor capacity, reading for action.  Anxiety as a ‘signal’ is divided in two ‘moments’ 
and “the preparedness for anxiety seems [to me] to be the expedient element in 
what we call anxiety, and the generation of anxiety the inexpedient one” (Freud, 
1917:395). Our perception of these expressions of anxiety leads Freud to the 
central question of: What exactly is anxiety?  
His answer is that anxiety is an affect.  Affect, in its turn, is a complex concept that 
“includes in the first place particular motor innervations or discharges and 
secondly certain feelings; the latter are of two kinds—perceptions of the motor 
actions that have occurred and the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure 
which, as we say, give the affect its keynote” (Freud, 1917:395). Affects, in this 
view, relate to the body and the psyche, touching on perception and feelings. The 
‘imprint’ of the affect of anxiety, which is then repeated when this affect comes 
about, is present at the instant of birth, as well as in the ‘unpleasant’ separation 
from the mother. He writes: 
“We believe that it is in the act of birth that there comes about the 
combination of un-pleasurable feelings, impulses of discharge and 
bodily sensations which has become the prototype of the effects of a 
mortal danger and has ever since been repeated by us as the state of 
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anxiety. The immense increase of stimulation owing to the 
interruption of the renovation of the blood (internal respiration) was 
at the time the cause of the experience of anxiety; the first anxiety was 
thus a toxic one” (Freud, 1917:396). 
Affect, in Freudian theory, thus, has to do with an extension of oneself, mobilising 
perception; and a relation to the other, the mother more specifically, as a primary 
love and dependency object.  In this discreet sense, by thinking of anxiety as an 
affect as such, Freud builds upon his earlier libidinal theory that accounted for 
stimulus that leads to anxiety as endogenous, or of an understanding of sexuality 
as endogenous, rather than as a ‘drive’. A drive, as such, mobilises both the internal 
and external realms, in and out, the extimate (external and intimate), in Lacanian 
words.  
The differences between the affect of anxiety, that which can be shared by anyone, 
and a neurotic experience of anxiety follows in this text. An ‘expectant anxiety’, or 
an anticipation of something that can happen and is undesirable is a shared 
affective state in which “we find a general apprehensiveness, a kind of freely 
floating anxiety which is ready to attach itself to any idea that is in any way 
suitable, which influences judgement, selects what is to be expected, and lies in 
wait for any opportunity that will allow it to justify itself” (Freud, 1917:398). 
When too much of this ‘expectant anxiety’ appears it “forms a regular feature of a 
nervous disorder to which I have given the name of ‘anxiety neurosis’ and which 
[I] include among the ‘actual’ neuroses” (Freud, 1917:398). Freud observes that 
there is also another type of anxiety, phobia, that instead of being free-floating and 
characterised by the above-mentioned neurotic ‘structure’ of anxiety “is bound 
psychically and attached to particular objects or situations. This is the anxiety of 
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the extremely multifarious and often very strange ‘phobias’” (Freud, 1917:398). 
 
Freud’s previous work on anxiety neurosis forms a base to his explanations 
surrounding yet another type of neurotic anxiety, that “faces us with the puzzling 
fact that here the connection between anxiety and a threatening danger is 
completely lost to view” (Freud, 1917:401) – or an anxiety without ‘reality’ nor 
object. This lack of a correlation to danger leads Freud to a few hypotheses when 
trying to connect realist anxiety and neurotic anxiety. For example: Could there be 
anything the patient is in fact afraid of at the heart of their neurotic anxiety?  This 
crucial point, later to be developed further in his 1926 text ‘Inhibitions, Symptoms 
and Anxiety’, finds its first explanation here, bringing back the previous ideas of 
discharge of sexual libido. Without departing from his earlier texts too drastically, 
Freud argues that “it is not difficult to establish the fact that expectant anxiety or 
general apprehensiveness is closely dependent on certain happenings in sexual 
life, or, let us say, certain employments of the libido” (Freud, 1917:401). That 
would be the case in the most varied contexts, even when sexuality is bound to 
‘cultural differences’; he states that “however much these relations are altered and 
complicated by a variety of cultural influences, it nevertheless remains true of the 
average of mankind that anxiety has a close connection with sexual limitation” 
(Freud, 1917:402). All in all, these observations led him “to conclude that the 
deflection of the libido from its normal employment, which causes the 
development of anxiety, takes place in the region of somatic processes” (Freud, 
1917:404). What will become clearer as Freud moves along with his writing is that 
for him, a normal employment of libido must involve another object or an 
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extension beyond one’s own body and idea of self. 
Whilst neurotic and realistic anxiety as different ‘categories’ proposed by Freud in 
this text may have different origins – the former related to ‘libido put to ‘abnormal’ 
employment’ and the latter ‘a reaction to danger’ – in the way such anxieties are 
felt, there is no distinction, for what is ‘real’, or ‘dangerous’ are complex categories 
when dealing with the unconscious. This open question is also picked up in the 
following decade, when Freud works with the concept of ‘castration anxiety’.  
 
It is necessary to introduce another factor that Freud presents here adding further 
to his theories on anxiety, that of the oppositions between the ego and libido: 
“As we know, the generation of anxiety is the ego's reaction to danger 
and the signal for taking flight. If so, it seems plausible to suppose that 
in neurotic anxiety the ego is making a similar attempt at flight from 
the demand by its libido, that it is treating this internal danger as 
though it were an external one. This would therefore fulfil our 
expectation that where anxiety is shown there is something one is 
afraid of. But the analogy could be carried further. Just as the attempt 
at flight from an external danger is replaced by standing firm and the 
adoption of expedient measures of defence, so too the generation of 
neurotic anxiety gives place to the formation of symptoms, which 
results in the anxiety being bound” (Freud, 1917:405). 
 
 
The ego, here being confronted by some internal libidinal ‘call’, starts to appear as 
the guarantor of a certain psychic stability in the end of Freud’s lecture, which 
ends with the debate between anxiety and repression. He asks, “what happens to 
the affect that was attached to the repressed idea?” (Freud, 1917:403) and his 
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answer is “that the immediate vicissitude of that affect is to be transformed into 
anxiety, whatever quality it may have exhibited apart from this in the normal 
course of events” (Freud, 1917:409). Such ‘discharge’ into anxiety of what was 
repressed also follows a particular route in phobias, slightly different then in cases 
of other neuroses: 
“In phobias, for instance, two phases of the neurotic process can be 
clearly distinguished. The first is concerned with repression and the 
changing of libido into anxiety, which is then bound to an external 
danger. The second consists in the erection of all the precautions and 
guarantees by means of which any contact can be avoided with this 
danger, treated as it is like an external thing. Repression corresponds 
to an attempt at flight by the ego from libido which is felt as a danger. 
A phobia may be compared to an entrenchment against an external 
danger which now represents the dreaded libido” (Freud, 1917:410). 
 
This ‘remainder’ is accounted for in Freud’s most famous case of phobia, Little 
Hans, published in 1909 and delineating that some excess of this ‘libidinal flow’ 
not grasped by the conversion in anxiety will not be shifted onto the object even 
in cases of phobia. In this sense, anxiety appears to us clearly as a ‘surplus’ or an 
excess in what Freud called ‘libido’ that does not and cannot find total and 
complete grounds to be satisfied or channelled in the body (in sex, eating, 
drinking, or other points when need and desire circle what later will be the ‘drive’) 
nor in representation, or words and symbolisation. Here we must pay special 
attention to the quality of this ‘surplus’, as it will be the grounds on which Lacan 
will later pin down the Real (where anxiety is located) – an excess that is not 
connected to desire nor satisfaction, and which is not bound by symbolisation.  
In this account of anxiety, Freud is able to schematise anxiety within the topology 
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of the ‘ego’ as functioning as a guarantor for subjectivity thus, gatekeeping 
excessive libido. This formulation is crucial to the understanding of anxiety as 
vibration, once it describes the psychic life of the subject formulated by 
psychoanalysis – one whose excesses are displaced (phobia), channelled (affect of 
anxiety) or accumulated (anxiety neurosis) in the body. Psyche-soma, or the 
subject of the drive, clearly present a libidinal charge to ideas and representation. 
In this manner, and again without relying on Oedipal sexual difference, Freud 
challenges what is later proposed by Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, which 
accounts for a non-libidinised relation to thoughts, working, instead, with an 
automatic body/mind model of the subject.  What is also interesting in this 1917 
work is that it again does away with the pathologisation of anxiety, describing so 
clearly that this is a fundamental affect that is formative of psychic experience.  In 
treatment, thus, when working with a case of extreme anxiety, the ego and its 
function of a gatekeeper of psychic stability is the focus of the treatment. Instead 
of getting rid of anxiety altogether, the Freudian model implies that we work 
through it.  This, of course, does away with the reliance on psychopharmakon as a 
treatment for anxiety, or a treatment for stopping the body ‘feeling’ anxiety.  
Whilst Freud gives us a rich account of how anxiety is an integral part of psychic 
experience and points towards a treatment of the ego, he is yet to add his theories 
of the function of the Id and the superego in this equation that results in anxiety.  
When he does so, the Modern humanism (and patriarchal) tone of his 





Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety, 1926 
 
 
It is in this 1926 essay that Freud outlines his most elaborate theory of anxiety, 
following a temporal logic that can be summarised as initially connecting anxiety 
as an un-discharged sexual tension; then as repressed libido. He further 
differentiates between anxiety being either realistic or neurotic and, finally, 
proposes that anxiety is a signal in the ego of a danger of disintegration.   In this 
paper, Freud ‘updates’ earlier views, especially in respect to libido and anxiety, a 
view he now regards as “not [in] accord with the general character of anxiety as a 
reaction to unpleasure” (Freud, 1926:161). Unpleasure, in psychoanalytic 
parlance, is of the order of the excessive, that which disturbs homeostasis. 
The essay itself is quite contradictory and fragmented, divided in chapters and 
including a final addendum, where earlier concepts are summarised, reworked, 
rejected and confirmed, sometimes in a very circular manner. Yet, there are 
important points that will later be worked over by Lacan in the 1960s. Freud 
begins arguing about the differences between an inhibition and a symptom, which 
may seem simple but reveal his journey into some key dynamics of psychic 
structures. Parting from the common use of each term being the first of a ‘non-
function’ and the latter a ‘wrong-functioning’, Freud indicates that in reality the 
very inhibition, or a ‘non-functioning function’, can be a symptom itself in the eyes 
of psychoanalysis. Anxiety and inhibitions are correlated. Freud explains that 
“some inhibitions obviously represent a relinquishment of a function because its 
exercise would produce anxiety” (Freud, 1926:88). Whilst the inhibition to eat or 
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towards the sexual act can take place, a symptom would be, as he offers as 
examples, vomiting or disgust at the idea of sex.  In the clinic, mapping the function 
and dynamics of a symptom is a fundamental direction in the treatment. This is a 
way to trace the singular arrangement of one’s subjectivity in relation to their 
psychic suffering. 
 For Freud, when there is a restriction of an ego-function, an inhibition takes place 
“the ego renounces these functions, which are within its sphere, in order not to 
have to undertake fresh measures of repression—in order to avoid a conflict with 
the id” (Freud, 1926:90). Thus, we find here inhibitions being seen almost as a 
‘protective measure’. At the same time, inhibitions can represent self-punishment, 
“in order to avoid coming into conflict with the super-ego” (Freud, 1926:90). 
Whilst inhibitions “are restrictions of the functions of the ego which have been 
either imposed as a measure of precaution or brought about as a result of an 
impoverishment of energy” (Freud, 1926:90), symptoms differ by not being “a 
process that takes place within, or acts upon, the ego” (Freud, 1926:90). Here is 
why Lacan, as I will explore in Chapter 3, will go on to say that anxiety is not a 
symptom, rather, it is an affect.  
Freud challenges his earlier understanding of the symptom, which was by now 
complicated by the findings in his work on ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920): 
“A symptom is a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction 
which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of the process of 
repression. Repression proceeds from the ego when the latter—it may 
be at the behest of the superego—refuses to associate itself with an 
instinctual cathexis which has been aroused in the id. The ego is able 
by means of repression to keep the idea which is the vehicle of the 
reprehensible impulse from becoming conscious” (Freud, 1926:91). 
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This view of the symptom in relation to unpleasure as what is actually being 
‘looked for’ instinctually posits that a symptom appears when “as a result of 
repression the intended course of the excitatory process in the id does not occur 
at all; the ego succeeds in inhibiting or deflecting it” (Freud, 1926:91). This ego, 
which is in a somewhat privileged position in relation to perception and thus 
consciousness of the outside world, “wards off internal and external dangers alike 
along identical lines” (Freud, 1926:92) by means of a flight. Whilst the external 
stimuli are met with bodily movements (for example, you may ‘run away’), an 
internal unwelcomed process will be met with repression. The ego will withdraw 
the cathexis emerging off an instinct (as the translation goes, or the ‘drive’) that is 
going to be repressed and will ‘employ’ “that cathexis for the purpose of releasing 
unpleasure (anxiety)” (Freud, 1926:93).  Therefore, with this mechanism, Freud 
supersedes his earlier account of an automatic transformation of what is 
repressed into anxiety, bringing it into the realm of the ego, which allows for a 
more complex mapping of the subject, their being in the world, their bodily being 
in the world and stimuli of all orders. The libidinal excess from the drive and from 
reality-resting are routed by a gatekeeping ego, which manages the rhythm of 
excess in light of a possible dissolution of the ego’s stability. Anxiety, therefore, is 
a by-product of the Id. 
Otto Rank’s then contemporary theory of the trauma of birth as one of the early 
universal ‘mnemic symbols’ for anxiety also leaves space for other traumatic 
experiences and the sexual act to act as such symbols– which appears in Freud’s 
earlier writings on this topic. Freud writes: “Anxiety is not newly created in 
repression; it is reproduced as an affective state in accordance with an already 
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existing mnemic image. If we go further and enquire into the origin of that 
anxiety—and of affects in general—we shall be leaving the realm of pure 
psychology and entering the borderland of physiology” (Freud, 1926:93).  Rank’s 
theories, that Freud was writing in contrast with, suggested that birth was the 
universal traumatic experience and the nucleus of the neuroses. However, 
“Freud’s examination shows that this cannot be the case. A child’s anxiety-
potential increases, not decreases after birth” (Mitchell, 1974:81). What is 
particularly interesting at this point is the connection Freud makes with affect as 
a kind of blueprint that gets repeated. He writes: “Affective states have become 
incorporated in the mind as precipitates of primaeval traumatic experiences, and 
when a similar situation occurs they are revived like mnemic symbols” (Freud, 
1926:93).  As we can see, affect thus appears in this piece as a repetition without 
difference; here we see anxiety as reproducing ‘being’ and hardly opening into 
new ‘becomings’.  
Repression being the activating mechanism of symptom-formation and anxiety, 
according to Freud’s logic, remains slightly puzzling, especially in regard to its 
relation with the super-ego. This leaves Freud with an open-ended understanding 
that there are primal repressions and an ‘after-pressure’, which could be perhaps 
demarcated by the emergence of the super-ego; nonetheless, in small children, 
who are pre-Oedipal, there is, as he sees, still intense anxiety. 
 
When repression fails, “the instinctual impulse has found a substitute in spite of 
repression, but a substitute which is very much reduced, displaced and inhibited 
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and which is no longer recognizable as a satisfaction” (Freud, 1926:95). In trying 
to satisfy a drive via such substitutive process (which is the dynamic of symptoms, 
in a general sense), the repressive mechanism “is forced to expend itself in making 
alterations in the subject's own body and is not permitted to impinge upon the 
external world. It must not be transformed into action” (Freud, 1926:95). The 
‘internalisation’ of the effect of repression en route to become anxiety is explained 
as follows: “As we know, in repression the ego is operating under the influence of 
external reality and therefore it debars the substitutive process from having any 
effect upon that reality” (Freud, 1926:95). The ego at first struggles against this 
newly emerged symptom, as if trying to get rid of a ‘foreign body’; however, a 
secondary, and, as Freud sees it, more complicated process takes place 
subsequently, that of a ‘conciliation’ to the point of enjoyment – as Lacan would 
phrase it – with this symptom.  Freud writes: 
“Being of a peaceable disposition it [the ego] would like to incorporate 
the symptom and make it part of itself. It is from the symptom itself 
that the trouble comes. For the symptom, being the true substitute for 
and derivative of the repressed impulse, carries on the role of the 
latter; it continually renews its demands for satisfaction and thus 
obliges the ego in its turn to give the signal of unpleasure and put itself 
in a posture of defence” (Freud, 1926:100). 
 
This ‘signal of unpleasure’ is anxiety. With the introduction of the ‘signal’, 
following what I presented in the Introduction, anxiety appears as fundamentally 
a psychosocial phenomenon, comprising a subject beyond itself. Freud reworks 
yet another of his earlier ideas, that which argued that anxiety is produced by 
repression. By dissecting neurosis through the cases of phobia in Little Hans and 
the Wolf Man, pointing at each case’s symptom and inhibitions whilst working on 
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their castration anxiety, Freud elaborates that “the majority of phobias go back to 
an anxiety of this kind felt by the ego in regard to the demands of the libido. It is 
always the ego's attitude of anxiety which is the primary thing and which sets 
repression going. Anxiety never arises from repressed libido” (Freud, 1926:109).  
Anxiety, thus, “is produced from the libidinal cathexis of the instinctual impulses” 
(Freud, 1926:110), slightly different to what he suggested in his early theories.  
Conversion Hysterias and obsessional neurosis bring, on their turn, another layer 
to Freud’s understanding of the symptom in relation to the logic of satisfaction 
and the ‘agency’ of the ego, the id and the super-ego over one another. In 
obsessional neurosis, the tendency in symptom-formation “is to give ever greater 
room to substitutive satisfaction at the expense of frustration. Symptoms which 
once stood for a restriction of the ego come later on to represent satisfactions as 
well, thanks to the ego's inclination to synthesis, and it is quite clear that this 
second meaning gradually becomes the more important of the two” (Freud, 
1926:118). The ego is then reduced to the role of satisfying the symptom, as Freud 
writes: “The over-acute conflict between id and superego which has dominated 
the illness from the very beginning may assume such extensive proportions that 
the ego, unable to carry out its office of mediator, can undertake nothing which is 
not drawn into the sphere of that conflict” (Freud, 1926:118). This riddle brought 
to light from cases of phobia, obsessive neurosis and conversion hysterias is 
somewhat problematised in the following pages, when Freud brings up the 
remarkable hypothesis that castration anxiety lays in the backdrop of anxiety in 
general. Juliet Mitchell (1974) argues, in her influential Psychoanalysis and 
Feminism, that it is in this essay, when Freud reformulates his theories of anxiety, 
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that he “changed not the nature but the connotations and scope of the theory of 
castration. Anxiety precedes the fear of castration; it is a red-light warning of a 
possible danger” (Mitchell, 1974:81).  Castration, as a cornerstone of subjectivity 
within the Oedipal metaphor, as I will reach in what follows, is a problematic point 
of criticism from feminist scholars to the mental life assumed by psychoanalysis.12 
Whilst the Freudian subject is indeed psychosocial – rather than solely biological 
or individualised, as mainstream practices of psy will have it– this subject is still 
anchored in a type of subjective alienation in which the ‘moral’ of the Oedipal 
father is internalised in a guarantee to an affective modulation, crystallising 
patriarchy as a means to manage the excessiveness of the drive – a view that is not 
sufficiently challenged by even some feminist contemporary psychoanalysts such 
as Gherovici (2018 ).  
According to Freud, in phobias, the relation to castration anxiety is rather straight 
forward: “As soon as the ego recognises the danger of castration it gives the signal 
of anxiety and inhibits through the pleasure-unpleasure agency (in a way which 
we cannot as yet understand) the impending cathectic process in the id” (Freud, 
1926:125). In this case of phobia, the ego is successful in its ‘solution’ to anxiety, 
 
12 As early as 1975, the anthropologist Gayle Rubin writes of psychoanalysis’ use for 
feminism, in the essay ‘Traffic in Women’, famously calling psychoanalysis a ‘failed’ type 
of feminism. For Rubin, “Psychoanalysis contains a unique set of concepts for 
understanding men, women, and sexuality. It is a theory of sexuality in human society. 
Most importantly, psychoanalysis provides a description of the mechanisms by which 
the sexes are divided and deformed, of how bisexual, androgynous infants are 
transformed into boys and girls. Psychoanalysis is a feminist theory manqué” (Rubin, 
1975:185). Heleieth Saffioti, a pioneer Brazilian Marxist Feminist, had already published 
in 1969 a similar critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, stressing that Freud’s theory of 
femininity validated anatomic difference as anchor of a patriarchal domination between 
two sexes (Saffioti, 1975). 
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avoiding it by avoiding the ‘object’ where it was displaced to or through the very 
inhibitory symptom. What Freud suggests, making this ‘simple’ economic 
equation more sophisticated, is that the danger in phobia towards which the ego 
is giving a signal is the danger of castration, in a manner that is no different to a 
‘realistic anxiety’ –  when there is something ‘real’ threatening the subject – the 
difference however being “that its content remains unconscious and only becomes 
conscious in the form of a distortion” (Freud, 1926:126). Similarly, in obsessional 
neurosis, a danger is also being ‘solved’, but the difference here is that “the danger- 
situation from which the ego must get away is the hostility of the superego” 
(Freud, 1926:128), an internalised danger, not external. This ‘threat’ on the ego 
parting from a scrutinising superego is also ‘felt’ as real and also derives from 
castration, but in this case it becomes what Freud calls ‘moral anxiety’.  
So far, what Freud offers on the topic of anxiety is that anxiety is, be it in cases of 
phobia, hysteria or obsessional neurosis, a ‘reaction’ to some ‘situation of danger’, 
and it becomes apparent “by the ego's doing something to avoid that situation or 
to withdraw from it” (Freud, 1926:128). Whilst anxiety itself is not a symptom, but 
an unwanted affect that serves as a signal to this imminent danger, “symptoms are 
created so as to avoid a danger-situation whose presence has been signalled by 
the generation of anxiety” (Freud, 1926:129). The danger situation, the threat, to 
which anxiety is a signal of, is lined by castration, which, for Freud at this point, 
can be identified in various instances, from separation to death, all of which 
present a danger to the integrity of the ego.  He writes: “I am therefore inclined to 
adhere to the view that the fear of death should be regarded as analogous to the 
fear of castration and that the situation to which the ego is reacting is one of being 
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abandoned by the protecting super-ego—the powers of destiny—so that it has no 
longer any safeguard against all the dangers that surround it” (Freud, 1926:130). 
What we see here is this danger of fragmentation, of annihilation of the unifying 
or ‘stable’ (even if by an illusion of stability) sense of self as the basis of anxiety – 
this characteristic underlies my notion of anxiety as a vibration, as it will become 
clearer as the thesis develops along.  This is also precisely the grounds for anxiety 
Lacan will be working with, situating the subject as bound to the Other, in a 
position lacking of any autonomy, which is at the foundations for his theories on 
anxiety, as I will explore in the next chapter.  Evidently, the choice of the word 
‘castration’ and its reverberations with ‘lack’ within a phallic matrix of subjectivity 
are far from unproblematic from feminist lenses.  
 
For Freud, the ‘manifestation’ of anxiety is particular to the body, to specific 
‘physical sensations’ that are here pointed as mostly respiratory, connected to the 
heart and motor in their discharge. In short, anxiety is linked to “(1) a specific 
character of unpleasure, (2) acts of discharge and (3) perceptions of those acts” 
(Freud, 1926: 132-133). And it is precisely in the way anxiety is characterised 
through the acts of discharge connected to it and how such acts are perceived that 
anxiety differs from other kinds of ‘un-pleasures’. Freud even offers the specific 
examples of pain and mourning, that can be similar, yet diverge in their 
‘discharge’, for “anxiety is based upon an increase of excitation which on the one 
hand produces the character of unpleasure and on the other finds relief through 
the acts of discharge” (Freud, 1926: 133). Despite its remarking physiological 
characteristics, which Freud mentions as an increase in excitation that produces 
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unpleasure and at the same time finds a path of discharge; there is more to anxiety 
than this very physiology. The unconscious is also highly associated in this 
‘specificity’ of anxiety, once there is a specific ‘temporality’ of anxiety brought 
together by the very ‘marks’ it leaves on the subject and their experience. This 
‘line’ or ‘trail’ of anxiety is, Freud supposes,  connected to a ‘model’ experience that 
is reproduced through the anxious feeling, this initial experience, “contained the 
necessary conditions for such an increase of excitation and a discharge along 
particular paths, and that from this circumstance the unpleasure of anxiety 
receives its specific character” (Freud, 1926: 133). One of such early experiences 
is the trauma of birth. Whilst Freud acknowledges that some biological 
observations with non-mammals can possibly refute the trauma of birth theory, it 
nonetheless cannot be so easily discarded in relation to the human experience, 
and what follows from this assumption would be the questioning of ‘why’ anxiety. 
What would be its function, presuming there is any? “The answer seems to be 
obvious and convincing: anxiety arose originally as a reaction to a state of danger 
and it is reproduced whenever a state of that kind recurs” (Freud, 1926: 134).  
 
Instead of the trauma of birth in the way Rank has proposed, Freud sees birth and 
the subsequent developments in small children as allowing for a ‘primal anxiety’ 
which is linked to the fear of object loss. This fear of object loss and anxiety are, 
however, enveloped in the same danger-signal logic. Freud suggests earlier that 
this involves this initial danger, a possibility raised in the infant’s awareness that 
without the ‘mother’ it can vanish without care, nourishment, etc., all of which is 
‘processed’ by the infant as a satisfaction-unsatisfied-unpleasure state.  This 
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growing tension that emerges with need and the state of non-satisfaction that sees 
stimuli accumulating to the point of unpleasure sees infants unable to master this 
tension physically or discharge it, “analogous to the experience of being born” 
(Freud, 1926: 137), giving rise to anxiety in relation to this very ‘danger’.  Only 
when the baby is able to process this danger as linked to the presence of the 
mother that her absence becomes a danger itself. 
 
Yet, an early infant anxiety, this primary anxiety and the fear of loss are also 
analogous to what happens later on, when castration becomes the danger, when 
the phallic phase is reached, as “in this case the danger is of being separated from 
one's genitals” (Freud, 1926: 139). The genital, particularly the penis, of high 
narcissistic value, as Freud paraphrases from Ferenczi, is linked with the fantasy 
of it being what could once again unite the child with the mother. In castration, 
“being deprived of it [the phallus] amounts to a renewed separation from her, and 
this in its turn means being helplessly exposed to an unpleasurable tension due to 
instinctual need, as was the case at birth” (Freud, 1926: 139).  At this point Freud 
introduces the problematic riddle of sexual difference to his theory of anxiety, 
which, as I will discuss in what follows, is important in the formulation of a 
psychosocial approach to this affect that does not rely on Oedipal sexual difference 
as the anchor of subjectivity. 
 
For Freud, with the subsequent refinement of perception and psychic activities, 
the fear of loss of the mother and castration are followed by the super-ego, when 
the latter is ‘installed’ as a ‘depersonalisation’ of the parental figure/agency that 
once allowed for castration. When the super-ego is installed as part of the psychic 
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structure, a type of anxiety emerges which is social and Freud calls ‘moral anxiety’. 
Subsequently, the ego will signal with anxiety when the ‘disapproval’ from the 
super-ego becomes prominent. And here, in this complex state of anxiety in 
relation to the super-ego, a foundation for the Lacanian anxiety and the desire of 
the Other is laid down: “The final transformation which the fear of the super-ego 
undergoes is, it seems [to me], the fear of death (or fear for life) which is a fear of 
the super-ego projected on to the powers of destiny” (Freud, 1926: 140). Or, as 
Lacan asks, in Italian: Che vuoi? 
 
Avoiding danger, removing oneself from the possibility of it…the reactions to this 
danger are closely linked to anxiety and of course the question of what are these 
dangers and the place they occupy in one’s psychic structure is the next question, 
that is addressed on a tangent.  Freud moves to the end of this essay by 
summarising the different ‘stages’ in life as per how one is situated to face one’s 
anxiety, a process that culminates with negotiations over the process of ‘being in 
the world’ in the most direct sense. There is a justification of a moral 
internalisation and the affect of anxiety as correlate, not to mention the, yet again, 
focus on the ‘boy’s’ psychosexual development. 
“In early infancy the individual is really not equipped to master 
psychically the large sums of excitation that reach him whether from 
without or from within. Again, at a certain period of life his most 
important interest really is that the people he is dependent on should 
not withdraw their loving care of him. Later on in his boyhood, when 
he feels that his father is a powerful rival in regard to his mother and 
becomes aware of his own aggressive inclinations towards him and of 
his sexual intentions towards his mother, he really is justified in being 
afraid of his father; and his fear of being punished by him can find 
expression through phylogenetic reinforcement in the fear of being 
castrated. Finally, as he enters into social relationships, it really is 
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necessary for him to be afraid of his super-ego, to have a conscience; 
and the absence of that factor would give rise to severe conflicts, 
dangers and so on” (Freud, 1926:146-147). 
 
This ‘line’ is not particularly ‘linear’ in everyone’s experiences, as a person can get 
caught in an earlier manner of dealing with the excess stimuli and “remain 
infantile in their behaviour in regard to danger and do not overcome determinants 
of anxiety which have grown out of date” (Freud, 1926:146). That would 
characterise neurosis and also offer light on the quantitative aspects of this 
economy of stimuli in the dynamics of repression. Repression, repetition and 
anxiety form a cycle of excesses and remainders operating in a somewhat non-
organised circuit, propelled by the interplay of control and excess of libido so 
vividly evidenced in the production of anxiety. 
 
Sexual difference, as well as moral anxiety and castration are, for Juliet Mitchell 
(1974) central themes for a feminist engagement with psychoanalysis, once they 
are intrinsically linked with the debate of the Oedipus Complex.  Anxiety, thus, has 
a feminine imprint in Freudian thought, as she explains: 
“The anxiety caused by the mother going can be resolved by 
understanding that she will come back […]. The point is that this 
anxiety does not (any more than does the anxiety of birth), involve 
socially unacceptable ideas. On the other hand, the incestuous 
desire for the mother that then arises does involve the forbidden. 
Now, anxiety comes into play to suggest fear of castration if these 
incestuous ideas are not abandoned. […] If the castration complex is 
not adequately resolved – and that means the possibility of 
castration in not symbolically accepted, then the Oedipus complex 
is not shattered and aspects of its irresolution will recur in later 





Freud, through the function of the phallus (in the evident description of patriarchy 
present in his theory of psychosexual development), connects narcissism and the 
Oedipus complex – or a modulation of desire within a politically situated family 
drama, as Deleuze and Guattari (1983) will denounce in Anti-Oedipus– with the 
concept of castration.  This model of positing sexual difference thus relied on the 
artifice of anxiety, once a fear of castration would, for a little boy, be expressed 
through an outburst of anxiety, such as seen in the case of Little Hans.  Mitchell 
writes: 
“Freud gave a number of reasons for the value attached to the 
phallus […]. Having incorporated it into the concept of narcissism – 
its ownership is crucial to the nature of the ego being formed, or 
rather its loss would be an immense blow for the narcissistic ego – 
Freud had to recognise the distinction between the sexes in this 
respect. This recognition, and the diverse role of the castration 
complex, led him, in the second half of the twenties and thirties to a 
reassessment of the Oedipus complex and from there to the 
development of his theories of femininity and the pre-Oedipal 
narcissistic stage” (Mitchel, 1974:88) 
 
Lacan will make castration anxiety even more central to his theory of this affect, 
as I explore in Chapter 3.  Castration and the phallic law, as well as a positioning 
of the subject on the side of ‘having it’ or ‘lacking it’ in a Symbolic and Imaginary 
form are the grounds for his theory of sexual difference. What Juliet Mitchell 
observed, so early in the encounter between psychoanalysis and feminism, and 
what she argues in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, is that Freud’s theory of anxiety, 
which unfolds through lack, loss and separation, is utilised to account for a type of 
castration (the ‘castration complex’), for when castration is already there 
(‘femininity’). Anxiety, thus, is a feminist issue. 
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As we have seen so far, in this paper, Freud makes several changes to his previous 
views on the topic of anxiety, taking into account his works in other texts as 
mentioned before such as ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, 1920, and ‘The Ego and 
the Id’, 1923.  Anxiety, by 1926, then, is more complex than an overwhelming 
excess of libido finding its ‘way out’; it now passes through the mental apparatus, 
mobilizing the body accordingly, in much less ‘pre-arranged’ zig zags, once the Id 
and also repression come to negotiate stimuli, protections, symptoms and 
remainders.   The ego is the ‘seat’ but also the ‘source’ of anxiety – an assertion 
that Lacan would challenge in his take on the subject, taking it away from the ego.  
Rank’s work on the trauma of birth as a ‘prototype’ to anxiety was also worked 
over, raising the central discussion around what is perceived as a situation of 
danger, a threat to the ego, and not only neurotic or realistic anxieties but also 
moral anxiety.  The existence of an ‘original’ situation of danger was circumvented 
until Freud was able to reach the heart of the question in the identification of the 
factor of a ‘threat to the ego’.  
 
Anxiety as ‘signal’, as it has been conceptualized in this paper, also comes close to 
‘fear’, nonetheless Freud offers a very precise clarification of the difference 
between the two. Again, this is a point that Lacan will pick up later in relation to 
anxiety and the ‘lack of the lack’, subverting Freudian logic. To Freud, “anxiety 
[Angst] has an unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about something. 
It has a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise speech we use the 
word ‘fear’ [Furcht] rather than ‘anxiety’ [Angst] if it has found an object” (Freud, 
1926:165). Having ‘something’ to be anxious ‘about’ brings up the question of the 
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nature of this ‘something’, of it being ‘real’ or ‘not real’, and in this paper Freud 
insists that something is ‘real’ as long as it feels as such to the subject. In this sense, 
a bearing on ‘material reality’ is not what defines what is a ‘realistic’ of neurotic 
anxiety, rather, the external (as in an external object) or internal 
(instinctual/drive-related) ‘nature of this sources’ of anxiety, both share the same 
‘realistic basis’. 
 
New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis: Lecture XXXII Anxiety and 
Instinctual Life, 1933 
 
Written in 1932 and published the following year, Freud’s New Introductory 
Lectures series was never delivered, rather, printed straight away in 1933, 
covering a number of topics that crossed psychoanalysis. The lecture on ‘Anxiety 
and Instinctual Life’, the last of his pieces dedicated specifically to the theme of 
anxiety, sets off by promising updates but nevertheless no real ‘final’ answers in 
regard to the riddle of anxiety.  The text, in the first half, in particular, when 
recapping the previous lecture on the same topic, Lecture XXV from 1917, and 
updating its findings, is very much in line with the contributions found in 
‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’, pointing at an anxiety as signal to a situation 
of danger; a danger deriving from a traumatic experience and an anxiety formed 
around the fear of castration and its repercussions.  
 
Freud departs from what is known about anxiety by that point, that it is “an 
affective estate—that is to say, a combination of certain feelings in the pleasure-
unpleasure series with the corresponding innervations of discharge and a 
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perception of them, but probably also the precipitate of a particular important 
event, incorporated by inheritance” (Freud, 1933c:81).  Anxiety had a sort of 
‘footprint’ on the psyche-body that would see itself resonating in future 
experiences of anxiety. Another point raised still in 1917 was in relation to the 
different ‘types’ of anxiety: neurotic and realistic, and their origin and process. 
Whilst the latter seems to be clearer to understanding, as a response to an external 
threat and the preparedness towards it, the former, by his account, was still left 
slightly up in the air in 1917.  However, as noted in this chapter, the 1926 essay 
deals with this difference in more detail. 
 
One key aspect that is now clearer in relation to anxiety in cases of hysteria and 
neurosis is the mechanism of repression, that by now, towards the later years of 
Freud’s life, is more refined than what was offered in early texts. By 1932 he was 
already working over his second topographical model of the psychic apparatus, 
and the id, ego and super-ego come to function as dynamic agencies of the psyche 
with more clarity. In regard to anxiety and repression, our understanding can 
benefit   
“if we separate what happens to the idea that has to be repressed from 
what happens to the quota of libido attaching to it. It is the idea which 
is subjected to repression and which may be distorted to the point of 
being unrecognizable; but its quota of affect is regularly transformed 
into anxiety—and this is so whatever the nature of the affect may be, 
whether it is aggressiveness or love” (Freud, 1933c:83). 
 
 
In light of this transformation, Freud reminds us of previous works in linking 
symptom and anxiety – a correlation that becomes confused at times in the 1926 
work, precisely because they “represent and replace each other” (Freud, 
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1933c:83) in different case scenarios.  Therefore, “it seems, indeed, that the 
generation of anxiety is the earlier and the formation of symptoms the later of the 
two, as though the symptoms are created in order to avoid the outbreak of the 
anxiety state” (Freud, 1933c:84). Another point clarified on this occasion is that 
what one is really afraid of in cases of neurotic anxiety and realistic anxiety is their 
own libido, and the difference here would be that in neurotic anxiety “danger is 
internal instead of an external one and that it is not consciously recognised” 
(Freud, 1933c:84). This ‘re-employment’ of libido in anxiety and the fact that it 
may be replaced by a symptom that is ‘physically bound’ is what gains more 
consistency in this current presentation, once, as Freud points out,  it is in the 
interplay between id, ego and super-ego that we can grasp further what is the 
Freudian contribution to the riddle of anxiety.  
 
The ego being, as he previously established, the ‘seat of anxiety’, does not mean 
that despite anxiety not being ‘in’ the id, for instance, that these other psychic 
agencies do not exercise any impact on the formation of anxiety. Quite the 
contrary, as Freud elaborated in the 1926 piece, there is a centrality of castration 
anxiety that can be read over different cases and at different moments in life of 
any individual. He related the ‘fear of castration’ to a sense of helplessness, lack of 
autonomy and a threat to the subject.  Yet, so far the Freudian subject of anxiety 
has been – despite the account of hysteria – much focused on a presupposed 
‘male/masculine’ individual. Here Freud for once differentiates castration in the 
possible implications it has over sexual difference, whilst still keeping to the 
‘findings’ of the work on the previous decades:  
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“Fear of castration is not, of course, the only motive for repression: 
indeed, it finds no place in women, for though they have a castration 
complex they cannot have a fear of being castrated. Its place is taken in 
their sex by a fear of loss of love, which is evidently a later prolongation 
of the infant's anxiety if it finds its mother absent. You will realise how 
real a situation of danger is indicated by this anxiety. If a mother is 
absent or has withdrawn her love from her child, it is no longer sure of 
the satisfaction of its needs and is perhaps exposed to the most 
distressing feelings of tension” (Freud, 1933c:87).  
 
What is interesting here is that Rank’s trauma of birth and the centrality over this 
separation from the mother, instead of a centrality in castration, could somehow 
hint at a less Oedipal sexual difference in the foundations of anxiety. Yet, as Freud 
dismisses this claim of the centrality of the trauma of birth, we are left with anxiety 
as a riddle that seats in the ego but is mobilised by the id and the super-ego as well 
and mobilising the body in its turn through a path that, in this account, relies on 
the Oedipal structure.  What we can also read into this centrality of castration is a 
problematic infantilisation of women/femininity, once he posits that:  
“The danger of psychical helplessness fits the stage of the ego's early 
immaturity; the danger of loss of an object (or loss of love) fits the lack 
of self-sufficiency in the first years of childhood; the danger of being 
castrated fits the phallic phase; and finally fear of the super-ego, which 
assumes a special position, fits the period of latency. In the course of 
development the old determinants of anxiety should be dropped, since 
the situations of danger corresponding to them have lost their 
importance owing to the strengthening of the ego. But this only occurs 
most incompletely. Many people are unable to surmount the fear of 
loss of love; they never become sufficiently independent of other 
people's love and in this respect carry on their behaviour as infants”  
(Freud, 1933c: 88). 
 
Through this logic Freud explains how neurotics are held onto this early, infantile 
relation to danger, not being able to ingress in the phallic phase that entails a 
‘getting over’ the fear of being ‘left’, just as for women. Women, for not being able 
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to enter the Oedipal phase as such, and neurotics are stuck in this infantilised 
state. An obvious testament to Freud’s patriarchal views – which I add to what has 
been elaborated by Juliet Mitchell (1974) on the topic, as mentioned above. 
 
Another key aspect of Freud’s late theory of anxiety is its relation to repression. 
Whilst at first it was thought that repression generated anxiety, we now 
understand that it is the other way around, as previously mentioned. Anxiety, 
therefore, is located in the interplay between ego and id. Such ego and id relation 
in anxiety only becomes clear after the 1923 text, substituting the visual model of 
vessels of quantities Freud proposed in the ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’, 
outlined in 1895.  The ego “makes use of an experimental cathexis and starts up 
the pleasure-unpleasure automatism by means of a signal of anxiety” (Freud, 
1933c:90), which is activated on the face of the dangers the repetition of a certain 
traumatic experience that would emerge if a ‘call’ of the id were to be attended to.  
Given this, anxiety and repression can go different ways. There may be an anxiety 
attack (which is when the ego withdraws completely from what Freud calls this 
‘objectionable excitation’ it is alerting against) or the ego may offer a counter-
balance, an anticathexis that will be joined by the reserved energy of the repressed 
impulse resulting in a symptom.  
 
Signal anxiety ‘sets in action’ the pleasure-unpleasure principle impact of 
repression, transforming what goes on in the id, or ‘instinctual/drive impulses’ 
that belong there. Freud offers different scenarios to what happens in the id 
through repression. “In some cases the repressed instinctual impulse may retain 
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its libidinal cathexis, and may persist in the id unchanged, although subject to 
constant pressure from the ego” (Freud, 1933c:92). At other times this ‘instinctual 
impulse’ vanishes leaving only a trace of libido, of energy, that is ‘diverted’ 
thereafter – which he posits as being the case when the Oedipus complex is well 
resolved. Another option would be for “a regression of the libidinal organisation 
to an earlier stage. This can, of course, only occur in the id, and if it occurs it will 
be under the influence of the same conflict which was introduced by the signal of 
anxiety” (Freud, 1933c:92). 
 
Quantities of tension that cannot be dealt with, which are overwhelming to the 
consistency of the subject, are still the backbone of anxiety. This includes signal 
anxiety, where “what is feared, what is the object of the anxiety, is invariably the 
emergence of a traumatic moment, which cannot be dealt with by the normal rules 
of the pleasure principle” (Freud, 1933c:94).  Therefore, anxiety is almost a 
secondary process that has to have an initial point at a previous experience, a rule 
maintained even when it is a case of anxiety neurosis “owing to somatic damage 
to the sexual function” (Freud, 1933c:94).  A fresh contribution in this text then is 
this short observation that supersedes the 1926 text, stating that “we shall no 
longer maintain that it is the libido itself that is turned into anxiety in such cases 
[of anxiety neurosis linked to the bodily sexual function]” (Freud, 1933c:94). In 
summary, Freud offers “a twofold origin of anxiety—one as a direct consequence 
of the traumatic moment and the other as a signal threatening a repetition of such 
a moment” (Freud, 1933c:94). And in so doing, he moves psychoanalysis away 
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from its cruder focus on the sexual drive and towards the matter of an 
overwhelming threat to the consistency of the ego. 
 
Yet again, Freud’s view of anxiety is that it is a central affect to ‘normal’ experience 
and that it has a function. By functioning as a signal to a threat to the stability of 
the ego, anxiety is able to establish itself as a ‘compass’ in the map of the treatment 
(Miller, 2007). It is by going through the clues of anxiety that we can get in touch 
to what is anchoring one’s ego. Whilst some clinical approaches (from mainstream 
biologist psychiatry to certain orientations in psychoanalysis) might find value in 
strengthening the ego’s mechanisms of defence (from some psychoanalytic 
schools to forms of counselling and psychotherapy that are humanistic, or ‘person-
centred’), or one’s ‘ideal of oneself’ (think here of CBT, Positive Psychology and 
wellness, in general), a Freudo-Lacanian practice will lead towards disputing the 
very illusion that the ego consists on. Anxiety is then, the guiding principle of this 
practice; and if one has to be less anxious, the solution is to make the ego less stiff 
and a little more malleable.  Instead of a stranger, anxiety is deeply entangled into 
the Freudian subject. 
 
The trail of anxiety in Freud  
 
 
The very final systematic account of anxiety in Freudian writing appears in one of 
his last written pieces, before passing away in London. In ‘An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis’, from 1938, his later ideas about the id, the ego and the functions 
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and dynamics of anxiety are expressed. We quite clearly see anxiety as a 
negotiation between these psychic agencies, operating as a threshold of 
overwhelming tension and the movement of preservation of integrity. The ego 
appears as a gatekeeper, guaranteeing an adaptation to the ‘world’, against both 
internal and external dangers of annihilation of the subject. The id, in this final 
account, appears as a still mysterious and charged psychic sphere that is directly 
connected with the body, the drive and perception. Freud writes:  
 
“The id, cut off from the external world, has a world of perception of its 
own. It detects with extraordinary acuteness certain changes in its 
interior, especially oscillations in the tension of its instinctual needs, 
and these changes become conscious as feelings in the pleasure-
unpleasure series. It is hard to say, to be sure, by what means and with 
the help of what sensory terminal organs these perceptions come 
about. But it is an established fact that self-perceptions—coenaesthetic 
feelings and feelings of pleasure-unpleasure—govern the passage of 
events in the id with despotic force” (Freud, 1938:198). 
 
 
This overwhelming flow of pleasure-unpleasure is then channelled through the 
activity of the ego, guided by ‘the sensations of anxiety’. In Freud’s words: “The 
ego has set itself the task of self-preservation, which the id appears to neglect. It 
[the ego] makes use of the sensations of anxiety as a signal to give a warning of 
dangers that threaten its integrity” (Freud, 1938:199). It is interesting that Freud’s 
development of his theory of anxiety as a signal of an imminent threat first starts 
with a focus on realistic dangers, which are dangers to the body and to life. He then 
moves on to dangers that are more subjective, related to the ego, to the 
preservation of some integrity and a sense of ‘self’ that is guaranteed and 
stabilised through the ego’s activities.  Post-Freudian psychoanalysis – especially 
in the context of the several Jewish analysts that escaped Nazi persecution in 
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Europe during and around the period of  WWII – grows in the United States into a 
further preoccupation with these promises of stability conferred to a well-
functioning ego. Adaptation and strengthening the ego’s defences become central 
to the work developed by Anna Freud in the 1940s in Britain and by Ego-
Psychology in the United States (Frosh, 1987).  In France, Lacan puts this into 
question, twisting the roles of the id and ego.  Freud’s ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich warden’ 
becomes “Where it was, I must come into being” (Lacan, 1957 [2006]:435). 
Anxiety, as an affect of sensations that at once overwhelm and inform the ego, 
assumes a central and intriguing role in subjectivity.  It can at the same time 
paralyse and cause suffering, whilst it may point at new horizons, opening up the 
gates of the id beyond the limits of the ‘illusion’ of the ego.  
 
This view of the function of anxiety is, therefore, contrary to the hegemonic 
psychiatric nosology discussed in Chapter 1, where, instead, the goal is to 
eliminate anxiety altogether, keeping any ‘sense of self’ unexamined.  From this 
perspective, the Freudian view of anxiety already hints at a possible ‘becoming’ 
away from a frozen ‘being’.  In doing so, the Freudian theories of anxiety open the 
way to an understanding of anxiety as a ‘vibration’, or as an affect of the order of 
excess, beyond the delineation of the individual.  
In the 1920s and early 1930s, there is a strong reliance on the Oedipal myth and a 
subsequent formulation of castration anxiety that anchors the psychoanalytic 
understanding of sexual difference.  However, what this detailed close reading of 
this archive has revealed is the potential of the ‘unbound’ character of anxiety 
found in the pre-psychoanalytic texts, the 1917 paper and the 1938 text.  In these 
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occasions, as this chapter has recuperated, Freud does not rely on the Oedipal 
model so strongly, rather connecting anxiety to 1) excessive libido and 2) the id. 
The early energetic model of psyche-soma will map anxiety into a dynamic of 
excessive libidinal pressure that will result in anxiety. The locus of libido, as we 
can track in this chapter, is the Id. When Freud, in 1938, say that the id “has a world 
of perception of its own” (Freud, 1938:198) he leaves a door open for an 
understanding of affect that extends beyond the ‘I’ (ego, Ich), beyond 
morality/internalised culture or modulations of desire (superego).  The id, thus, 
is crossed by perceptions of what extends beyond oneself, which produce 
pressure onto the ego, an activity such that Freud sees as anxiety.  If anxiety is then 
seen, as I am elaborating as this thesis is weaved further, as a production in the “I” 
that echoes an accumulation, or a flow of libido imprinted upon the Id but 
accumulated not just through the drive, but also through this ‘perception’ capacity 
of the Id, then anxiety is an affect that vibrates between a ‘being’ (the 
ego/superego consistencies of the subject) and ‘becomings’ – or the effects of the 
flows perceived in the Id of what extends beyond the “I” and might put the very 
consistency of the “I” at risk.  
 
In this chapter, a close reading of Freud’s systematic delineations of the grounds 
of anxiety allow us to rescue two main pillars of his theory. These are first, the 
rescuing of Freud’s very early account of anxiety that is not reliant on an Oedipal 
understanding of the subject. Secondly, the function of anxiety as a signal for the 
insistence of ego-activity in preserving a sense of reality.  Lacan, as the next 
chapter will explore in detail, will formulate a theory of anxiety as an affect that 
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marks an encounter with the Real that takes these two pillars of Freudian theory 
further. He will, specifically, problematise the promise of a strong ego in a theory 
of anxiety as ‘excess’.  
 
Freud’s very early work, in the 19th century, as seen in this chapter, addresses the 
question of anxiety as an excess that is not bound to symbolisation or to Oedipal 
function.  What we have seen is a dynamic relation between the ‘libidinal flow’ and 
‘representatives’, or ideas, in Freud’s model of psyche-soma. A ‘conversion’ takes 
place when the surplus tension of the drive cannot find sufficient or adequate 
grounds in the frameworks enveloping it. In the case of hysteria, for example, 
there is an established tradition of feminist thinking of this mode of conversion 
under the lenses of hysteria and hysteric symptoms as a form of social protest 
against a patriarchal arrangement (from Cixous, 1976 and Mitchell, 2000 to 
Webster, 2018 among several others). In Lacanian parlance it would be a case of 
the explicit limits of the Symbolic and relation to the Real in hysteria as well as in 
anxiety. In anxiety a ‘conversion’ takes place moving the Real of the body that finds 
no place in experience. In other words, the phenomenological body of the subject 
in culture as experiencing the resonances of a chaotic and excessive energetic flow 
is evident in Freud’s very early account of anxiety. This is foundational to my 








After a close reading of Freud’s trajectory on his theory of anxiety, I will offer a 
contrasting analysis of Lacan’s interventions on this topic. Most noticeably in his 
Seminar X, which focused on anxiety and departed from Freud’s 1926 piece, 
‘Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety’, Lacan’s understanding of this affect 
mobilises the register of the Real, jouissance and the objet a, central concepts in 
the delineation of an excessive affective vibration that I elaborate in this thesis.  
Lacan’s anxiety brings to light an ‘excess’, but differently to Freud, since the latter 
was accounting for an economic dynamic of accumulation of tension under a logic 
of discharge which he understood as the central mechanism of the psychic 
apparatus.  Lacan’s ‘excess’ is marked in a reminder – or remainder – of singularity 
evidenced in anxiety, as I will be arguing in the following pages, and this has been 
eternalised in the often-cited passage from Seminar X that “the true substance of 
anxiety, is that which deceives not” (Lacan, 1962-1963[2014]: 76).  This 
affirmation comes along the intellectual trajectory that marks Lacan’s move 
beyond what he calls the register of the Imaginary, stressing its limits and bringing 
anxiety, thus, as a kind of ‘proof’ of the ‘unreliability’ of the Imaginary.13  The year 
in which this seminar was delivered, 1962-63, is also particular as Lacan’s relation 
to the IPA was getting heated and the year came to a close with his expulsion from 
 
13 The Imaginary in Lacan can be summarised as the function that offers coherence to 
the world ‘outside’ through the ‘image’ of the subject.  Its limits, so the limits of this 
anchoring ‘image’ and ‘coherence’, are particularly relevant to the understanding of 




the international organisation in 1963 (Roudinesco, 1997).14With this in mind, we 
could argue that this split allowed Lacan more space – or increased his 
stubbornness – to move into his own theories, beyond his initial endeavour of a 
‘return to Freud’. To put it boldly, this moment of delivering Seminar X represents 
a turning point in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory.15 In the seminar on anxiety, 
Lacan’s innovation is marked by the articulations on the objet a, which continues 
in Seminar XI. This chapter will contemplate various pillars of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, focusing on his writing up until Seminar X and the 
emergence of the objet a in relation to a structural lack, or gap, in the Lacanian 
subject. Mapping the development of the consistency of the subject through the 
theory of the mirror stage and the discussion of self-consciousness during the 
1950s and 1960s,   I will  construct an argument with an emphasis on anxiety in 
relation to the Real, the body and possible readings of this ‘lack’ as a positive gap 
– or, as I am conceptualising in this thesis, a vibration – as developed in Seminar X 
and later seminars. It is in relation to questions of ontology, the Real and negativity 
that I will be distancing myself from the theories of Freud and Lacan through an 
engagement with Deleuze and Guattari ( expanding the Real seen in Lacan’s very 
late writings beyond the Symbolic and beyond the Oedipal metaphor), all the 
 
14 Details of his break with the IPA were famously registered in the introductory section 
of the following seminar, Seminar XI ‘The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis’, titled ‘excommunication’. 
 
15 Lacan’s conceptualisation of the registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real 
dates from the 1940s. From the 1950s onwards, he will develop the more complex idea 
of the Real and in the 1970s, his later texts, bring the ideas of knots, or the links between 
the registers. Anxiety, as Seminar X presents, marks an encounter with the register of 
the Real, therefore the latter has a particular importance for this research.   
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while trying to bring these traditions together in a ‘clinically viable’ concept of 
anxiety as vibration in the next chapters of this thesis.  
Exceeding Freud  
 
Lacan’s work can be roughly divided in three phases, each lasting more or less a 
decade and corresponding to one of the registers of psychic life identified by him: 
First, the Imaginary, then the Symbolic and last, the Real. Over the course of his 
seminar teachings, conference presentations and writings, from the 1940s to the 
early 1980s, each of these registers is worked through, never in isolation or with 
‘privilege’ over the other registers, rather, simply through a theoretical working 
emphasis.  Why does this matter in understanding the place of ‘anxiety’ in 
Lacanian psychoanalytic work?  For two reasons, both guiding this study.  The 
most noticeable one is the place of the seminar on anxiety in this chronological 
line, closing the moment of the Imaginary and entering the years Lacan was mostly 
concerned with the Symbolic.  The second reason is the ‘quality of anxiety’ 
throughout these different moments of his teachings.   Early mentions of ‘angoisse’ 
in his seminars in the 1950s are mostly concerned with Freudian case studies, 
from the Wolf Man in 1952-53 or Irma’s dream in 1955, to a considerable amount 
of attention paid to Little Hans and the writing on phobia and anxiety until the 
closing of the 1950s. Something will change in the seminar on anxiety and that is 
the beginning of Lacan’s thinking of anxiety in relation to desire, a theoretical 
venture that carried on, despite less evident in respect to anxiety, through his very 




Based on this sort of ‘timeline’, is it possible to divide Lacan’s work on the topic of 
anxiety in about three different instances.  At first, in the work that is the very 
early Lacan, so prior to the Seminars, there is a mention of anxiety in the 1945 
paper ‘Le Temps Logique’. Here anxiety is the ontological form of a ‘motivation to 
the conclusion’, following the instant of the glance and the time for 
comprehending as the three evidential moments of the assertion of oneself – here 
already anxiety appears as a ‘common’ experience, rather than necessarily 
pathologised, in contrast with the diagnostic trend of the period as per Chapter 1. 
The topic is left to the side for many years, until what we could call a ‘second 
moment’ of Lacan’s work on anxiety, which really focused on Freudian works, at 
the time of delivering Seminar II, when Lacan addresses Freud’s own anxiety in 
the face of women when commenting on his analysis of the dream of Irma’s 
injection. Here there is an early delineation of Lacan’s work on the anxiety of the 
analyst, a point he will explore further in Seminar X, which is Lacan’s third theory 
of anxiety, his most comprehensive and focused elaboration on the topic. What is 
missing, systematically, is a later theory of anxiety in light of his post-1963 
thinking, as I will argue in this chapter. 
 
The Freudian base of Lacan’s anxiety seminar is the 1926 text ‘Inhibitions, 
Symptoms and Anxiety’.16 Lacan picks up on key Freudian concepts from 1926, 
signal and castration anxiety, not offering equal attention to Freud’s last texts on 
 




the topic, however. 17   What Lacan brings into Seminar X, in particular, is the 
fundamental tension between the subject and the Other, a relation that will 
reverberate with his earlier writing on the Mirror Stage and a completion of the 
Graph of Desire18. This same tension between subject and Other serves as the 
ground for his subsequent development of the notion of the objet a. It is the objet 
a that will mark the structural ‘lack’ of the subject and the Other, simultaneously. 
As we will see in the coming pages, it will be, subsequently, such ‘lack’ that will be 
reformulated in his later Borromean Clinic, or Clinic of the Real (Voruz and Wolf, 
2007). 19  What is curious is that after Seminar XI, Lacan will not provide any 
systematic theorising of anxiety in his teachings. He only mentions it en passant 
once in Seminars XIII and XIV, twice in Seminars XVII and XXII and for the last time 
in 1977 in his Seminar XXIV, despite the drastic changes to his theories more 
generally (i.e. the abandonment of the centrality of the Oedipus complex and a 
 
17 These being, as seen in Chapter 2, New Introductory Lectures and Outline of 
Psychoanalysis. 
 
18  Both the Mirror-Stage and the Graph of Desire, which are important graphic 
representations of Lacan’s ideas of the processes of subjectification, the first dating from 
the late 1940s and the latter from the 1950s and early 1960s, are relevant to an 
investigation on anxiety. Both concepts deal with the ‘mythical’ subject that precedes an 
entry into the Symbolic and early processes of constituting a relation to the Imaginary 
and the body, therefore implicating the ontology of the Lacanian subject in relation to 
the negativity of desire.   A key text in which this question of subjectification and desire 
is dealt with is "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious", from 1960, published in Écrits. 
 
19  This matter of a structural lack versus what would be a generative gap or crack is the 
core of where Lacanian theory can meet Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of the unconscious 




detour from a focus on differential diagnosis, both following his move beyond 
structuralism (Guéguen, 2013)). 20 
 
Preliminarily, Lacan holds onto the Freudian idea that anxiety is an affect (Lacan, 
1962-1963[2014]: 14, 18) and an ‘exceptional affect’ (Soler, 2014). For Lacan, it is 
in anxiety that the Real makes an ‘apparition’, since “anxiety highlights how much 
of the subject is not captured by language, or how much is left over after the most 
exhaustive attempts to encapsulate or represent the subject in words” (Gallagher, 
1996:5). It is owing to its relation to the Real that anxiety points at a failure of 
fantasy, and this is developed in detail through Seminar X, especially in relation to 
castration anxiety. Fantasy, that for the neurotic structure functions as a cover up 
for the fundamental ‘structural fault’, for ‘that bit’ that is not reflected in the 
mirror, fails to provide this efficient covering up in the moment of anxiety.21 This 
fact alone alludes to something beyond symbolisation, something that fails and in 
failing is unique to each subject that is evident in anxiety. In addition, we must 
consider how important it is in the Lacanian orientation, and in psychoanalysis 
more broadly, to understand anxiety not as an ‘isolated symptom’, as the dominant 
 
20 This is significant as moving away from a differential diagnosis, which is based on 
fixed categories of structural diagnosis (neuroses, psychoses or perversion), 
accompanies the side-lining of Oedipus in Lacan. Only beyond structural diagnosis and 
Oedipus that a singularity of the symptom is really being dealt with clinically.  
 
21  Lacan offers detailed accounts of his concept of fantasy in different moments of his 
teachings. In general, it describes each subject’s specific or unique relation to the object 
of desire, or object a. The most important seminars on the question of fantasy are 
Seminar IV, La Relation d'objet (1956-57); Seminar VIII, Le Transfert (1960-61) and  
Seminar XIV, La Logic du fantasme (1966-1967). 
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discourse within the psy field would have it; rather, it is entangled in psychic 
experience and fundamental to the treatment. 
 
Anxiety, in this tradition, evidences the extimate character of the psychic 
apparatus. Extimité is the Lacanian play on words to emphasise that “the intimate 
is Other – like a foreign body, a parasite” (Miller, 2008). In this sense, the oft-
quoted passage ‘anxiety is the desire of the Other’, which Lacan elaborates in 
Seminar X, indicates how it is through anxiety that we can ‘dig’ into the Otherness 
in oneself and the self-ness in the Other. To extrapolate this further, through 
anxiety we can navigate from an estrangement to a possible entanglement in the 
I-Other/others relation – this being a possible interpretation of ‘vibration’.  To 
arrive there, I will carve the nuances of entanglement in the subject formation 
proposed by Lacan and alive in clinical practice of this orientation. If anxiety 
points to a stranger of me as experienced by me, what is the source and extent of 
such stranger? Is it an abyss-within or a horizon-beyond, as the Freudian 
articulation from libido, through Oedipus to an Id-perception revealed in the 
previous chapter?  
 
Lacan’s Mirrors  
 
In ‘On Narcissism’, from 1914, Freud addresses the constitution of the ego, or what 
allows the self to become an object in the psychoanalytic sense. However, Freud 
leaves the question of the ‘birth’ of such an ego open, simply hinting at a possible 
‘new psychical action’ that must take place in order to allow the ‘birth’ of the ego, 
without precisely pointing to what this action would exactly be. Lacan offers an 
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answer to this open-ended question left by Freud with his theory of the Mirror 
Stage.  His inventive response points towards the assimilation of the identification 
with an external image as what allows for this ‘ego’ or in general terms a ‘self’, or 
an I/Ich, to exist. To Lacan it was partly due to human premature birth – all babies 
are “trapped in [...] motor impotence and nursling dependence” (Lacan, 
1949[2006]:76) – that children are drawn to their reflection in the mirror, a 
striking image of a ‘complete’ body, or coherent body in which all limbs and parts 
of this early ‘l’hommelette’ form one’s image. This uncanny meeting leads to the 
identification with a coherent image thereafter; it is, for Lacan, a moment of 
jubilation. In the first eighteen months of age, for Lacan, the Mirror Stage 
represents this inaugural encounter with an image of oneself reflected in the 
mirror, an image which appears, strangely, complete.   
 
As we can trace from his writings of 1949 onwards, the Mirror presents the 
promise of an image of totality, elaborating psychoanalytic explanations for the 
dynamics through which the child gravitates towards this image. Since then a 
certain anticipation for a future mastering of all functions that the child by the time 
of their encounter with the Mirror does not yet have is present, as is a fictional 
tone to the identification proposed through the mirror. This ‘fiction’ of the ‘form’ 
(Lacan, 1949[2006]), as Lacan calls the image, which is constitutive of the subject, 
comes from an ‘outside’ space.  Or, the m(ego), the subject, reflects back i(a), which 
is the image from the Other that is constituting this same ‘moi’/’ego’. This relation 
is discussed throughout Seminar I, delivered in 1954. It is, therefore, via the 
identification with this ‘fictional’ mirror image that a perception of one’s own body 
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comes through.  This relation between the body and what Lacan will call the 
registers of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real will reverberate later on in 
the Lacanian theories of anxiety. 
 
Preoccupied with the grounds for the emergence of the psychoanalytic subject, 
Lacan theorises the ego in the manner of a ‘return’ to Freud that contrasted with 
a ‘mastering’ and ‘unity’ character present in other then dominant schools of 
psychoanalytic thinking.  The image in the mirror appears as a crucial mediator 
between ‘in’ and ‘out’ that troubles a reliance on a ‘reality principle’. In summary: 
“The function of the mirror stage thus turns out, in my view, to be a particular case 
of the function of imagos, which is to establish a relationship between an organism 
and its reality – or, as they say, between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt” (Lacan, 
1949[2006]:78).  Parting from such images of ‘completeness’ that the infant does 
not yet have, as a reference point for a foundational identification, there is an 
implicated understanding of the ego already relying on the ‘outside’ rather than in 
some ‘internal’ or individualised agency. Identification crosses the image of the 
body when establishing an ‘I’, in a relation that is never without conflict, a status 
guaranteed by the constant dissonance between these realities (internal, external; 
Innenwelt, Umwelt).   
 
The ‘orthopaedic’ mirror image also reveals the strong bond between libido and 
the visual that is present in Lacan’s text, especially earlier texts and less so in later 
works, critically observed by feminist scholars such as Jacqueline Rose (1986). 
‘Reality’ and the image are linked in the sense that whenever a child experiences 
their own subjective ‘chaos’, they will return to the ‘image’, or, they will find 
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recourse in the Imaginary.  However, this ‘unreliability’ of the Imaginary, or the 
mere fact that one could never ‘integrate’ or ‘be’ that image in the mirror, makes 
for its deceptive character.  Without stretching our imagination very much, we can 
see how this proposition challenges the discourses of wellness described in 
Chapter 1, since the ‘image’ is but a fictional promise to cover up psycho-soma 
‘chaos’. 
 
The Imaginary function of the Mirror is reformulated through the 1950s and 
1960s, mostly by offering an emphasis not so much on the power of the image 
itself but on the presence of an Other, forming a triangle crossing i(a) [the Image 
in the mirror], m [the moi] and A, the ‘big’ Other/Autre. In the early 1950s, in 
Seminar I, the Symbolic will already make an appearance when Lacan makes a 
distinction between the Ideal-Ego and the Ego-Ideal in relation to the Mirror Stage.  
Other teachings from this period such as Seminar II, Seminar V and the paper 
‘Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation: Psychoanalysis and Personality 
Structure’, from 1960, published as part of the Écrits, comment on the fact that in 
the specular relation there will always be the Other in the equation. Lacan thus 
swiftly moves beyond the impression of a somewhat ‘pure’ or ‘independent’ 
relation of the infant with the image in the mirror, as described in the 1949 essay, 
to stress the turn towards the Other.  It is crucial to keep in mind that the Lacanian 
construct of the subject, as a critique of what was then ‘mainstream’ 
psychoanalytic theory, marks his efforts to always see any firm reliance on 
autonomy or an ‘individual’ crumble. This mark of the Symbolic will be evident in 
the infant’s turn towards the person accompanying them, accessing a 
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confirmatory look from the caring adult that ‘glues’ the experience of the image on 
the mirror.  In other words, the specular image i(a) is constituted via the big Other. 
The truly “jubilatory” moment in the mirror stage is when the infant turns to the 
adult: they seem “to be asking the one supporting [them], and here representing 
the big Other, to ratify the value of this image” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]: 32).  
 
In sum, from these early 1950s texts, it is clear to us that the Other participates in 
any specular relation once this experience is not of a ‘pure’ captivation of the 
young person by their image. The child’s turn towards the Other seeks the 
recognition that that’s ‘their image’, a Symbolic confirmation (‘who is that in the 
mirror? That is baby’, etc.). Already at this stage, Lacan posits the mirror’s relation 
not only to the Imaginary but also to the Symbolic. This is the site of entrance into 
Lacan’s distinctions between the Ego-Ideal and the Ideal-Ego, which are psychic 
points of reference located in the Symbolic and in the Imaginary registers 
respectively albeit interconnected. Ideal-Ego is a term that refers to the image in 
the mirror, the Imaginary point of reference of coherence and completeness that 
is set into place by the Ego-Ideal, the locus from which the subject feels ’looked at’, 
indexing the site in the Symbolic that frames the subject. Lacan summarised this 
more complicated Mirror-Schema in the lecture of the 31st of March 1954:  
 
“In other words, it's the symbolic relation which defines the position of 
the subject as seeing. It is speech, the symbolic relation, which 
determines the greater or lesser degree of perfection, of completeness, 
of approximation, of the imaginary. This representation allows us to 
draw the distinction between the Idealich and the Ichideal, between the 
ideal ego and the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal governs the interplay of 
relations on which all relations with others depend. And on this 
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relation to others depends the more or less satisfying character of the 
imaginary structuration” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:141). 
 
 
The Symbolic anchoring of the Ego-Ideal is not arbitrary, or without consequence 
as Lacan continues: 
 “The Ichideal, the ego-ideal, is the other as speaking, the other in so far 
as [he] has a symbolic relation to me [moi], which, within the terms of 
our dynamic manipulation, is both similar to and different from the 
imaginary libido. Symbolic exchange is what links human beings to 
each other, that is, it is speech, and it makes it possible to identify the 
subject” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:142). 
 
 
The Ego-Ideal is, as it will later be called, the ‘unary trait’, meaning that it is via the 
Ego-Ideal that one is able to recognise the other with some trait, or being able to 
concede that ‘this is the Other’ through the identification with this unary trait 
(clearly carrying the tone of universal referential in subjective formation). Lacan 
will develop this in more detail in Seminar IX on the theme of Identification, 
claiming that the stability of the Ideal-Ego is granted via the unary trait. Putting it 
differently, it in is this crossed temporality of registers in which Symbolic 
identification precedes the mirror that the subject emerges, or in very simple 
terms, the ‘world out there’ is already the instance of the Other when we arrive 
into it.   It is only thanks to the Mirror image that the ‘moi’ as such emerges, almost 
as an ‘ego’ that we dress over our early fragmented body, the corps morcelé. The 
Symbolic, culture and discourse, are, thus, integral to the anchor of the subject, 
who comes into ‘being’ therein…without many routes into ‘becoming’ outside of 




In short, the simple formula I/S (in which I stands for Imaginary and S, for 
Symbolic) proposes that the image only comes to occupy the space of ‘an 
important image’ as such when it relies on the presence of the Symbolic, which 
situates this image. Registers, throughout Lacanian theory even before the ‘knots’, 
which mark his later teachings in the 1970s, are not separate or in blocks, rather, 
they constantly appeal to each other.  This support in the Symbolic was Lacan’s 
first important revision of his theory of the Mirror Stage – a development that is 
important for his theories on anxiety as we will see in what follows – and allows 
us to explore the matters of self-consciousness and recognition via the 
philosophical ‘roots’ of the Lacanian Mirror.  
 
Self-consciousness as a general philosophical debate that crossed the field of psy 
in its heart was at the centre of Lacanʼs reworking of Freudian texts and his own 
psychoanalytic contributions. With the writings on the Mirror Stage, and 
subsequent earlier teachings, the centrality of this theme is clear for they 
condensed fundamental ideas of his thoughts around the installation, 
development and maintenance of an ʻIʼ.  Without running the risk of delineating a 
metapsychology that favoured adaptation, ‘normality’ or mastering, Lacan’s 
subject is since the beginning of his teachings marked by a ‘glitch’ to normality, 
and concepts such as ‘barred’, ‘alienation’, Real, object a will offer a side of 
impossibility, antagonism and excess to any experience of the ‘self’, both in 
fantasies as in symptoms (Chiesa, 2007; Van Haute, 2002).  
 
In this sense, the Lacanian praxis elaborates a subjectivity that goes against the 
grain of the hegemonic psychiatric nosology. Following Freud, the lines between 
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a ‘normal’ and a ‘pathological’ are blurred and symptoms, as well as anxiety, 
appear as lively and dynamic arrangements that each subject finds in order to stay 
alive. In treatment, mapping the function and modus operandi of such symptoms, 
as entangled to the body, libido and a general position in the world, is the 
fundamental logic of its direction. Rather than thinking of a symptom in isolation 
and ‘blocking’ it either by avoidance (a process which is integral to CBT 
techniques, for example) or chemically (with the use of pharmaceutical drugs), 
exploring how this symptom was formed in the historical narrative of the patient 
and re-orienting its dynamic to one of less suffering (without any pre-conceived 
standard for what that looks like) is what directs the clinic.  In Lacan, the barred 
subject is ‘glitched’ already, for a coherent ‘I’ is but an illusion. 
 
Consciousness and Desire  
 
Already in Lacan’s ideas of the Mirror, there is a furthering of the Hegelian dialectic 
of master and slave as a somewhat stable cycle into a conflict of recognition 
internal to subjects (yet not restricted to an individual), divided between the ʻreal 
meʼ, or my physical perception that is fragmented and incoherent, and ʻthat me in 
the mirrorʼ, which is really an image of the body of the child, an image of this body 
in its entirety, with a coherent contour. In simple terms, that reflection on the 
mirror functions as an ʻideal-Iʼ acting as a point of reference and generates an 
ongoing impasse between ʻrealityʼ and an anchoring ʻwholeness or ‘coherenceʼ 
(Lacan, 1949[2006]). Such coherence will always be deceiving despite being 
necessary, for what we see in the mirror is an image mediated by the ʻexternal 
worldʼ, by the Symbolic, conferring an essential alienation to subjective 
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experience and removing any possibility of a ‘pure’ captivation of the subject by 
the image ‘alone’. Hegelian philosophy, through Kojève, influenced Lacan’s 
distrust in the ego as theorised by his contemporaries, mostly Anna Freud, whose 
work on the ego’s defences he is very critical of, since for Lacan the ego should not 
be seen as “centred on the perception-consciousness system or an organised by 
the ‘reality principle” (Lacan, 1949[2006]:80). Rather, he argues, we must “take as 
our point of departure the function of misrecognition that characterises the ego” 
(Lacan, 1949[2006]:80). An ‘impossibility’ of sorts in the process of identification 
will mark the Lacanian subject from then onwards, becoming more evident in his 
later discussions of the Real. Such ‘impossibility’, as I am carving out in this thesis, 
is the very edge of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ in Lacan.  
 
Crossing ‘perception’ and ‘consciousness’, desire is, as various exchanges during 
his first Seminar show, the fundamental term Lacan takes from philosophy into 
his psychoanalytic work.  In Seminar I, Lacan goes through what he considers to 
be “the fundamental Hegelian theme – man’s desire is the desire of the other” 
(Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:146), this being “exactly what is made plain in the 
model by the plane mirror” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:146).  In this Seminar Lacan 
stresses the relation of ‘desire’ and the ‘other’ in the crucial ‘moment de virage’, or 
the ‘turning point’ in ‘development’ (and he uses this word here) that is the mirror 
stage “in which the individual makes a triumphant exercise of his own image in 
the mirror, of himself” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:146), in which “what occurs 
here for the first time, is the anticipated seizure of mastery” (Lacan, 1953-1954 
[1991]:146). This moment is also the first time, he explains when debating with 
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an attendee of his seminar, that one’s libido is unstuck, or we could understand 
that libidinal investments whilst still being narcissistic are detached from the 
body itself, redirected to the image in the mirror and yet crossing or traversing 
the ‘other’, or the Symbolic, and thus producing a delay that evidences a ‘gap of 
desire’. Lacan explicates: 
“The subject originally locates and recognises desire through the 
intermediary, not only of his own image, but of the body of his fellow 
being. It's exactly at that moment that the human being's 
consciousness, in the form of consciousness of self, distinguishes itself. 
It is in so far as he recognises his desire in the body of the other that 
the exchange takes place. It is in so far as his desire has gone over to 
the other side that he assimilates himself to the body of the other and 
recognises himself as body” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:147). 
 
This primordially ‘intersubjective’ approach to desire, consciousness, perception, 
relation to one’s body and one’s image is, as Lacan explains, already present in this 
version of the Mirror Stage of the 1950s. It is interesting that Lacan spells out the 
relation between the perception/experience of a fragmented body and a 
‘fragmented’ or not yet ‘matured’ desire in this pre-Mirror Stage moment of life, 
explaining that “The body as fragmented desire seeking itself out, and the body as 
ideal self, are projected on the side of the subject as fragmented body, while it sees 
the other as perfect body” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:148).  Quite confusingly, this 
very early ‘fragmented body’ is not ‘glued’ to the subject, or, it is not ‘from the place 
of the fragmented body’ or as an ‘I-as-fragmented’ that the subject engages with 
the other and their image. Rather, “for the subject, a fragmented body is an image 
essentially dismemberable from its body” (Lacan, 1953-1954 [1991]:148). What I 
read from these passages is precisely that subject formation, or the establishment 
of self-consciousness, in Lacan, is bound to a bodily experience. That is because 
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desire (or a ‘singular’ mark of being) is “matured” through the dialectic 
engagement of the ideal mastery of the body – or of the coherent contour of the 
body on the mirror – and the body of an other.  In this sense, a relation to the world 
is already ‘alienated’ from this multiple, fragmented body; channelled through an 
image captured through its place in culture (an important detail to hold on to, as 
this fragmented body returns as the central theme of Lacan’s later works, after the 
abandonment of the Oedipal metaphor). Alienation, identification and a certain 
‘dividualisation’ are thus structural to the Lacanian subject, yet, this same theory 
makes evident the very fictional quality of such identifications, alienations and 
dividualised subjectivities assumed by psychoanalysis.  
 
In the following sessions, when exploring the ‘see-saw’ of desire, Lacan will  bring 
into his focus ‘identification’, making it clear that the establishment of desire is not 
a simple ‘stage’ that one goes through once, crossing through the other and the 
mirror…rather, it is through a series of identifications, a series of encounters, a 
series of moments of being in the world that desire in its singularity will emerge.  
Identification, however, is not without a ‘problem’, since this fundamentally 
alienated desire should only be ‘resolved’ with the destruction of the other, as 
Hegelian dialectics would indicate for Lacan:  
“Before desire learns to recognise itself – let us now say the word – 
through the symbol, it is seen solely in the other. At first, before 
language, desire exists solely in the single plane of the imaginary 
relation of the specular stage, projected, alienated in the other. The 
tension it provokes is then deprived of an outcome. That is to say 
that it has no other outcome – Hegel teaches us this – than the 
destruction of the other. The subject's desire can only be confirmed 
in this relation through a competition, through an absolute rivalry 
with the other, in view of the object towards which it is directed. And 
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each time we get close, in a given subject, to this primitive alienation, 
the most radical aggression arises – the desire for the disappearance 
of the other in so far as he supports the subject's desire” (Lacan, 
1953-1954 [1991]:170). 
 
This ‘destruction of the other’ and the question of aggressiveness and this dialectic 
struggle obviously generate a political matter in Lacan’s description of the subject 
and the possibilities of socialisation.  Lacan spells it out simply as “an impossibility 
of all human coexistence”, which I take as a poignant political shortcoming in 
Lacanianism (or, less generously, a blatant sign of his modern patriarchal and 
colonial epistemological roots). Yet, he also points that it is via the Symbolic order, 
or of language, that living together is made possible. In this sense, we are all 
enigmas to each other that get by through speaking – a relation that carries its 
limits but that has profound political and clinical implications when considering 
the relation between the analyst and analysand, the limits of speech and the fitness 
of diagnosis to the masses under the same names. In Lacanian practice, the enigma 
of the other and the flimsiness of identification are what prevents the analyst from 
interpretations (of the transference, of the material brought into the sessions, as 
done in other clinical orientations) that would be akin to a ‘colonisation’ of the 
unconscious, or an act of clinical violence.  
 
The quest for recognition of one’s desire in the other is, therefore, the setting stone 
of the Lacanian psychoanalytic approach and his clinic of a desire that is by 
essence intersubjective. That means that the subject’s desire comes into being 
through this relation with an other. The Lacanian clinic that aims at unveiling one’s 
desire is fundamentally a clinical approach that situates the subject 
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psychosocially. The Lacanian clinic, it can be argued, is psychosocial par excellence 
once it engages with the fact of the alienation of the I on the image 
(misrecognition) and in this negativity of desire as a mode of being (Safatle, 2006), 
and always puts in check the subject and their symptoms as part of a shared matrix 
rather than an isolated, individual phenomenon as in the approaches debated in 
Chapter 1. There is a certain level of entanglement in the Lacanian subject, yet, it 
leaves something behind. 
 
Recognition – or misrecognition – of oneself in the image or in the other and the 
appeal to the Symbolic do not come, however, smoothly or totally. There is always 
something else involved and it is this that is bound up with the concept of the Real. 
Anchoring the non-adaptive character of the negativity of desire, the Real already 
appears in the early writings on the Mirror Stage as embodied in the prematurity 
of the human child and an early lack of coordination. However, at first, we have 
‘that’ which is there at the beginning – but only mythically – that can be partially 
subsumed to an image, but not entirely, or this ‘me’ which does not fit into the 
image.  
 
Following the logic set out by Lacan with his writings on the Mirror Stage, once 
identified with the image, the infant starts to gesticulate, to experiment with the 
space surrounding them, reaffirming that ‘that is their image’ at the same time that 
‘the image is not themselves’, opening up, therefore, this other space, a space 
outside the mirror.  Whilst the specular image establishes an anchoring point of 
the subject, it also establishes a space for a ‘real’ body, its frontiers with the world, 
a contour. The body, therefore, is essential to identification, from which emerge a 
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complicated relation to the image and, as Lacan adds in early seminars, the 
Symbolic barring of the subject.   From the outset of Lacan’s teachings, simply by 
following the logic delineated in the theory of the Mirror Stage, the body functions 
as a point of departure to identification at the same time that it never ‘fits’ into any 
‘frame’ completely.  From the body and the experience of being a body or having a 
body, Lacan will follow Freud in exploring particular bodily parts that in their very 
‘not-fitting’ establish the drives, or as Lacan will call it at the time of Seminar X, the 
different forms of object a.   We could say, thus, that this earlier period of Lacan’s 
teachings, during the 1950s, addresses the bodily presence of the subject as an 
inside out of the mirror from various perspectives.  Towards the end of this 
decade, and moving into the 1960s, this ‘in-out’ excess, or that of ‘me’ which 
cannot fit the cut of the frame of the mirror that appears in the image, becomes 
more clearly articulated as not only a matter of the Imaginary (or the ‘image in the 
mirror’). Rather, the ‘excess’ and as its counterpart, ‘lack’, both on the side of the 
subject and on the side of the Other, are unravelled in relation to the Symbolic 
register.  
 
The effect of the Symbolic or, in Lacanian parlance, the effects of the Symbolic ‘cut’ 
upon the subject that results precisely in emerging as subject are explored in the 
1950s and early 1960s across a variety of teachings, crossing themes that range 
from identification to transference. In order to offer some clarity on Lacan’s 
articulations in regard to the Real in relation to the Symbolic at this moment of his 
work, a delineation of his elaboration on ‘desire’ – which is perhaps the most 
fundamental concept of Lacanian Psychoanalysis – is of particular relevance.  It is 
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in the limits of his theory of desire as harnessed to the desire of the Other and 
what grounds are then left for the Real that my thesis of anxiety as vibration is 
articulated, as the next chapters will argue.  
 
 
In Seminar VII, delivered between 1959-1960 on the theme of Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, the Real appears, with clarity, as a ‘problem of language’.  By this 
is meant that the Real marks what is impossible within language or symbolisation. 
Lacan delves into the matter of ‘impossibility’ as a legitimate path to engaging with 
reality and it is in this respect that the Real as an ‘impossibility’ is articulated.  This 
seminar, which deals with the relations between action and desire, offers an 
elaboration of the concept of ‘la chose’, das Ding or ‘the thing’, an enigmatic ‘excess’ 
that will later form the base of his concept of object a as the object cause of desire 
– crucial contributions of his work on Anxiety.  Lacan speaks of a ‘field of das Ding’ 
as the locus of an ungraspable enigma that organises psychic life. 
 
In the following year, when teaching about Transference in his Seminar VIII, Lacan 
returns to the Mirror Stage and the relation between anxiety and desire. 
Dissecting his formula of fantasy [$ <> a] in relation to Freud’s ‘Inhibition, 
Symptom and Anxiety’ text, Lacan argues that “anxiety is produced when the 
cathexis of little a is transferred to $” (Lacan, 1960-1961 [2015]:361). By this he 
means that there is something in fantasy that orients the barred S, or the subject, 
in relation to their desire and this point of apprehension of oneself as desiring is 
homologous to i(a), the Ideal-Ego, or the Imaginary ‘image on the mirror’. Lacan 
explains that:  
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“anxiety as a signal is produced somewhere, in a place that can be 
occupied by i(a) – the ego insofar as it is the image of the other, the 
ego insofar as it is, fundamentally, the function of misrecognition. It 
occupies this place not inasmuch as this image occupies it but qua 
place – in other words, inasmuch as this image can, on occasion, be 
dissolved there” (Lacan, 1960-1961 [2015]:363). 
 
The possibility of this image in the mirror, or the fantasy, or the Imaginary (which 
are similar to one another, as he points out) being ‘dissolved’, or ‘to fail’, brings out 
anxiety. It is not “the absence of the image that provokes anxiety” (Lacan, 1960-
1961 [2015]:363), rather it is the encounter with this failure of the fantasy that 
brings out anxiety.  In fact, in Seminar X Lacan will posit that “the structure of 
anxiety is the structure of the fantasy” (Lacan, 1962-1963[2014]:3). This 
emergence of anxiety, however, is only possible through a relation to desire, so 
Lacan’s invocation of the order of the fantasy is, in this seminar, simply a way into 
this relation to one’s desire and the same ‘way into’ can be articulated in regard to 
the mirror image and the question of the ‘object of desire’.  
 
Anxiety does not emerge as facing the image per se, rather, in facing the image as 
‘a’; or, it is this charge of ‘a’ present in the specular image and in the fantasy that 
allow for their function in relation to the emergence of anxiety. He writes: “Anxiety 
is the radical mode by which a relationship to desire is maintained” (Lacan, 1960-
1961 [2015]:365). Already in this seminar (VIII) we can sense an anticipation to 
what Lacan will develop in detail in Seminar X, which is the relation between 
anxiety and desire through the various forms of the object a, granting anxiety the 




Sustaining one’s relation to desire therefore is the function of anxiety. More is 
elaborated on desire, its emergence and the emergence of the subject, around the 
same time Lacan was delivering Seminar VIII, in the influential text ‘The 
Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’, 
from 1960 and published as part of Écrits.  In this work, the subject is situated in 
relation to the establishment of needs, demands and desire, forming an interesting 
base to what will ‘happen’ to desire at the moment of Seminar X, a few years later. 
A concise summary of this article could be as follows: In our attempts to ‘satisfy 
our desire’, this desire is transposed by demands, important terms in this analysis 
of subjectivity. A physical need such as hunger or thirst, can be satisfied. However, 
our ʻsubjective needsʼ when transferred to the Other, in the belief this Other could 
satisfy our desire, take the shape of what Lacan calls a ʻdemandʼ. Demands are, in 
simple terms, a manifestation of desire limited by language, the in-between point, 
or a gap, in the relation of need and desire (Lacan, 1960 [2006]). The interlinking 
of desire and the Other demonstrates how the split of the subject also leaves the 
subject deprived of autonomy, being impossible to gain any sense of selfhood 
outside of the relationship with culture – ‘culture’, or the Symbolic, are understood 
by Lacan in a particular and not unproblematic way that is limited to a dialectical 
relation, where a ‘rest’ (the Real) can only be accounted as an impossible that is 
the kernel of symptoms.  
 
At the same time, the body is still present in these elucubrations, being then at the 
heart of the psychoanalytic project. As Lacan puts it, “psychoanalysis concerns the 
reality [réel] of the body and of its imaginary mental schema” (Lacan, 1960 
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[2006]:680).  To illustrate the complex dynamic of subjectivation through desire 
and the Other, Lacan formulated the Graph of Desire, an evolution of mathemes 
worked across a series of different seminars, noticeably Seminar V and given 
emphasis in this text and in Seminar X. The basic element of the graph is the ʻpoint 
de capitonʼ, a subjective ʻpoint of anchoringʼ representing the autonomy of the 
signified and signifier, furthering Saussureʼs linguistic model of there not being a 
universal grounding referent for meaning, rather just a structure of signs in 
relation to one another.22  
 
 
Fig.1: Complete Graph of Desire, from 1960 
 
22 Guattari, as I will elaborate in Chapter 5, moves away from Saussure and Lacan via his 
study of Glossematics and the linguistic theory proposed by the Danish linguist 
Hjelmslev, making the relation to meaning and representation more complex in his 





The complete Graph of Desire (Fig.1, p.136) explores the duality of attempting to 
gain recognition from the Other in the enterprise of becoming the object of desire 
of the Other, giving evidence to the objet a, the ʻpetit autreʼ in the Imaginary realm. 
In trying to identify the desire of the Other, the subject identifies with this ʻwhat 
the Other wants from meʼ, a fantasy, attaching the desire of the Other to its own 
subjective experience (Lacan, 1960[2006]). From the Graph of Desire, another 
interesting element of Lacanian thought arises: anxiety. The subjective opacity 
granted by the prominence of the Other over oneʼs desire leaves a gap, once there 
is “no universal satisfaction” (Lacan, 1960[2006]: 689). This uncertainty, this 
impossibility, is anxiety. In desire, which opens space for a fantasy of omnipotence 
of the Other (Lacan, 1960[2006]), we become subjected to the rules of the Other.  
Here again, the subject could only gain access to something that could be perhaps 
called ‘oneself’ or even ‘singularity’ not within language, so not within this rule of 
the Other, but through the repetition of the drive, the force that makes it repeat, 
or desire, as caused by object a and opened in something of the order of the rims 
of the body. These ‘rims’ as I will address in the next section of this chapter, have 
a significant importance when thinking of anxiety beyond the limits of the Oedipus 
complex. Accordingly, these ‘openings’ of the body, where in and out get mixed-up 
or confused, are the loci of the drive; and it is from the logic of the drive, rather 
than of desire, that Lacan’s later teachings get closer to an ‘anti-oedipal’ model of 









To get to this point, or in order to lay out the ground for a non-Oedipal critique of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is important that some basic elements of his ideas of 
the ‘phallus’, ‘lack’ and ‘sexual difference’ are clarified.  Once these problematic 
and widely criticised elements of Lacan’s theory appear with evidence in his work 
on anxiety as well. We can start from the premise, as seen above, that negotiating 
oneʼs ʻreality’ with the idealised version of oneself through discourse, leaves 
behind an excess, an ʻun-symbolisableʼ fragment, the Real (as described in his 
early teachings and in relation to the Imaginary). Subjects will be left in a constant 
“discordance with [their] own reality” (Lacan,1949:2) in the same manner that the 
positioning of oneself in language will leave out a frustrating lack (again, the Real 
comes in his mid-life teachings as a ‘gap’ in the Symbolic system). Desire will carry 
in its core an absence, a lack. The unconscious, therefore for Lacan, is marked by 
lack, one we will try to fulfil throughout life with no necessary guarantee of 
success.  The understanding that desire will never be satiated, that oneʼs wish for 
wholeness will always be frustrated, is the meaning Lacan attached to the phallus 
(Lacan, 1958). As a ʻveiled signifierʼ, the phallus marks the divide inherent to 
subjectivity. It is that which guarantees the Imaginary with Symbolic ʻsupportʼ, 
with a promise in language. Symbolising, thus, brings reassurance. This use of the 
word ʻphallusʼ and further developments of theories of femininity leave space for 




The Mirror Stage can be utilised as a fruitful background for thinking of the split 
subject, one of Lacanʼs greatest contributions to the thinking of subjectivity. Whilst 
the divide of the subject already refutes any notion of unity, Lacan proposes 
femininity and masculinity ʻlack differentlyʼ. The ʻLaw of the Fatherʼ, which 
guarantees prominence to the phallus in culture can be understood as Lacanʼs 
denunciation of patriarchy (Mitchell, 1982; Rose, 1986). When theorising on 
sexual difference – in Encore Lacan, curiously, does not cite any women analyst – 
and positing that ʻWoman does not existʼ, Lacan denounces biological roles as 
determinant, yet, he backs this idea by stipulating different ʻkindsʼ of jouissance 
experienced by ‘men’ and ‘women’ (in Seminar XX – Lacan, 1972-1973). Phallic 
jouissance is the frustrating enjoyment in believing we have satiated our desire, a 
promise held in the Other; whilst the ʻOther jouissanceʼ involves carrying this 
ʻpromiseʼ of satisfaction in oneself. The Lacanian views of sexual difference and 
the phallus will then move from a strict guarantor of lack, which flirts with 
biologism in the 1958 text ‘The Signification of the Phallus’, which was published 
in Écrits, to his first views of ‘different’ kinds of jouissance in Seminar X on Anxiety 
(when he still speaks of the breast, breastfeeding and the detumescence of the 
phallus/penis) until the clear formulation of sexual difference in Seminar XX, 
where a ‘masculine’ and a ‘feminine’ position are the (only, for him) two options 
of a relation to the phallic Law that mark two different subject positions. This Law 
comes in as a mediator of the ‘excessive’ jouissance, in which ‘everyone lacks’, but 
just ‘enjoy’ differently. ‘Lack’ is throughout Lacan’s teachings an anchor of subject 
formation, one that presents in ‘negativity’ its antidote beyond total domination. 
The deep interconnection of these themes in Lacanian teachings makes it very 
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difficult for some theorists and psychoanalysts to try and conceive of a subjectivity 
that is not dependent upon Oedipal sexual difference (and its binary arrangement) 
or on ‘lack’. Addressing the political and onto-epistemic problems of this far from 
neutral arrangement that relies on the binary of sexual difference seems to cause 
a crisis of imagination among orthodox followers of Lacanian texts. Owing to this, 
tensions between feminist theory and psychoanalysis seem to be as alive as ever, 
with a current of Lacanian analysts equating, for example, transgender living to 
psychosis precisely on the grounds of such ‘lack’ being foreclosed. 
 
Contemporary elaborations around queerness and trans-identities in 
psychoanalytic settings have argued that transgender subjectivity sits on the side 
of psychosis (Millot, 1990 and Morel 2000). That would be because it is a case of 
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and a push-to-the-woman (inspired by the 
reading of Schreber’s case) characteristic of the inability to live with the 
inconsistency of sexuality, transitioning thus as a way to name oneself and suture 
this gap. 23 Argentinean analyst Patricia Gherovici (2017), however, has led the 
way in stating what, to me at least, is the obvious reality of the Lacanian 
psychoanalytic encounter: trans people, like all people, can have any unconscious 
structure and can be hysterics just as well. Whilst Gherovici’s (2017) remarks are 
well grounded in case-studies and theory and her contributions are generous and 
therapeutically sound, there is still some insistence on the equation of sexual 
 
23 Miller (2021), following this very logic, has generated much negative response to his 
‘Docile au Trans’ article in response to Preciado’s (2020) intervention at the École de la 
cause Freudienne de Paris in 2019, such is the difficulty of the Lacanian field in 




difference (and differential diagnoses) as fundamental to the clinical encounter 
and to subjective formation. What Gherovici does is very important: as a clinician 
and keen theorist of Lacan’s teachings, she finds a ground within Lacanian theory 
to demonstrate how queerness can be a creative solution of a capacity to live 
without the hold of the phallus. In other words, rather than a symptomatic escape, 
it is a sinthôme, like James Joyce’s sinthôme – described in Lacan’s seminar XXIII, 
from 1975-1976.24 By acknowledging a possibility that is not ‘just’ psychosis to 
whatever mode of existing that does not correspond to the phallic Law, Gherovici 
paves the way for a feminist conceptualisation of all forms of rupture with ‘the 
 
24  Lacan says, in Seminar XXIII, in the lesson of the 18th of November, 1975: “Joyce 
expresses himself as one might expect from him in a very pertinent way. I mean that he 
metaphorises something which is nothing less than his relationship to his body. He 
notes that the whole affair has drained away. He expresses this by saying that it is like a 
fruit skin. What does this indicate to us? This indicates to us that this something that is 
already so imperfect in all human beings, the relationship to the body – who knows 
what is happening in his body? It is clear that there is here indeed something which is 
extraordinarily suggestive and which, even for some, is the meaning they give, it is 
certain, these people in question, it is the meaning they give to the Unconscious. But 
there is something that I, from the beginning, have articulated with care, which is 
precisely the fact that the Unconscious, has nothing to do with the fact that one is 
ignorant of a lot of things concerning one’s own body. And that what one knows is of a 
quite different nature. One knows things that that have to do with the signifier; the old 
notion of the Unconscious, of the Unbekannte, was precisely something based on our 
ignorance of what is happening in our bodies. But Freud’s Unconscious, is something 
that is worthwhile stating on this occasion, it is precisely what I said. Namely, the 
relationship, the relationship between a body which is foreign to us which is a circle, 
indeed an infinite straight line, which in any case are one and the other equivalent, and 
something which is the Unconscious. So then what meaning are we to give to what Joyce 
bears witness to? Namely, that it is not simply the relationship to his body. It is, as I 
might say, the psychology of this relationship which… for after all, psychology is nothing 
other than that, namely, this confused image we have of our own body, but this confused 




phallus’ as creative transformation within the sinthôme. 25  Accordingly, and 
informing my theory of anxiety as vibration, excess, chaos or too-muchness (such 
as anxiety) do not necessarily need to be ‘castrated’ in order to be soothed – as 
Gherovici  (2018)herself proposed elsewhere– nor ‘sublimated’, rather, excess can 
be mobilised into a sinthôme, bypassing the Law-of-the-Father into a ‘becoming’ 
(as I will argue in the following chapters). This possibility, or, what is done to 




Seminar X: L’Angoisse  
 
When Lacan started his Seminar on Anxiety (Seminar X, in 1962-1963) the first 
lectures brought up again the Mirror Stage and the Graph of Desire, demonstrating 
how the Other is inscribed in the specular relation. To Lacan, anxiety was an affect 
separating desire and jouissance (Harari, 2001) in which the fear of fragmentation 
is paramount. Reworking Freudʼs earlier ideas of an anxiety which anticipates a 
threat to the ego, Lacan points anxiety towards the Imaginary. The virtual specular 
image and its prestigious state attracts the subject. The subject invests more and 
more in their own body – believed to be the originator of the specular image – with 
 
25 Sinthôme is a term Lacan introduces in 1975 as a rewriting of the symptom. As a 
singular manner of enjoyment that does not call for interpretation, resting beyond the 
Symbolic, the sinthôme (a play on the words ‘saint’ and ‘man’, in French), appears as a 
fourth element of the Borromean knot, tying imaginary, Symbolic and Real together.  In 
Seminar XXIII, Le Sinthôme, it appears as creative solution in the organisation of 
libido/enjoyment or jouissance that makes no use of the Imaginary; or a creative 
solution to carry on living. 
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the aid of objects assuming the role of the object of desire; being, consequently, 
fooled (Lacan, 1962-63). This dynamic precisely was named ‘anxiety’ at the 
lecture of November 28,1962.  The ‘strange’ object that Lacan discovers, object a, 
is the focus of several of the lessons of the seminar on anxiety, once “anxiety is not 
incited by the lack of the object but rather by the lack of the lack, i.e. the emergence 
of an object in the place of lack” (Salecl, 2004:32), standing right in between desire 
and jouissance. Once desire is linked to frustration and the lack of the object of 
satisfaction, jouissance is the somewhat ‘painful’ – or ‘charged’ – approach to this 
satisfaction; enjoyment, or the Lacanian version of Freud’s libido. The ʻlack of lackʼ, 
the knowledge something is there which could satisfy our desire and yet, it does 
not, appearing in the place where lack should be, is in this complicated logic, the 
backbone of anxiety. The new argument brought forward by Lacan in this seminar 
is the fact that there will always be a portion of the libido that does not go through 
the Mirror image (elaborated in terms of the minus phi, castration and object a). 
The image in this seminar is defined by the exclusion of minus phi and object a, 
leaving something aside. If the ‘lack lacks’, it then produces the affect of anxiety. 
An auto-erotic jouissance, something that is profoundly invested in the body 
makes its way in anxiety; in other words, in anxiety, the Symbolic is invaded by 
the Real and desire appears as extracted, indexed to the experience that we are 
only just bodies (hence the bodily harnessing and mobilisation of anxiety, both in 
a chronic form and in attacks). 
 
Anxiety is an “intermediary term between jouissance and desire in so far as desire 
is constituted and founded upon the anxiety phase, once anxiety has been got 
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through” (Lacan, 1962-1963[2014]:175), writes Lacan in an often-quoted passage 
from Seminar X. What is very important in this seminar is the idea of ‘going 
through’ anxiety. In French, the original term used is ‘franchir’, thus ‘franchir 
l’angoisse’ connotes a stepping through it as if stepping over a threshold, crossing 
it.  Lacan is referring to castration anxiety, saying that only when one crosses 
through one’s castration anxiety can desire be encountered.  This idea presents an 
interesting paradox, bringing up a cyclical impossibility of our relation both to 
anxiety and desire.   We could parallel here an idea from Lacan’s Seminar VII, of 
‘ceder’, or giving up of one’s desire; he states that “from an analytical point of view, 
the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s 
desire” (Lacan, 1959-1960 [1997]:319). In this sense, whenever one goes in the 
direction of one’s desire one feels anxious – as anxiety is a way into desire, as per 
Seminar VIII – conversely, when one ‘gives up’ on desire there comes guilt.  This is 
an interesting nuance that is added to the ‘truth’ found in anxiety in Seminar X. In 
this sense, there is no ‘cure’ for anxiety other than desire. The paradox is that in 
order to access desire you face anxiety, and as a ‘cure’ to anxiety, there is only 
desire. There is a cycle here and perhaps the whole notion of ‘franchir l’angoisse’ 
or crossing through one’s anxiety that is so central to Lacan’s presentation in this 
seminar implicates a learning to balance oneself within this cycle, or to dance in 
this rhythm established by anxiety and desire that, as we cannot lose sight of, 
emerges in the encounter with the Real via the sight of the object a.   
 
There is something about anxiety, which is an affect, that is revealing of the 
structure of the subject, in Lacan’s words: “What is anxiety? We’ve ruled out the 
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idea that it might be an emotion. To introduce it, I will say that it’s an affect” 
(Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]: 14). He continues: “And this is even the reason why it 
has a close structural relationship to what a subject is. On the other hand, what I 
said about affect is that it isn’t repressed. Freud says it just as I do. It’s unfastened, 
it drifts about. It can be found displaced, maddened, inverted, or metabolised.  But 
it isn’t repressed.  What are repressed are the signifiers that moor it” (Lacan, 1962-
1963 [2014]: 14). Anxiety is, therefore, “a question of desire” (Lacan, 1962-1963 
[2014]: 15). It is owing to such a privileged presence in psychic life that Lacan 
dedicates a whole year of his teachings to anxiety. A guiding thread into reading 
this Seminar will be formulated in what follows. It is by carefully looking into 
Lacan’s only major work on the topic of anxiety in detail that an important impasse 
(or even contradiction in his work) can be fleshed out, namely, how the object of 
anxiety – object a – is not bound to the field of the Other and to the Symbolic, 
potentially escaping an Oedipal binary of sexual difference frame for the subject. 
 
The Seminar begins with Lacan recuperating Freud’s account of anxiety, which is 
mainly castration anxiety according to his reading of ‘Inhibition, Symptom and 
Anxiety’, by means of a theoretical reconstruction. Lacan approached castration 
anxiety from the point of the dominance of the Symbolic order over the Imaginary, 
when the latter is then bound to the Symbolic rule.  He comments in the first 
chapters that his contribution in this seminar will be to formulate an anxiety that 
is ‘beyond’ castration anxiety. By that he means that everything of the order of the 
signifier (with a chapter title announcing this precisely: Anxiety in the Net of 
Signifiers) is a castration anxiety. A critical idea that marks Lacan’s development 
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of anxiety at the moment of Seminars X and XI is that anxiety is tied with the desire 
of the Other. Therefore, to address this point, Lacan makes use of the Graph of 
desire, proposing “a formula indicating the essential relationship between anxiety 
and the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:5), stressing that what he 
added in the then recent work was precisely the matter of the ‘desire of the Other’. 
It is through the elaboration of the desire of the Other that Lacan is able to advance 
on Freud’s theories of castration anxiety.  The question ‘Che vuoi?’ at the top of the 
Graph is, thus, an anguishing question. Lacan says “‘Che vuoi?’ is not just ‘what does 
the Other want with me?’, it’s ‘what does [He] want concerning the place of the 
ego?’ (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:6). In other words, this question is linked to the 
specular image and to narcissistic capture. In the Graph of Desire, “the distance 
between [the two levels] renders the relationship to desire at once homologous 
with and distinct from narcissistic identification” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:6). 
Anxiety, as he points out, plays a role in “the dialectic that knots these two levels 
[of the Graph] so tightly together” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:6). 
 
Lacan also recuperates ideas from Seminars VIII and IX in relation to the object 
and the desire of the Other, elucidating an anxiety that is beyond castration 
anxiety, which is the anxiety facing the desire of the Other, when one is the object 
for the Other. An anxiety, thus, knitted within the Symbolic realm.   Lacan’s 
dissection of the Symbolic, Desire of the Other and Anxiety is rather extensive as 
he addresses philosophical texts (Hegel and Kierkegaard, especially) and 
composes multiple formulas to trace what this relation is in the moment of 
anxiety.  This is Lacan’s ‘structural’ approach, where he is looking for the function 
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of the signifier in anxiety in order to trace a map towards the point of anxiety that 
is beyond the signifier, or how do we cope with the ‘rest’ in the process of 
subjectivation.    
 
The ‘rest’ is very important to the argument that will follow in regard to anxiety 
and the Real, an articulation that will carry on in the later 1970s with Lacan’s last 
teachings. The rest raises a question of what is left from our jouissance when we 
enter the Other and the field of the signifier.  At this point, in Seminar X, he brings 
us the concept of the ‘unary trait’ – which stands in very simple words for the fact 
that there’s no subject without a signifier preceding it. In Lacan’s words: “There's 
no conceivable advent of a subject as such except on the basis of the prior 
introduction of a signifier, and the most straightforward of signifiers, known as 
the unary trait” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:21). This ‘dominance’ of the Symbolic 
is very clear at this point. “The unary trait precedes the subject” (Lacan, 1962-
1963 [2014]:21) and brings with it a singularity, which he proposes as the 
“singularity of the trait, this is what we cause to enter the real, whether the real 
likes or not” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:21). This unary trait marks the subject in 
the sense that it mediates the speaking subject’s access to the Real whilst it is, 
itself, extracted from the field of the Other, which, in its turn, precedes the subject.  
This articulation reads slightly confusingly, but one simple manner to connect it 
with anxiety is the following: once the subject is marked with the unary trait, 
drawn from the field of the Other, a relation to the Other is instigated that moves 
the subject towards an encounter with the Other’s desire. Clearly, Lacan leaves 
very little space for real social emancipation, change or rupture, once the subject 
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seems to be caught by a dominant Symbolic. In other words, there is ‘being’, but 
virtually no ‘becoming’.  
 
By means of the unary trait, the subject is “inscribed as a quotient” of (i.e. the result 
of mathematical operation of division by) the Other. In Lacan’s words, “first off, 
you find A, the originative Other as locus of the signifier, and S, the subject as yet 
inexistent, who has to situate himself as determined by the signifier” (Lacan, 1962-
1963 [2014]:26). What follows is a move into the Imaginary in relation to anxiety, 
which is explored by Lacan via Freud’s work on narcissism and the Mirror Stage, 
and it is in this relation that Lacan points to the ‘object of anxiety’. Here the concept 
of the phallus is utilised in order to approach this ‘special’ object – ‘special’ 
because Freud had postulated that anxiety had no object and Lacan will ‘discover’ 
or reveal the object of anxiety. The phallus, according to his logic, not having an 
image in the mirror, which is akin to the Imaginary definition of castration, leaves 
a gap, a void, and it in the space of this lack that something else can appear, in 
Lacan’s words: “the disruption wherein anxiety is evinced arises when this void is 
totally filled in” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:65). The phallus is auto-erotically 
invested, giving rise to a fracture in the specular image, this fracture in the 
specular image is the ‘support’ of symbolic castration. This ‘something else’ that 
can appear in this space is precisely the object of anxiety.  The limits to the 
specular investment are articulated not only through what is left or what remains 
– Lacan is clear that “not all of the libidinal investment passes by way of the 
specular image. There’s a remainder” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:38) – but also 
through what is just ‘not there’. The remainder is the place of the phallus, which is 
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“an operative reserve” but is “not represented at the level of the imaginary” and is 
“cut out of the specular image” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:38). This cut can 
establish two different pieces, first a piece which can have a specular image, which 
is the minus phi and, second, a piece that doesn’t have a specular image which is 
the object a. 
 
Lacan underlines the difficulty of defining object a, so perhaps the easier manner 
to grasp it, at least within this seminar is by considering that “whenever Freud 
speaks of the object of anxiety, think of him as speaking of the object a” (Lacan, 
1962-1963 [2014]:40). To map the relation between the phallus, minus phi and 
the object a, Lacan brings back the mirror stage, positing, in this way that 
castration anxiety is Imaginary in the sense that “in everything that concerns 
taking one’s bearings in the imaginary, the phallus will henceforth step in, in the 
form of a lack” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:39-40). Pointing at the Imaginary, or the 
image of the body in the mirror, Lacan describes the phallus as essentially ‘cut out’ 
of the image, which is why in this seminar the phallus is still considered one of the 
forms of the object a. 
 
Minus-phi, in its turn, denotes the place of such a missing or lacking imaginary 
phallus. The phallus “can’t be grasped in the imaginary”, rather it is an absence 
that brings with it the possibility of presence (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]:45). Lacan 
links it strongly to the penis in this seminar with all the references to the body, 
detumescence and copulation, opening, of course, space for a feminist critique of 
his view of the phallic function and the predominance of the visual in the 
Imaginary (and proof that the use of the word phallus is not at all arbitrary but 
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intentional in his work). The phallus as this ungraspable part of the body schema 
in the Imaginary means, for Lacan, the portion of auto-erotic enjoyment that the 
subject has not parted with under the castration threat. If minus-phi holds out the 
possibility of the missing something becoming present in the specular image, the 
object a is a remainder that cannot be brought into the specular field. A 
relationship is established between this place of lack and the “libidinal reserve”, 
which could not be incorporated into the specular image and remains profoundly 
invested at the level of one’s body. Lacan calls it primary narcissism, 
autoeroticism, and “an autistic jouissance”.  
 
A proximity of the object is the core of Lacan’s view on anxiety at this stage of his 
work. Anxiety, as he stresses time and time again in this seminar, is not without 
object, neither a signal of lack, but rather it is when the support that this very lack 
or gap provides to the subject fails that anxiety emerges.  Lacan speaks of the 
baby’s relation to the breast, this early encounter with the field of the Other and 
with the object of anxiety, stressing that is not an anticipation for the breast that 
produces anxiety, but the anticipation of its going away. He says: “Don’t you know 
that it’s not longing for the maternal breast that provokes anxiety, but its 
imminence? What provokes anxiety is everything that announces to us, that lets 
us glimpse, that we’re going to be taken back onto the lap” (Lacan, 1962-1963 
[2014]: 53). This early encounter is anxiety-provoking once it disrupts the 
delineation of desire that is then orienting the subject:  
“The most anguishing thing for the infant is precisely the moment 
when the relationship upon which he’s established himself, of the 
lack that turns him into desire, is disrupted, and this relationship is 
most disrupted when there’s no possibility of any lack, when the 
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mother is on his back all the while, and especially when she’s wiping 
his backside” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014:52-3). 
 
The mother being there which is bound to her not being there is what opens space 
for this anxiety, as he points out.  In general terms, anxiety is then not linked to a 
‘loss’ but with a ‘presence’. In Lacan’s words, “anxiety isn’t about the loss of the 
object, but its presence” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]: 53). In this sense, and 
referring back to his work on the seminars on Transference and Fantasy, it is the 
meeting of a fantasy over the mirror that allows for an object to appear in this 
space of a void, and when this happens, anxiety emerges. This is what is meant by 
the often-quoted definition of anxiety being ‘the lack of the lack’, or, instead of this 
void, the object pops up. Lacan claims to have discovered such an object, which 
was only possible after he revised Freud’s work in light of his own return to Freud 
and theoretical advances.  
 
When approaching this object in order to delineate anxiety, Lacan goes through 
the question of the drive. At the point of Seminar X, the relation between drive and 
body is on the basis of the action of the signifier over the body. Lacan is also critical 
of the psychological and psychoanalytic methods to research and theorise anxiety 
that take as a given that the body is a unity – and here we sense again a strong 
presence of his earlier critique of phenomenology too.  His body is one of excesses. 
The place of the void and a ‘residue’ will bring us back to his earlier texts on the 
Mirror Stage when asking how does the drive is established, or how does the drive 
‘come about’.  Here it is clear that the drive derives from the relation to the mirror 
image that ‘cuts into’ the body. The initial corps morcele, the fragmented body is 
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cut through when reflected in the mirror and as a result various ‘parts’ of the body 
are cut off, or become objects.  This cut, therefore, creates lost objects and ‘voids’ 
in the body as a graphic ground in which to explore this question of ‘these voids’ 
that are established through the cut: 
“It is with the real image, constituted, when it emerges, as i(a) that 
one clasps or not the multiplicity of objects a, here represented by 
the real flowers, in the neck of the vase, and this is thanks to the 
concave mirror at the far end, a symbol of something that must 
stand to be found in the structure of the cortex, the foundation of a 
certain relationship that man has with the image of his body, and 
with the different objects that can be constituted from this body, 
with the fragments of the original body grasped or not at the 
moment when i(a) has the opportunity of being constituted” (Lacan, 
1962-1963 [2014]: 118). 
 
These peculiar, special objects marked on the body, are not external, but neither 
are they completely internal.  Such ‘inside-out’ zigzagging is of the order of the ex-
timate, of that which is internal but always crossed by the field of the Other. With 
the object a  marking such excess of the body that is not captured by the division 
and establishment of the body and the drives, Lacan comes close to the 
polymorphous perversion of early Freud and of the Body-Without-Organs of 
Deleuze and Guattari (see Chapters 4 and 5). For Lacan, however, and crucially, 
without the cut, there is no subject. Or, in Lacan’s view, there is simply no subject 
before the mirror stage and whatever there is there, involved in the autoerotic 
jouissance is not the subject. In his words:  
 
“Prior to the mirror stage, that which will be i(a) lies in the disorder 
of the objects a in the plural and it is not yet a question of having 
them or not. This is the true meaning, the deepest meaning, to be 
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given to the term autoeroticism – one lacks any self, as it were, 
completely and utterly. It is not the outside world that one lacks, as 
it is quite wrongly expressed, it is oneself” (Lacan, 1962-1963 
[2014]: 118-119). 
 
The voids of the body, or the ‘rims’, as in these physical spaces where in-out get 
blurred (openings such as the mouth, the anus, the eye, etc.) are loci of the drive 
only in so far as they bear a relation to the field of the Other, producing an excess 
that is cast off from this Other. As Lacan puts it: “Freud tells us that anxiety is a rim 
phenomenon, a signal that is produced at the ego’s limit when it is threatened by 
something that must not appear. This is the a, the remainder, which is abhorred 
by the Other” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]: 119). The object a, therefore, escapes the 
Symbolic and in this way, causes anxiety, as “if what is seen in the mirror is 
anguishing, it is in so far as it cannot be proposed to the Other’s 
acknowledgement” (Lacan, 1962-1963 [2014]: 120). In this sense, anxiety, as an 
encounter with the Real, is excessive of the field of the Other. By being so, it is 
excessive to the Oedipal logic and bears a special place within a Lacanian 
differential diagnosis.  
 
By conducting this very close reading of this seminar, we are able to identify a 
subtle and yet powerful change to his structural clinic: If psychosis, neurosis and 
perversion relate to a foreclosure or internalisation of the Name-of-the-Father 
(Oedipal order), anxiety is an affect that brings the subject to the world beyond 
such subjective formation: it is a new horizon of being. This is precisely what 
‘becoming’ entails. If anxiety, thus, is an affect that characterises the emergence of 
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experience beyond ‘the subject’, it moves away from ‘being’ into a ‘becoming’ – 
anxiety vibrates in its emergence. Here is the impasse of Lacan’s seminar on 
anxiety that such close reading allows us to observe. 
 
Anxiety in Late Lacan 
 
The ethics of Lacanian Psychoanalysis through the relation to Desire and the Real 
changes in his later teachings.  In ‘early’ Lacan, and in particular in Seminar VII, 
the seminar dedicated to the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan proposes a version of 
‘ethics’ that can be roughly summarised as an unconditional fidelity to one’s 
singular desire.  A simple critique of this notion is that in social life (i.e. collective, 
political and even democratic life) this arrangement would be ‘impossible’, for 
how could we ‘fit’ in so many singularities, making concessions and negotiations 
of desire the crux of sociality and subjectivity?  In Lacan’s later teachings, he offers 
a second proposition of an ethics of psychoanalysis; without annihilating this 
principle of fidelity to one’s desire, he proposes another ethics that has to do with 
the Real.  He proposed that we must make ourselves ‘dupes’ of the Real, 
demarcating thus, the later Lacanian characteristic of an ‘Ethics of the Real’.  Dupe 
derives from Lacan’s poetic linguistic games that take the ‘Nom-du-Pere’ and 
‘Pere-version’ to the fore, arriving at a ‘dupe’ of ‘du-Pere’.  If anxiety is so closely 
linked to the Real, how does this later ethical proposition relate to anxiety?  
 
The theoretical and clinical potency of anxiety we find in Seminar X was last 
evoked by Lacan in Seminar XI, when he defends that the clinician must ‘canalise’ 
it in ‘small doses’ in the treatment. Any later mentions of anxiety (the French 
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angoisse) will not cover any further theoretical grounds. His very last definition of 
anxiety comes in 1977, in Seminar XXIV, L'Insu que Sait de L'Une-Bévue S'Aile à 
Mourre (1976-1977), where he characterises anxiety as ‘symboliquement réel’ and 
the opposite of a ‘lie’. Until Seminar XI, Lacan delineates an anxiety in relation to 
the Other and introduces this affect to this peculiar excessive blind-spot he calls 
object a. Towards his later works, we find a change from the structuralist Lacan of 
desire into a post-structuralist Lacan of the Drive, or of the body, of jouissance not 
harnessed to the Other and beyond the logic of the signifier.  
 
In the 1974 Rome congress of the EFP, Lacan, in what is known as La Troisième, 
says that anxiety is “precisely something that is situated in our body but in another 
part, it is the feeling that emerges of this suspicion which fools us that we are 
reduced to our bodies” (Lacan, 1974:102). 26 Around this period, Lacan was 
reworking fundamental pillars of his teachings such as castration and sexual 
difference, leaving behind the ‘feminine’ and ‘phallic’ jouissance he still hung on to 
in the 1960s.  By the time Lacan delivers Seminar XX, in 1972-73, instead of a 
phallic jouissance (limited by castration) versus the ‘other’ jouissance (beyond 
castration and object loss), Lacan proposes that it is the signifier that is the main 
source of jouissance.  The signifier here appears with a very different face; rather 
than attached to the possibilities of meaning which dressed his structuralist tone 
until the 1960s, now the signifier is quite material, it is not bound to meaning but 
 
26 My translation from Valas Spanish text (the original printed version of this speech). In 
Spanish: “La angustia es, precisamente, algo que se situa en nuestro cuerpo en otra parte, 
es el sentimiento que surge de esa sospecha que nos embarga de que nos reducimos a 




rather to sounds that mark the body in lalangue (the lallation of a baby’s play with 
sounds, repetitions and the body, our first encounter with words that will only 
later be restricted to meaning). Whilst the later Lacan focuses on the parlêtre – or 
the speaking-being – rather than the subject of Oedipal sexual difference, offering 
a queer possibility for a psychoanalytic subject not determined by the phallic 
signifier, it is the Real that marks his clinical and theoretical shift.  
 
Voruz and Wolf, two contemporary Lacanian analysts, stress the insistence of the 
Real as a motor to psychoanalytic theory observable in the transformations of 
both Freudian and Lacanian texts and seminars through their lifetime (Voruz and 
Wolf, 2007).  Whilst Freud leaves us with the somewhat generalised idea of 
‘negative therapeutic reactions’, Lacan, “eventually had to acknowledge the 
impossibility of fully ‘draining’ the unconscious with the signifier” (Voruz and 
Wolf, 2007: viii) and the end of analysis and of his theoretical endeavour. This 
‘push-to-the-Real’, or this unconscious beyond what can be grasped or reduced is, 
for the psychoanalysts, the characteristic of Lacan’s later teachings.  Anxiety, and 
the seminar on anxiety, roughly situated in the middle of Lacan’s career and right 
before his excommunication from the IPA, is, as we know, an encounter with the 
Real.  
 
Both in Seminar XXII and in La Troisième, Lacan puts anxiety in the centre of his 
Borromean Knot (a diagram of the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real and its 
intersections).  In this movement, as Colette Soler (2014) also concludes, we are 
then able to find an anxiety that lies outside meaning, but not outside of the body. 
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This later Lacanian understanding of the Real, which is not an impossibility of the 
Symbolic but existing outside of it, will not manifest itself as enjoyed meaning 
(sens-joui), rather, it will manifest in the affect of anxiety.  Thus, anxiety is an 
encounter with a materiality of the body that does not cross meaning or the 
Symbolic (and its discontents). Anxiety can, in this manner, point towards the 
constitution of a new Imaginary – rather than an abyss within, a whole new 
horizon – as I will move into arguing in the final chapters of this thesis. This new 
horizon takes anxiety as being a ‘compass’ (Miller, 2007) to the clinic not only of 
‘being’ but also of ‘becomings’.  In this sense, anxiety is an affect that vibrates 
possibilities within and beyond the frame of the subject. 
 
A lot has been written in recent years about later Lacanian teachings, a large part 
of which remains untranslated into English.   Lacan, who died in 1981, had a 
chance to circulate around very radical and political thinkers of his time, from 
Guattari and Deleuze to the strong feminist movement in France, choosing, 
however, not to engage so actively with more radical ideas (Dosse, 2010).  Aside 
from a clue to his own political conservativeness, open dialogues between 
Lacanian works and both feminist and Deleuze & Guattari-influenced thinking 
have been articulated in academia ever since. However, the lack of a substantial 
later formulation of anxiety by Lacan could be the reason why anxiety rarely, if 
ever, features as part of such novel dialogues.   
 
This chapter has mapped Lacan’s theory of anxiety whilst articulating it with the 
potential openings from ‘being’ into ‘becoming’ found in his Seminar X. By 
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situating his only systematic theory of anxiety contextually and in detail within 
Lacan’s praxis, it is possible to grasp precisely how the moment of anxiety – in 
theory, in the clinic and in the experience of this affect – is witness to the 
emergence of the Real. The Real in question, following this detailed account of his 
seminars, appears in Seminar X, as still laced by the limits of the Other. The 
fragmented, or multiple body that Lacan addresses very early on (in Seminars I 
and II), returns in his later teachings as giving rise to the speaking-body; or the 
affective body which is not reliant on the Symbolic (and its Oedipal myth).  Lacan, 
however, does not spell out a new theory of anxiety in the 1970s and it is here, 
recuperating the two vibrational moments in Freud’s work on anxiety (as realised 
in Chapter 2, namely, the pre-psychoanalytic libidinal excess and the very late Id-




CHAPTER 4 THE FULL-VOID CAN VIBRATE 
 
 
Departing from Freud and Lacan’s theories of anxiety – which see anxiety as an 
‘affect’ and as ‘an encounter with the Real’, as developed in the previous chapters 
– this section of the thesis will explore such interruption or rupture of the 
Symbolic net and the Imaginary frame that characterises anxiety via the concept 
of a ‘vibrational body’. Here I discuss, extrapolate and construct bridges through 
the dilemma between the abyss-within and possible horizons-beyond the subject 
as accounts of the Real.  
 
 How could I start thinking – and writing – about affect, about the Real, and about 
anxiety if what I am trying to reach is precisely the ‘limits of language’?  To anchor 
my thinking and to challenge the conceptualisation of the body in the context of 
anxiety I will discuss the notions of a ‘vibrating body’, the ‘Plane’ and the ‘full-void’ 
in the art work of the late Brazilian artist Lygia Clark. It is possible to make a 
parallel between Clark’s ‘abandonment of art’ and such limits of language that are 
alive in the experience of anxiety as we will see in what follows. Clark’s ‘vibrational 
body’, as observed by the Brazilian psychoanalyst, art critic and scholar, Suely 
Rolnik (1989, 2000) not only pushes the definition of the status of the ‘body’ and 
affect in psychoanalysis as it offers a scope for an ontological debate over the 
status of the subject in and out of language, providing my research with an 
‘affirmative gap’ in its centre. I draw inspiration from Rolnik and Clark’s ‘vibrating 
body’ to develop my own concept of ‘anxiety as vibration’, a term I believe to be 
fruitful in its challenging of ontological aspects within the field of Freudian and 
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Lacanian psychoanalysis and, by consequence, offering insights that can politicise 
clinical work. What Clark allows me to do is to travel beyond what she calls the 
‘Plane’ of the Other, putting not only Oedipal sexual difference in check but also 
the barriers between psychoanalysis and an ethics of multiplicity instead of 
Lacan’s ethics centred on the dialects of Desire, as seen in the previous chapter. 
 
In the next pages, Clark’s work opens a discussion about affect, the Real, Oedipus 
and the limits of language; themes approached via an engagement with the 
interrogation: ‘What can a body do?’. This puzzling question posited by Spinoza in 
the seventeenth century and picked up by Deleuze and Guattari from late 1960s 
is, we could easily agree, one that also moors the psychoanalytic clinic. From 
‘conversion hysteria’ in Freud’s couch to contemporary psychosomatic disease 
and at times ‘unexplained’ chronic illness, the body’s capacity to produce 
symptoms, to react and to ‘speak’ appears as an important riddle of any analytical 
trajectory – and, as seen, in anxiety. The excessive, chaotic, unbound Real that is, 
across much of Freud and Lacan’s work in need of ‘castration’, here will find ways 
into the sinthôme through a collectivising assemblage. Clark’s vibrations ‘beyond 
the Plane’ allude to the realm of creativity and collectivity of affect that neither 
Freud nor Lacan articulate in their work of anxiety – but only hinted at in their 
‘vibrational moments’, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Following Guattari (2000), I agree that psychoanalysis needs an ethico-aesthetic 




“In short, the mythic and phantasmatic lure of psychoanalysis must be 
resisted, it must be played with, rather than cultivated and tended like an 
ornamental garden! [my emphasis] Unfortunately, the psychoanalysts 
of today, more so than their predecessors, take refuge behind what one 
might call a ‘structuralization’ of unconscious complexes, which leads 
to dry theorisation and to insufferable dogmatism; also, their practice 
ends up impoverishing their treatments and produces a stereotyping 
which renders them insensible to the singular otherness [alterité] of 
their patients” (Guattari, 2000:39).   
 
 
Guattari is referring to Lacanians and the structuralist foundations of Lacan’s 
theories of the unconscious that dominated his teaching specially during the 
1960s. The trouble with this kind of psychoanalysis is, to Guattari, that it tries to 
encompass everything – all possibilities, all symptoms, all discourses – within its 
structural mapping (where the Other is the locus of all signifiers), making little 
space for the rise of and relationships among singular others.  As such, working 
with this idea of vibration takes us to the realm of ‘chaos’, a threshold of creativity 
and immanence that posits an ontological and epistemological challenge to 
contemporary clinical practices. My intention is to discuss the limits and problems 
of a conceptualisation of the body and the Real through the dichotomy inherent in 
the Freudian and Lacanian ‘drive’ – a founding psychoanalytic concept that 
presupposes a division between language and flesh; between the realms of a 
castrating Symbolic and a chaotic body. Agreeing with Braidotti (2006a), I see one 
central problem with the psychoanalytic theory of the drive in Lacan as that it 
relies on a Hegel-inherited negativity of desire and a dialectics of ‘sexual 




In what follows, I will dive deeper into the world of chaos by taking not just 
Guattari and Deleuze as companions, but also Spinoza, whose Ethics can illuminate 
the vibrating possibilities of anxiety presented in previous chapters. Art practice, 
here, will be crucial to our push beyond critique and towards creativity in the field 
of psy-care, unfolding mainstream theories through vibration. 
 
Moving beyond the limits of the Plane 
 
A prominent artist of her time, Lygia Clark was famously influenced by her 
experience in psychoanalysis. Working during the Brazilian military dictatorship 
that lasted from the 1960s to the 1980s, and witnessing the very early 
announcement of neoliberal politics in Europe, the United States and Latin 
America, she developed, in the later stage of her prolific career, a practice marked 
by what she claimed to be an ‘abandonment of the art world’. She is notable for 
her singular practice involving the body: her body, the body of viewers and the 
possibilities of bodies. Specifically, hers was a practice named the ‘Nostalgia of the 
Body’, which she defined as “a corporeal fragmentation in the process of arriving 
at a reconstruction of the body as ‘collective body’” (Rivera, 2013:148).27  This 
trajectory of leaving the art world and embarking on a psychotherapeutic 
proposition can be followed in her essay ‘Nostalgia of the Body’, published 
posthumously in 1994 in the October journal. In a passage entitled ‘Death of a 
Plane’, Clark qualifies the discontent with the elementary form of artistic practice 
– the ‘plane’, or the square, the canvas – that led her to embark on a journey 
 




beyond such a ‘false idea of reality’ projected by humanity within this limiting 
frame: 
The plane is a concept created by humanity to serve practical ends: 
that of satisfying its need for balance […]. The plane arbitrarily 
marks off the limits of a space giving humanity an entirely false and 
rational idea of its own reality […]. It's also the reason why people 
have projected their transcendent part outward and given it the 
name of God. In this way the problem of their own existence is raised 
in inventing the mirror of their own spirituality […]. But the plane is 
dead. The philosophical conception that humanity projected onto it 
no longer satisfies – no more than does the idea of an external God 
persist. In becoming aware that it is a matter of an internal poetry 
of the self that is projected into the exterior it is understood at the 
same time that this poetry must be reintegrated as an indivisible 
part of the individual (Clark, 1994:96) 
 
 
The plane is charged with her cosmological dissatisfaction with the need for an 
‘external God’ as an obstacle to an ‘internal poetry’ that pertains to the self.  In this 
sense, I suggest one could interpret the ‘plane’ as what Lacanian psychoanalysis 
calls the net of signifiers anchored in an Imaginary relation to language and 
culture that is always dependent on the Other to have any consistency. Following 
this logic, Clark’s move towards a practice that liberates this ‘internal poetry’ is 
akin to an endeavour of tracing an ontological possibility that gives space for an 
immanence in desire that is not reliant on the relationship with the Other and the 
Oedipal Law-of-the-Father, as psychoanalysis demands, but to several ‘others’ in 
space, tracing a different ecological cartography to the subject. This is Clark’s 
feminist twist: against universals and proposing an ethics of multiplicity. 
 
Practicing art since 1947, when she moved to Rio de Janeiro from her native Minas 
Gerais, Lygia Clark’s most significant breakthrough in the artistic scene came with 
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the publication of the  Neo-Concrete Manifesto, in 1959.28 Her association with the 
Neo-concrete group and their push towards sensibility over the rationality of 
Concretism already carries something of her travel ‘beyond the Plane’, which is 
present in their discontentment with the standardised practices of then 
contemporary artists and curators. Clark’s bolder ‘killing of the Plane’ starts in the 
1960s, in her departure from the formalist geometrical painting and sculpture that 
ignited her career, and development of works such as Bichos and Caminhando 
(1963-64), which called the viewer to a closer contact with the artworks, touching 
and participating. Bichos, a series of multidimensional metallic forms joined by 
hinges, invites the spectator to be co-author of the piece by moving it.  In this work 
we see a dual interaction of entities (human/aluminium structure or 
spectator/artist) brought to the same level by movement. Or, we could say, in this 
early interactive piece we see a ‘levelling of the Plane’, before Clark really moves 
into perforating it.  
 
In Caminhando, the Möbius strip appears as the topological resource to bring her 
flight beyond the limits of the plane to the debate between in/out, where not only 
the relation between subject/object was questioned but the actual ‘being in space’ 
was the point of enquiry of her intervention on the ‘body’ in the piece.  In this 
work, for the first time in her career, the ‘act’ thus gains more importance over the 
 
28 The Neo-Concrete Manifesto was a collective text published in the Sunday culture 
supplement of the newspaper Jornal do Brasil, of the 23rd of March, 1959. It was signed 
by Lygia Clark, as well as other artists such as Helio Oiticica, Lygia Pape and the poet 





‘object’. The piece moves towards a “final rupture, that will certainly come, once 
the width of the strip is not infinite, but it [the rupture] is slowed down in the 
repetitive trajectory of the scissors over paper” (Rivera, 2013:142).  As I see it, this 
movement towards rupture via a repetition, present in this piece, is also her move 
beyond the ‘plane’. The action of Caminhando offers a metaphor of the 
psychoanalytic fantasy, or of the Death Drive, which implies a constant repetition, 
moving without leaving the same spot – this being Lacan’s view that all ‘drives’ 
operate as a repetitive ‘death drive’ (Lacan, 1966:848). In this sense, Clark’s 
Caminhando is a subversion of the status of the subject, which in her work is not 
confined to the tragic repetition of the same but is moving towards a rupture. The 
subjective crisis in such metaphoric gesture is “the subject themselves awakening, 
let’s say, from their specular alienation” (Rivera, 2008:5).29 From then onwards, 
objects would not mean the same to Clark (limited to the status of ‘art objects’), 
and would no longer represent the limiting spatial cut of the ‘plane’. From 
Caminhando onwards, until her death in 1988, “the object would lose 
its thingness to become, once more, a field of living forces that affect, and are 
affected, by the world, promoting a continuous process of differentiation of 
subjective and objective realities” (Rolnik, 2013a:76). Her work thus crosses the 











Lygia’s bodies of/at work 
 
 
While Clark ‘kills the plane’ and slowly ‘abandons the art world’, her surroundings 
shift dramatically. On a very concrete level, the Brazilian Military coup of March 
1964 inaugurated two decades of dictatorship in Brazil - a period of repressive 
censorship and violence that also loomed over other Latin American countries 
(Cayses, 2014).  In the art world, censorship was explicit (Whitelegg, 2013). 
Similarly to the university field, the artistic environment was severely sabotaged, 
controlled and violated by the dictatorship – and to practice art (or any cultural/ 
intellectual practice in general) that worked in opposition to the regime meant the 
risk of arbitrary arrest, and of further threats such as torture and assassination. 
After the promulgation of AI-5,30 many artists were forced into exile, either due to 
the toxicity of the environment or direct threats of imprisonment (Calirman, 
2012).  
 
Clark’s fleeing of the dictatorship and her subsequent move to Paris in 1968 marks 
another moment of her working with the ‘body’ (Rolnik, 2013b). At first, there is 
a clear ‘collectivist’ necessity characterising the work, which opens up 
micropolitical grounds more clearly, in order to pave the way to the final 
‘Structuring of the Self’, where the vibrating body is most in evidence. From 1972 
to 1976, Clark taught a course she called ‘The body and the space’ (Rivera, 2013) 
 
30 AI-5 stands for ‘Institutional Act Number 5’, promulgated in 1968 by the General then 
occupying federal presidency under the military dictatorship. This act suppressed 
further any constitutional guarantees, leading to greater use of torture as means of 
suppression of political opposition.  
 
 167 
at the Faculté d'Arts Plastiques St. Charles in the (post-1968) Sorbonne. The pieces 
she developed during this period were characteristically focused on collective 
interaction and envisaged the generation of a collective bodily experience and 
consciousness/perception, breaking with the subject-object dichotomy and 
playing out over the surface of the body.  She developed a series of propositions 
with her group of students named O Corpo é a Casa (the body is the house) (1968-
1970) and Fantasmática do Corpo (Fantasmatic of the Body), or ‘Collective-Body’, 
the latter beginning with the well-known piece ‘Anthropophagic Slobber’ (1973). 
In this piece, a group of around 60 people receive thread reels to insert on their 
mouths and subsequently unravel the threads over other people’s bodies who 
remain blindfolded at the centre of the group (Rolnik, 2000). Wet with saliva, the 
massive tangle of thread is untangled before the members of the group, who share 
their experience verbally.  Their bodies, together, open the way to the word. 
Instead of the Other as the source of language, words emerge in this collective 
effort, as a co-poiesis.31 
 
Compared to other artistic practices of the time, there is something fundamentally 
unique in Clark’s production from this period.  Contrary to the format of the art 
 
31 Bracha Ettinger (2005, 2006, 2019) uses the term co-poiesis across her writing, 
defining it as: “the aesthetical and ethical creative potentiality of borderlinking and of 
metramorphic weaving. The psychic cross-imprinting of events and the exchange of 
traces of mutually (but not symmetrically) subjectivizing agencies, occurring via/in a 
shared psychic borderspace where two or several becoming-subjectivities meet and 
borderlink by strings and through weaving of threads, and create singular trans-
subjective webs of copoiesis composed of and by transformations along psychic strings 
stretched between the two or several participants of each encounter-event. Thus, a 
matrixial borderspace is a mutating copoietic net where co-creativity might occur” 




Happenings that gave origin to Performance Art in the United States, (which sees 
“an affirmation of the body without a real problematization of the subject” (Rivera, 
2008:6), Clark opts for ‘propositions’ which “bring the body in a subtle and 
ephemeral manner that capture the subject in the kernel of its problematic 
constitution” (Rivera, 2008:6). This way, the collective pieces of the early 1970s 
see “bodies that affect other bodies” in a complicated way that allow for a “cast” to 
be formed on the affected body that is then “anthropophagically”32 incorporated 
(Rolnik, 2000), generating a new ‘becoming’. In a letter to Helio Oiticica dated 6th 
July 1974, Clark writes that “it is the phantasmatics of the body that interest me, 
not the body in itself” (Clark, 1974:223). 33   With regards to the process of 
‘Anthropophagic Slobber’ she concludes: “Afterwards I ask for the vécu [the ‘lived’, 
in French in the original letter], which is the most important, and like this I will go 
on elaborating myself through the elaboration of the other…”(Clark, 1974:223). 
This slobber seems to open up space for an ethics of a multitude of affecting 
‘others’ that does not need to cross any anchoring transcendental referential, or 
Other, to be realised. 
 
The presence of the body in this period comprises an invitation for the subject to 
speak of their body (sensations) and through their body, in this way “the bodily 
 
32 Anthropophagy is an early twentieth century movement in Brazilian modernist art. 
The 1922 publication of the manifesto by Oswald de Andrade in the Brazilian Modern 
Art Week has a strong connotation of early decolonial artistic expression. The 1922 
Modern Art Week happened one hundred years after Brazil’s ‘independence’ from 
Portugal. 
 




experience must give way to speech” (Rivera, 2013:148).  The parallel between 
this period of her work and psychoanalysis are, of course, rather potent. Indeed, 
during this time Lygia Clark was in analysis with Pierre Fédida34 in Paris, and this 
experiment with the ‘phantasmatics of the body’ “brings together explicitly the 
therapeutic process she is going through” (Rivera, 2013:147), a ‘sewing in of the 
body’ and an exploration of fantasies that can also be seen in her published letters 
exchanged with artist Helio Oiticica.  In the letter from the 6th of November of 
1974, Lygia Clark writes extensively about fantasies that may verge on some kind 
of ‘conscientious delirium’, that are very surreal about nature, sexes, bodies, 
serpents coming out of her vagina, a ‘tête d'abeille’ (bee head) etc. that she 
explored in her analysis. She writes: “In all the points of my analysis my work fits 
in a total manner, this is what impresses me a lot” (Clark, 1974:248).  The relation 
to the processes she has been proposing to her students and her journey in 
analysis with Fédida is spelled out in this long letter, where Clark is very focused 
on the potency of such ‘phantasmatics’ of the body, as she calls it.  She writes to 
Oiticica: 
 
34 Lygia Clark was in analysis with Pierre Fédida, the French psychoanalyst and founder 
of the Psychopathologie Fondamentale laboratory in Paris during her exile in France. In 
her letters to Oiticica she writes enthusiastically about her analytic process of 
reconnecting with the unconscious, her dreams, words and transformative spills of such 
dreams in her daily life. Psychopathology as a field has gone through an interesting 
critique during the late 1980s that I find relevant pointing out here. In opposition to the 
‘General Psychopathology’ (Allgemeine Psychopathologie) of phenomenological 
inclination proposed by Karl Jaspers in 1910, Pierre Fédida led the Laboratoire de 
Psychopathologie Fondamentale et Psychanalyse, at the University of Paris 7. The 
approach of Psychopathologie Fondamentale was that all pathos was somatic/or 
mobilising the body, in a less dualist body/mind model than that of phenomenology and 
mainstream psychiatry at the time, but this somatic element of the psychopathology was 
lived in the narrative the patient produced about their experience and through this 
narrative the clinical work would unfold. 
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“I think that all of us who create are this and the difference between 
us and the psychotics is that we are capable of extending this bridge 
to the world by communication, or else… ai de nós! [Untranslatable].  
Through this you see that my work is my own phantasmatic that I 
give to the other, proposing that they clean it and enrich it with their 
own phantasmatics: then it is anthropophagic slobber that I vomit, 
that is swallowed by them and added to their own phantasmatics 
vomited once again, added until the last consequences.  This is what 
I call a live culture and not a dead culture, which is the expression of 
the old support.  And society, that is afraid of what is alive because 
it is necrophagic, swallows everything today because everything 




 It is not completely clear, certainly not fitting to any pre-established 
psychoanalytic concept, what Clark means by ‘phantasmatics’. What we can grasp 
from this passage is that it relates to sensation, to exchange and possibility, to 
collective ‘becomings’. In this same letter, Clark writes, fittingly, right after 
speaking of jouissance (in French, in an obvious reference to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis), that “everything is libido, everything is sensation” (Clark, 
1974:248). A new moment, and the one that interests this research the most, 
unfolds in her practice soon after. We may see this as an announcement of her 
encounter with the limits of this communication or collective experience and 
verbalisation model (perhaps constituted by too much of the ‘dead old support’, 
as the letter says) and her interest in a new method of propositions.  The Paris 
years, the works in groups with her students at the Sorbonne and her intense 
analysis with Fédida were very potent in Clark’s journey and foundational to what 
came next, which was her establishment in the ‘frontier’ between art and clinic.  In 
the end of this same November 1974 letter to Oiticica, Clark talks about the impact 
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some of her works have had on some participants, whose lives and ‘ways’ have 
changed dramatically. She writes: “Sometimes I unblock people in one experience 
and, other times, more time is needed. I had thought before being in this 
psychoanalysis of becoming an analyst, but now I want to continue at the 
“frontier”, because this is what I am and it won’t do it wanting to be less frontier 
[pois é isso que sou e não adianta querer ser menos fronteira]” (Clark, 1974:254).  
Clark returns to Brazil in 1976 and finds in her ‘frontier’ the space to develop 
‘Structuring of the Self’, her last ‘piece’, carried on until she was close to the end of 
her life, in 1988.  
 
Clark’s contentment with the ‘frontier’ is very important since it challenges any 
easy interpretation of her project of ‘abandonment of art’ as ‘not artistic’ as such.  
It is not that she moved into being a therapist, yet she did not remain an artist in 
any traditional sense of the word.  The ‘transformative’ character of aesthetics and 
interaction were, to Clark, the real aim of her path as an artist: her abandoning of 
art and self-titled ‘therapeutic work’ in the ‘Structuring of the Self’ series from 
1976-1988, worked as the epitome of meaning of her practice, challenging the 
clinic/art divide and parking right at the ‘frontier’ – in a way a realisation of her 
artistry through this abandonment of art (Rivera, 2008). In other words, Clark 
chooses to abandon art by not becoming exactly a psychotherapist, but instead, 
exploring this threshold, this in-between, as creative and generative. This 
abandonment, as she called it, or her desertion from art practice was, conversely, 
her greatest artistic endeavour. This work, decades later, still leaves some open 
questions that are relevant to the discussion around the limits of language as a 
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Symbolic structure and of words, sounds, noise or vibrations that cross the body 
in the form of symptoms or affects that are central to my thesis.35  
 
The Parisian period of her work was also marked by a profound questioning of the 
function of art, of her practice and of herself – it was a prelude to Structuring of 
the Self (1976-88). This practice involved one-to-one exchange sessions designed 
to reach one person at a time, moving beyond the collective performances she was 
working on in France, but still challenging the status of the individual by invoking 
a singularity, or an individual potency, that was connected to one’s experience of 
the world. In other words, Clark was concerned with “the reactivation of this 
quality of aesthetic experience in the receivers of her creations” (Rolnik, 2007, 
para.9).  Or, as Rolnik expresses it, Clark’s move to this place in the ‘frontier’ was 
concerned with promoting the Structuring of the Self, “that is, the capacity of 
letting oneself be affected by the forces of objects created by the artist and the 
environment in which they were experienced; but above all, as a consequence, the 
capacity of letting oneself be affected by the forces of the environment of one’s 
daily life” (Rolnik, 2007, para.9). This vocabulary of ‘affect’ echoes what Deleuze 
and Guattari (1984) take from Spinoza’s monism, accepting that humans and non-
humans all share the same ‘substance’ and equally affect and are affected by each 
other constantly, without the need of a transcendental mediation à la Hegel 
(Braidotti, 2006a). In Structuring of the Self, the potency of such aesthetic 
 
35 The ‘frontier’ beyond the ‘plane’ also resonates with the efforts of other feminist 
decolonial writers of the time, noticeably Gloria Anzaldúa and her meditation on race, 
gender and sexuality as a Chicana in La Frontera (Borderlands), from 1987. Whilst Clark 
does not address such ‘concrete’ feminist decolonial matters in her work, she also 
proposes a ‘frontier’, or a borderland, as an implicated subjective position.  
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experience of transformation mimicked the clinical dynamics of psychoanalysis, 
offering, however, more nuance into collectivity, co-construction and the 
commonality of the experience – or, co-poiesis.  
 
Clark would see her ‘patients’ in her apartment in Copacabana, in Rio, for regular 
one-hour sessions. She would utilise her ‘Objetos Relacionais’ 36  as tools for 
inferring sensations on the bodies of these participants. These sensations would 
generate affect: together they would untangle knots; they would open the 
unconscious through the body. The sensations facilitated by the objects and their 
textures and weight would generate, or open, space for words that would be 
exchanged between Lygia and her patients.  The sessions “were regular, with a 
frequency of up to three times a week, and a considerable amount of time of the 
session, according to what the artist reported, seem to be employed with the 
verbalisation of associations generated from the experienced sensations” (Rivera, 
2008:6). The whole session was a co-poiesis, or, an in-common, collective poetical 
construction between Clark and the patient. The aim was that after a session, the 
participant would then encounter reality differently and a transformation would 
then take place upon such encounters, as they went out into the world.37 
 
36 Objetos Relacionais, or ‘relational objects’, were the objects of all sorts Clark utilised to 
touch, cover and generate sensations on the body during the ‘Structuring of the Self’ 
sessions. The objects were makeshift and cheap, including plastic bags, seashells, elastic 
bands, mattresses and so on.  
 
37 In terms of technique and transference, for a more psychoanalytic reading of her 
method, Clark did not hold the truth or the capacity to interpret the patient’s 
unconscious. Nor was she basing the relation on her own repertoire of world by 
interpreting the ‘here and now’. Rather, she was acting as the facilitator to this collective 
poetic creation, which resonates with Lacan’s very late teachings and contemporary 





The collective body marked her ideas until it was substituted by this solitary work 
or transformation, in which Clark’s proposition is that art invites the subject, 
radically, to “transform oneself into an act, poetically” (Rivera 2008:6). In other 
words, following Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary, this work is an invitation to 
experience the borders of ‘being’ and flirt, as much as possible, with ‘becomings’. 
Would not such invocation of ‘transformation’ be “analogous to what a 
psychoanalysis envisages?” (Rivera 2008:6), proposing a ‘traversing’ of the 
fantasy, a subjective destitution and new forms of enjoyment, as Lacan would 
propose across his teachings. 
 
Suely Rolnik sees this last stage in Clark’s oeuvre as the fixing of the vibrating body 
in subjectivity (Rolnik, 2000), or as activating the vibrating body as an ‘excess’, or 
‘beyond’ that pertains to the level of sensation. Sensation, Rolnik, remarks, is 
“precisely this that is engendered in relation to the world beyond perception and 
sentiment” (Rolnik, 2002:45)38 – it is not just phenomenological, as it is not about 
perception only, for it is, for Rolnik (2002), always limited to the visible, and we 
could extend it, to the ‘imaginable’.  The use of such sensation-provoking objects 
and the session as a ritual, promotes “a mode of subjectification in which the ‘at 
home’ is not the neuroticised ego of the modern subject anymore, but a live 
structure ‘becoming’, engendered in the impregnation from the world that Lygia 
calls ‘self’” (Rolnik, 2000, para.16).39 In Clark’s vocabulary, what she was doing 
 
38 My translation from original Brazilian Portuguese. 




was to operate a means of deciphering the experiences each person would have 
with each relational object, this process inflicted upon the ‘phantasmatic’ of the 
body, a frontier that does not fit into a classic psychoanalytic idea of the Imaginary, 
nor into phenomenological or even biologised ideas of the fleshy body. Perhaps, 
phantasmatic would be more on the side of this zone of excess, of creation, where 
there is no subject, but where subjectivity can be produced, this quality she will 
later call a ‘full-void’. Her work, thus, invited each participant to a confrontation 
with the ‘full-void’ chaotic potency of their bodies. This character of offering a 
unique vocabulary for ‘affect’ in the ‘full-void’ beyond the ‘Plane’, is what makes 
her work different from performance art and body-therapies. Clark was 
mobilising the unconscious beyond the grasp of the subject. It is here that her 
practice meets what I have identified as  Freud and Lacan’s ‘vibrational’ moments 
in their theories of anxiety, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3 –namely, an excessive 
libidinal emergence beyond what is repressed; the Id-perceptions or sensations of 
the unconscious and the encounter with a Real that is not anchored in the 
Symbolic.  
 
The ‘full-void’ can vibrate 
  
What is this vibrational ‘full-void’ of Lygia Clark and what relations to the 
unconscious does this presuppose?  She defines it as the in/out act of reaching out 
to the plural possibilities awaken by the affective ‘opening of the body’ (Gil,1998), 
a ‘rite’ without a ‘myth’ (Rolnik, 2000). In ‘Nostalgia of the Body’, she writes: 
“What strikes me in the "inside and outside" sculpture is that it 
transforms my perception of myself, of my body. It changes me. I am 
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elastic, formless, without definite physiognomy. Its lungs are mine. It's 
the introjection of the cosmos. And at the same time, it's my own ego 
crystallized as an object in space. "Inside and outside": a living being 
open to all possible transformations. Its internal space is an affective 
space. In a dialogue with my "inside and outside" work, an active subject 
encounters his or her own precariousness. […] The subject discovers the 
ephemeral in opposition to all types of crystallization. Space is now a 
kind of time ceaselessly metamorphosed through action. Subject and 
object become essentially identified within the act. Fullness. I am 
overflowing with meaning. Each time I breathe, the rhythm is natural, 
fluid. It adheres to action. I have become aware of my "cosmic lungs." I 
penetrate the world's total rhythm. The world is my lung. Is this fusion 
death? Why does this fullness have the taste of death? I am so incredibly 
alive ... How to connect these two poles always? Often in my life I have 
discovered the identity of life and death. A discovery which nonetheless 
has a new flavour each time. One night, I had the perception that the 
absolute was this "full-void," this totality of the interior with the exterior 
I've spoken of so often. The "full-void" contains all potentialities. It's the 
act which gives it meaning (Clark,1994:104)  
 
We may begin by considering this collective, affective unconscious that vibrates to 
be a ‘reverse’ of psychoanalysis; a model where the body is privileged over words 
to the point that words barely make a difference, or even, less generously, a 
materialist mysticism.  Yet there are clear resonances with ideas within Lacanian 
psychoanalysis that have been in high circulation over the past few years. Any 
versed Lacanian could bring out the notion of the ‘speaking body’, which is 
Jacques-Alain Miller’s (2014) extrapolation of Lacan’s ‘parlêtre’ (speaking being) 
into a body that speaks as marking the twentieth-first century unconscious.  Yet, 
the difference here is that Clark’s in-out dichotomy is not resolved in a version of 
the subject that is ‘transindividual’ – which is Lacanese for being crossed by a 
common Symbolic that we all share and thus the subject is formed by being 
precisely anchored in language. Clark’s ‘in and out’ – subject and world, flesh and 
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unconscious – is really rather material, physical and tangible. The unconscious is 
bare, and accessed by sensations, not an island or a repository. The unconscious 
is collective, in co-production; the unconscious is affected.  
 
Clinicians might challenge Clark’s technique as being just part of an artistic 
endeavour and not a guide for therapeutic practice. Yet, in the least, it illustrates a 
problem in the anchoring concept of the body in the drive and the function of 
language in analysis.  It is well known, as per Chapter 3, that Lacan’s later texts 
were precisely veering in the direction of the limits of language, specifically 
through the abandonment of the Oedipal metaphor and the ‘Law of the Father’ as 
the single most important mark of subjectivation that guarantees our life ‘in 
culture’. This phallic Law acts as a regulator of the excess of enjoyment of the body, 
so a mediator of the drive and the effect of the word on the body – as such, this 
patriarchal universalist matrix is justified as a necessity in psychoanalysis over 
and over again as the guarantee ‘against psychosis’. In the 1970s, Lacan was 
leaving structuralism and making use of topology in order to escape the limits of 
language in his teachings. Until the enigmatic later teachings of Lacan in which a 
Real that has ‘nothing to do’ with the Symbolic appears, subjects are necessarily 
bound to the signifier and thus the ‘Name-of-the-Father’. What are we left with to 
think about anxiety, this point of subjective rupture, this encounter with the Real?  
 
The matter of the Real of the body, as this excess in being that becomes abundant 
in certain symptomatic repetitions and also invoked in ideological forms of 
enjoyment and which we encounter in anxiety returns here from where Freud and 
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Lacan’s ‘vibrational moments’ left off. To me, most attempts to grasp the ‘speaking 
body’ via this enigmatic Real that stains flesh are unsatisfactory. Even bold 
attempts by feminist philosophers such as Alenka Zupančič’s work on sex (2017b), 
privilege binary sexual difference, mediated by the phallus, as the ‘generative’ gap 
of negativity in subjects (from all genders and sexes, for that matter) that leaves 
‘desire’, or what moves us, as a negativity. My problem with that, as I will elaborate 
further, is that we are still working within a Hegelian dialectics and therefore the 
possibilities for (an ecological and feminist thought of) ‘becoming’, are rather 
limited – we are stuck in a relation to a transcendental Other and a circular lack, 
unable to think of creative emancipation and remaining at the level of critique, as 
Braidotti (2013) puts it. We are still stuck to the Plane. The Hegelian dialectics 
inherited by Lacan, assumes a division between the ‘Subject’ and historical time, 
or, assuming a Symbolic system that is mediated by the phallic law, that only re-
produces subjugated subjectivities, without a chance to create something new or 
be in touch with any ‘chaos’ outside this ‘phallogocentric’ system.40 So, echoing the 
1977 essay by Italian feminist Carla Lonzi: ‘let’s spit on Hegel’ – maybe with Lygia 
Clark’s ‘Anthropophagic Slobber’.  
 
What I am trying to flesh out from Clark’s works of art are possibilities to think of 
the ‘speaking’ and’ vibrating’ body, like Clark’s conceptualisation of the body in 
her art practice, outside of this Hegelian negativity and invoking a differential 
 
40 Poststructuralist feminists such as Elizabeth Grosz and Rosi Braidotti, for example, 
and Suely Rolnik, reject this ‘phallogocentric’ subjection of subjectivity assumed as 
necessary mediator of desire and universalising the colonial, capitalist and patriarchal 
order. They propose, across decades of theoretical thinking, instead, ethical possibilities 
for subject formation that go beyond this beaten track. 
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affirmative excess but still within psychoanalytic terms. By which I mean, still 
keeping psychoanalysis as primarily a practice that is radical in the context of the 
psy-field and mental health care but opening up to an ethical – epistemological 
and ontological – revision in light of the possibilities of a vibrating chaos beyond 
the ‘Plane’.   
 
Rosi Braidotti (2006a), in her much debated book, Transpositions, argues for a 
move beyond the humanist-scented ‘unitary’ notion of subjectivities, and not only 
to a poststructuralist account at the level of Lacanian psychoanalysis – which, as 
she sees, still relies on ‘universal values’  such as the master signifier, the phallus, 
the Law, lack, etc. – proposing a form of ‘nomadic subjectivity’ instead. She is, here 
and across her work, inspired by ecological, feminist, post-human and 
post/decolonial theories that speak to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical 
approach. In Transpositions, following her ongoing theoretical journey, she spells 
out the necessity for taking Life as a subject, moving beyond identification and 
post-Hegelian dialectical models of subjectivity and negativity and towards an 
ethics of multiplicity and affirmation, an ethics of the ‘not-one’.  As she 
summarises, in a commentary to her reviewers:  
“The focus in this line of thought is on the politics of life itself as a 
relentlessly generative force. The key terms in this affirmative politics 
are relations, endurance and radical immanence; the result is the 
notion of ethical sustainability. References to the non-human, inhuman 
or post-human play a very central role in this new ethical equation that 
rests on a fundamental dislocation of anthropocentric premises about 




Braidotti, therefore, expands accounts of a ‘stranger within us’ that are much 
indebted to psychoanalysis, and proposes an ethical encounter of affects in flux 
(the horizon-beyond), so not only an excess ‘of me’ ‘in me’ (or the abyss-within).  
She moves, like Lygia Clark, beyond the Plane. In my reading, this entails 
accounting not only for a Real that pertains to an excess of jouissance of the 
(bodily) drive, not captured by the signifier or sublimated, that feeds symptoms, 
sexuality and also anxiety (which we can find in Chapter 2, in Freud’s early 
accounts of anxiety as an excess of libido). Nor is this about that Real Žižek (2010) 
so energetically defends as an inherent impossibility within the Symbolic, fitting 
thus within a Hegelian dialectics that situates the subject in this gap of negativity. 
Rather, it is about a Real that vibrates such generative encounters of the forms of 
Life, human and non-human, and conditions for Life, material and immaterial, 
situating subjectivity as a constant makeshift knotting of what extends beyond 
oneself. This is what Braidotti (2011, 2019) calls for in an ethics of 
interdependence that sits beyond identification. 41 Here I find Lygia Clark’s 
methods of co-poiesis across her later works, where multiplicity and a 
construction of something new realised in togetherness is proposed; veering away 
from an classic psychoanalytic method of interpreting materials brought into a 
session under a structured frame of references that lock all possibilities within it.  
Can we think, therefore, with Lygia Clark and Braidotti in mind, of an ethics of 
togetherness based not on the mirage of the subject but on the flux of encounters 
 
41 Interdependence is a theme that has gained traction among feminist scholars recently, 
including Silvia Federici (2019), Judith Butler (2020) and Lynne Segal (2020), crossing 




and affects?  And can we think of such ethics within psychoanalysis?  And more, 
does this inform our understanding of anxiety as an affect of rupture and eruption 
of the Real? 
 
In the next part of this chapter, I venture beyond the Plane with Spinoza, Deleuze 
and Guattari, looking for clues of how to incorporate Clark’s vibrating ‘full-void’ 
into the potencies of the psychoanalytic clinic – finding a horizon-beyond where 
there sometimes is only an abyss-within. I commence with a mapping beyond the 
Oedipal Plane, addressing the riddle of sexual difference to reach a discussion of 
‘chaos’ in what touches the matter of anxiety. 
 
A horizon-beyond the Plane of Oedipus 
 
One of the central critiques to the project of psychoanalysis conferred by Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their seminal Capitalism and Schizophrenia two-
volume work, from 1972 and 1980 respectively, concerns the reactionary politics 
of the psychoanalytic clinic, from its institutional arrangements to the politics of 
its assumed subject. Perhaps, we could argue, whilst not a direct feminist 
intervention on the psychoanalytic model and its ties with a patriarchal 
arrangement of power in social bond and psychic life, Anti-Oedipus, does, however, 
manage to challenge very clearly one problem relevant to what this thesis debates: 
the question of ‘excess’ in light of ‘castration’. Excess, in this case, both as what 
exceeds meaning and as what accumulates in the form of a ‘libidinal energy’ and 
the mechanism of its destinies according to Freud, post-Freudians and Lacan.  
What is described as a ‘molar’ and ‘neurotic’ tree-like unconscious is contrasted, 
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famously, with a ‘molecular’, ‘rhizomatic’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983;1987) and 
thus multiple version not bound to a Symbolic cut guaranteed by what Lacan calls 
the ‘Father function’ of Oedipus’ castrating moral necessity. 
 
The Freudian Oedipal resolution was absorbed into Lacanian structuralism.42 So, 
instead of its dissolution resulting in the Super-Ego, Ego and Id, we will then speak 
of language and the effects of the signifier on the mythical pre-Symbolic subject 
(the one represented by the delta in the bottom right of the Lacanian Graph of 
Desire, as seen in Chapter 3). The entrance into the Symbolic, thus, has a 
structuring effect akin to an invitation into neurosis. Upon failure to joining 
‘civilisation and its discontents’ we find psychosis.43 Yet, a philosophical enquiring 
of the psychoanalytic subject here leads me to the following question: is there 
anything beyond psychosis outside this patriarchal conception of the possibilities 
for the subject? What are the grounds for rupture in the clinic? Is everything that 
aligns to a Real outside of the scope of the Other necessarily on the side of 
psychosis? The close readings of Freud and Lacan from Chapters 2 and 3 suggest 
that anxiety remains at an impasse in the clinic: it points to a rupture, but the 
 
42 In Seminar III, Lacan teaches clearly that ‘every analytic phenomenon, every 
phenomenon that comes from the analytic field, from the analytic discovery from what 
we are dealing with in symptoms and neurosis, is structured like a language’ (Lacan, 
1993:167), as such the Other as the locus of all signifiers is anchored through the Law-
of-the-Father that gives consistency, according to this version of Lacan, to the 
unconscious.  
 
43 However, in regard to this point – the primacy of this entrance into the Symbolic to 
the formation of the Lacanian subject, the unconscious and its relevant structure – we 
must never forget the clear non-pathologising, therefore radical on its own terms, take 
on these outcomes, or the non-hierarchical relation between neurosis and psychosis in 
the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition. 
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rupture was repeatedly circumscribed within an Oedipal alienating frame, 
although not always limited to it (the vibrational moments in Freud and Lacan’s 
theories of anxiety attesting as much). Lygia Clark’s push beyond the Plane, as I 
will argue in what follows, inspires an ethics of multiplicity that works itself 
against the dominance of the Oedipal model of the unconscious.  
 
What I propose in what follows is that there is plenty there beyond psychosis, 
escaping language, escaping Oedipal binaries and escaping castration – and 
through the experience of the affect of anxiety we are in touch with this excess that 
is both radical and expanding as well as paralysing and excruciating. This ‘surplus’ 
in anxiety marks the rhythm of what Deleuze and Guattari named as ‘becomings’ 
(devenir). Anxiety, as I argue in this research, is what persists, insists and opens 
up to a possibility in subjective experience directly emerged from the vibrational 
body facing the limits of language. To arrive at this understanding I must, however, 
salvage this ‘vibrating body’ from the enthralment of the Other, Oedipus and the 
Symbolic, thus, of patriarchy and its ideological allies. Such endeavour consists in 
rescuing Spinoza’s affective ‘surplus’ – noticeably an important influence on 
Deleuzian and Guattarian thought – in Freud’s very early and very late writings on 
anxiety, and Lacan’s later teachings and what they may mean to a theory of anxiety 
(as seen in Chapters 2 and 3).  This reading also throws some light on Lacan’s very 
complicated late teachings and assigns, therefore, a political potency to the 
ubiquitous and necessary experience of anxiety. An experience central not only to 
the very development of psychoanalysis as well as to twentieth century 
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psychiatric diagnosis and the psycho-political arrangement of contemporary late-
capitalism, as seen in Chapter 1. 
 
 
The Oedipal foundations of sexual difference is a matter that has historically 
permeated the debates between an ‘essentialist’ current in feminist thought, 
specially of 1970s second wave feminism, and the queer interventions of the 
1990s.  Antoinette Fouque, a member of the French Mouvement de libération des 
femmes (MLF), for example, a follower of Lacan and Irigaray and companion of 
Serge Leclaire and Monique Wittig, proposes as part of the group Psychanalyse et 
Politique, a return to sexual difference from the perspective of women. Fouque 
(1995), as found in the collection Il y a deux sexes: essais de féminologie. 1989 – 
1995, believed in the ‘feminine libido’, which was not reliant on the phallic 
dominance of Freudian and Lacanian theory, which she understood to only 
account for the sex of the ‘one’ – men. This feminine libido was incarnated in the 
experience of symbolic gestation, which she saw as offering an ethical position of 
subjective production, alliance and alterity against the patriarchal ‘brotherhood’ 
of post-1968 France.44 This symbolic function of the mother was her way into a 
psychoanalysis of the ‘two’ sexes, rather than the ‘one’ of its Oedipal matrix. 
Fouque, as well as Irigaray, was an important figure of inspiration for the 
 
44 Symbolic gestation being echoed also in Bracha Ettinger’s (2019) more recent work, 




development of a branch of Italian feminism that is concerned with sexual 
difference – with thinkers such as Luisa Muraro, Lia Cigarini and Lea Melandri.45  
 
In Italy, however, the feminist movements, which were, in the 1970s, close to 
Marxist and psychoanalytic ideas, take ‘difference’ away from only the difference 
between two sexes (male and female), anchoring it as a difference within oneself 
(Zamboni, 2019).  Difference, in this tradition of feminist psychoanalytic thought, 
is what guarantees a critique of the depoliticising absorption into the status quo, 
therefore into patriarchy, as a ‘piece’ of its puzzle without real emancipation.46 A 
plural, multiple version of sexual difference, which takes it away from the Oedipal 
inscription and its consequential dialectic framing upon a ‘phallogocentric’ 
referential,  and into the realm of a ‘nomadic subjectivity’ is Braidotti’s 
contribution to the field, since the early 1990s. She holds on to sexual difference 
as a significant tool for political analysis, revisiting the topic in light of 
contemporary political, ecological, scientific and social debates,  whilst 
maintaining a dialogue with contemporary feminists that do not consider sexual 
difference as a conceptual problem for feminism at all (such as ‘post-Deleuzian’ 
feminists Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, 1999; or Claire Colebrook, 2000). 
Whilst my thesis is not focused on resolving the vast discussion of sexual 
difference within feminist theory, nor on offering a detailed genealogy of this 
 
45 Lia Cigarini’s 1995 La Politica del Desiderio, promotes more clearly an affirmative and 
productive political landscape for feminist constructions departing from the point of 
difference.  
 




debate, it is important to mention how the reduction of difference into a binary is 
still characteristic of contemporary Lacanian works. Without dismissing the 
reality of patriarchy, oppression and exploitation in concrete but also in its 
psychological and unconscious traumatic consequences, an understanding of  
difference that moves beyond the Plane of Oedipus also allows us to think of the 
Real and its irruptions in anxiety as unbound by the One of the Other and 
pertaining to the sphere of affect that is creative, collective and in movement 
(rather than a rupture limited to the side of psychosis). 
 
Alenka Zupančič (2017b), an important contemporary feminist scholar, defends 
sexual difference as an equation of logics: we can only have difference and the 
failure of encounter, the gap in subjectivity, if we set out a system of two.  Zupančič 
is not, however, being simplistic, essentialist or anti-feminist with this remark 
about her defence of sexual difference as a concept; quite the opposite, her 
argument is that only within such a logic of two (which does not have to do with 
gender, or ‘real’ ‘man’ or ‘woman’, but with subjective positions), can we account 
for a power relation of inequality and oppression. This is, without a doubt, a 
powerful and important point. The ‘One’ has oppressed the ‘Not-one’, this ‘Not-all 
that does not (think to) have the phallus; and the Imaginary-Symbolic repertoire 
of modern humanism foreclosed the Real and any experience as part of a 
‘common’ (Federici, 2019, 2020). The calculation of unequal status, for Zupančič 
(2017b), needs this artifice of difference. Following Copjec, she argues that ‘sexual 
difference’, in Lacan, is a logic of two that allows us to see the power relation and 
the inconsistency that crosses the subject (a difference not between ‘man’ and 
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‘woman’, but a difference within ‘oneself’). It is her understanding that gender 
theory took this difference to the level of the surface, rather than depth, calling for 
a multiplicity that does not account for such ‘difference’, or the ‘gap’ that produces 
the relation between the two. 47  Her argument, as she explains:  
“goes—both methodologically and ideologically—against the 
grain of the “times we live in,” refusing to abandon the 
construction site in favour of more polished “conceptual 
products,” “services,” or “singular experiences.” [The pages that 
follow] grew out of a double conviction: first, that in 
psychoanalysis sex is above all a concept that formulates a 
persisting contradiction of reality. And, second, that this 
contradiction cannot be circumscribed or reduced to a secondary 
level (as a contradiction between already well-established 
entities/beings), but is—as a contradiction—involved in the very 
structuring of these entities, in their very being. In this precise 
sense, sex is of ontological relevance: not as an ultimate reality, but 
as an inherent twist, or stumbling block, of reality” (Zupančič, 
2017b:3)  
 
‘Sex’, according to this argument, guarantees this ‘too-muchness’ of the abyss-
within, an understanding that needs to be salvaged from the full trust in the 
signifier that tries to encapsulate identity in new names and definitions for such 
inconsistency.  This view, whilst radical in its own manner, seems to be still 
thinking of psychoanalysis as ‘an ornamental garden’ (Guattari, 2000) that needs 
to be well kept rather than transformed with time. This view – sexual difference 
or barbarism/neoliberalism (or worse, as mentioned in Chapter 3, in Millot and 
 
47 Another important feminist critique of the Deleuze-Guattari machinic model that 
takes sexual difference away from centre stage is Luce Irigaray’s, whose “critique of 
Deleuze is radical: she points out that the dispersal of sexuality into a generalized 
“becoming” results in undermining the feminist claims to a redefinition of the female 




Morel: sexual difference or psychosis/madness) – can easily turn ideological and 
sour. 
 
Such a view echoes Žižek’s (2004) criticism of post-Deleuzian work, which he 
holds as not accounting for any antagonism inherent to subjectivity, and fitting in 
very nicely with neoliberal accumulation and eternity of production.48 He slips, 
however, when asserting that the proliferation of gender and sexual identities in 
the twenty-first century (including within it all expressions of affirmation of non-
conforming identities, such as trans) are all ideological escapes of such 
antagonism. Žižek writes, in a very polemical essay for The Philosophical Salon, in 
2016, that “difference “in itself” is thus not symbolic-differential, but real-
impossible — something that eludes and resists the symbolic grasp” (Žižek, 
 
48 When Braidotti articulates this ethical possibility in Transpositions, she mobilises the 
concepts of bios and zoe, as elaborated by Agamben and further extended into her post-
humanist feminist model of immanence. This is a theoretical artifice that is invaluable 
for the non-liberalism of the concept of multiplicity– a pitfall of some post-Deleuzian 
works that see an infinite proliferation of positivity within one’s reach, seeing ‘desire’ as 
production and infinite but thwarting Deleuze and Guattari’s unequivocal anti-capitalist 
and ecological argument into simplistic ideas such as ‘accelerationism’ (Williams and 
Srnicek, 2013). In zoe, Braidotti acknowledges the historical and political mechanisms of 
isolation, destruction and alienation of this ‘type’ of life – dividing Life into ‘life’ and 
‘bare life’, as per Agamben’s elaboration in Homo Sacer (1995). Yet, “Bradotti brings zoe 
in from the cold, foregrounding this brutal inhuman force as a productive category” 
(Baraitser, 2010: 127) instead, seeing it as the key out of a subjective arrangement and 
biopolitical organisation reliant on a binary constitution of ‘sameness’.  The ecofeminist 
ethics proposed by Braidotti in this work are anchored thus “in terms of zoe, or 
generative, non-logocentric life: a micro-politics of affective becomings” (Braidotti, 
2006a:131). In other words, by unfastening a “joint reliance on the phallic signifier, i.e. 
the political economy of Sameness and of its specular, binary and constitutive 'Others'” 
(Braidotti, 2006a:130), it is possible to take an ethical position “as a non-unitary, 
nomadic feminist and accountable subject [which] facilitates this bond of both empathy 




2016).49 Whilst this affirmation is fine and ‘sound’ in terms of its faithfulness to 
Lacanian concepts, it seems to be a view that ‘tends to the ornamental garden’ of 
psychoanalysis, pruning its concepts for theoretical fruits that look more perfect 
– a move that sounds, to me at least, exactly like the blind-faith in the signifier that 
this rather conservative approach tries to antagonise. The ‘phallus’, in this 
approach, is maintained as essential, making of ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ 
sexuation a conceptual binary that follows unquestioned.  The fact that a ‘binary’ 
is the only guarantor of any ethical probity (with ‘lack’ in its centre), is not only 
problematic on the surface (implying that calling masculine and feminine 
something else, something ‘neutral’, A or B, would resolve it); rather, it is more 
complicated in depth.50 This binary that sustains lack is problematic in its very 
 
49 Sabsay (2016) discusses at length the problems of the question of difference and the 
liberalisation of sexual identities globally in more grounded and responsible ways than 
Žižek. 
 
50 Lorenzo Chiesa (2016) wrote a whole book exploring this question of the ‘two’ in 
Lacan. In The Not-Two Logic and God in Lacan, Chiesa argues that through his study of 
Seminar XX, which he sees as one of “the Seminars revolving around the axiom ‘There is 
no sexual relationship’, and perhaps the most inconclusive, it also undoubtedly remains 
to date the most commented-on and liable to misinterpretations (due often to a lack of 
involvement with earlier works). In short, such mistaken appraisals tend to share an 
identification of woman, who for Lacan emerges as a singular, nonuniversalizable une 
femme, with The Other. This view is especially confusing when voiced from allegedly 
feminist quarters: Woman as The Other supposedly irreducible to castration—namely, 
in the end, as the unity of substance of the classical metaphysical God—corresponds in 
fact for Lacan to nothing other than the illusory counterpart of the evanescent object 
through which man enjoys woman in his fundamental fantasy. We therefore need to 
interrupt this short circuit. The unbinding of a woman from The Other will also provide 
us with the right coordinates of feminine nonphallic jouissance, a supplementary 
enjoyment that is, however, linked to structure as its not-all, and thus does not prevent 
the Other sex from enjoying phallically” (Chiesa, 2016:xx). Chiesa moves further away 
from Žižek/ Zupančič’s reliance on sexual difference by exploring further the ‘non-
phallic jouissance’ of the Other/feminine, however, assigning this jouissance to the 




principle, following the dynamics of ‘difference and separation’ that Denise 
Ferreira da Silva (2016) connects so astutely with the onto-epistemological pillars 
of colonialism, patriarchy and human exceptionalism. In defence of a collective 
entanglement, she writes:  
“Without separability, knowing and thinking can no longer be reduced 
to determinacy in the Cartesian distinction of mind/body (in which the 
latter has the power of determination) or the Kantian formal reduction 
of knowing to a kind of efficient causality. Without separability, 
sequentiality (Hegel’s ontoepistemological pillar) can no longer 
account for the many ways in which humans exist in the world, because 
self-determination has a very limited region (spacetime) for its 
operation. When nonlocality guides our imaging of the universe, 
difference is not a manifestation of an unresolvable estrangement, but 
the expression of an elementary entanglement” (Ferreira da Silva, 
2016:65) 
 
Fittingly, when contemporary philosophers and psychoanalysts call for a move 
beyond the colonial unconscious – as Braidotti, but also Preciado (2020) and 
Rolnik (2015, 2019) do – multiplicity, immanence and becoming-with are the 
grounds for conceiving an idea of subjectivity and the unconscious based on an 
ecosophy (Guattari, 2000). By ecosophy, following Guattari’s method in The Three 
Ecologies (2000) I mean a social, ecological and psychic entanglement of the 
subject, and an onto-ethical framework that departs from such entanglement, 
rather than the post-Kantian distance from the world. Going back to Lygia Clark, 
 
phallic’ jouissance is inscribed within a dialectical relation with phallic jouissance, in 
other words, bound to a relation with this universal. Whilst this is ‘correct’ as an 
archaeology of terms within Lacanian archives, it fails to engage with contemporary life 






the phantasmatics of the body, the ‘full-void’ and their vibrations in collective 
poieses are elaborations that speak closely to ‘difference’ without ‘separability’ 
and, rather, differences within multiplicities.  
 
Moving beyond the binary of sexual difference – taking seriously the mechanisms 
of production and reproduction that engender this still limited Oedipal and phallic 
arrangement, namely a universalist modern humanism anchored in dominance 
and extraction – is a task that resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s work since 
Anti-Oedipus.51  The critique of such unitarian and universal points of referencing 
that are assumed as structuring is at the core of Guattari’s clinical, theoretical and 
political project, since “Guattari contests the unitary, homogeneous and 
authoritarian model of organisation, and privileges instead a type of system with 
multiple, a-centred connections” (Sauvagnargues, 2016:141). The mechanism and 
the machine are the conceptual resources mobilised by Deleuze and Guattari to 
trace the possibilities of becoming, taking, as it is well known, psychoanalysis for 
a radical and yet conservative praxis, rescuing it from Oedipus (or the structure of 
production and reproduction of the One in the colonial and patriarchal capitalist 
delirium).  
 
In The Machinic Unconscious, from 1979, Guattari “proposes a ‘machinic’ 
unconscious and not a structural one, an unconscious populated to be sure with 
images and words, but also with the mechanisms of reproductions of these images 
 
51 Or the bi-univocity, or the turning bivocal of what is polyvocal, as per Guattari (2006), 




and words. This unconscious is thus not representative or expressive, but 
productive” (Sauvagnargues, 2016:153). There is something here I hold on to in 
terms of the ethical and feminist potency of Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, which, in a certain way, is characterised by a movement of 
attempting to trace the mechanisms of becoming, situated, however, in its own 
contextual blindness.  Juliet Mitchel, in her introduction to the volume on Feminine 
Sexuality co-authored with Jaqueline Rose in 1982, writes very succinctly and with 
clarity about the somewhat ‘post-humanist’ potency in psychoanalysis, for it pulls 
back the curtain of the mirage of the subject: 
“The humanistic conception of mankind assumes that the subject 
exists from the beginning. At least by implication ego psychologists, 
object-relations theorists and Kleinians base themselves on the 
same premise.  For this reason, Lacan considers that in the last 
analysis, they are more ideologues than theorists of psychoanalysis.  
In the Freud that Lacan uses, neither the unconscious nor sexuality 
can in any degree be pre-given facts, they are constructions, that is, 
they are objects with histories and the human subject itself is only 
formed within these histories…This immediately establishes the 
framework within which the whole question of female sexuality can 
be understood. As Freud puts it: `In conformity with its peculiar 
nature, psychoanalysis does not try to describe what a woman is – 
that would be a task it could scarcely perform – but sets about 
enquiring how she comes into being.’” (Mitchell, 1982:4)  
 
In this sense, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis set out to elucidate the 
mechanisms of the machine that is the unconscious, with limits, of course, but still 
stirring a revolution within hegemonic onto-epistemic ideals of their time. The 
subject, therefore, is not ‘pre-given’, but a coming into being, or, rather, a ‘coming 
into becoming’. Freud and Lacan, at the very least, lift the veil of the alienation that 
is neurosis or the entrance into the Symbolic and succumbing to the Law. Preciado, 
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in closing remarks of his published speech addressed to the École de la cause 
Freudienne de Paris from November 2019, calls for a revolutionary mutation of 
psychoanalysis, one that addresses and moves beyond its patriarchal and colonial 
presuppositions.52 For Preciado, the answers to our situated and contemporary 
ecological, social, political as well as epistemological, scientific and ontological 
matters are not to be found in reading and re-reading Freud and Lacan (or tending 
to the ornamental garden…), rather, being faithful to the revolution in thought 
inaugurated by Freud means to ‘decolonise the unconscious’ (Preciado, 2020). 53 
 
As Braidotti (2006a) acknowledges in Transpositions, but also as any attentive 
reader of Deleuze and Guattari can grasp, Spinoza’s monism and theory of affects, 
that inspired them greatly, allows a logic in which ‘sexual difference’ does not need 
to be anchoring of subjectivity as such.  We don’t  need to think through Oedipal 
sexual difference and the mirage of a One that is All (following the Freudian myth 
in Totem and Taboo), nor of the Not-All as its binary opposition, always caught in 
the Master’s eyes; rather, it is a matter of understanding all subjective 
arrangements as necessarily not-all, since ‘all’ does not exist except in an 
 
52 He writes: “Nous avons besoin d’une transition de la clinique. Cela ne peut se faire que 
par une mutation révolutionnaire de la psychanalyse et un dépassement critique de ses 
présupposés patriarcat-coloniaux” (Preciado, 2020:54-55). 
 
53 Elisabeth Roudinesco, the grand historian of French psychoanalysis and biographer of 
Lacan, called the book ‘unconvincing’ in her review for the French newspaper Le Monde. 
One aspect Roudinesco did not enjoy in particular was how the author, Preciado, drew 
too much on his personal experience of transition. The title and subtitle of her article 
read: “Le philosophe trans s’appuie sur son expérience pour appeler à « décoloniser » 
l’inconscient. Sans convaincre.”  In English, ‘the trans philosopher bases himself on his 
own experience to call for a ‘decolonisation’ of the unconscious. Without convincing’ 




ideological onto-epistemic mirage. 54   This view contradicts that of Alenka 
Zupančič (2017b, 2019), for example,  as mentioned previously, that a system of 
two, regulated by the Phallic Law, is necessary in order to account for dominance, 
and therefore for patriarchal violence to be broader, an argument carved out of 
mathematical logics, which nonetheless, turns a blind eye to its own violent 
reproductions. 
 
The vibrational body and anxiety, an encounter beyond the Plane 
 
Whilst Deleuze and Guattari were sharp critics of psychoanalysis, Guattari later 
works curiously turned to Freud’s early works and the notion of libido beyond the 
constraints of an Oedipalised subject – which are, as seen in Chapter 2, 
systematised in this early theory of anxiety. In June 1983, Guattari was part of a 
colloquium in Cerisy, France, about the work of the physical chemist Ilya Prigogine 
where he presented a paper entitled ‘Semiotic Energetics’. This paper later 
composed his book Schizoanalytic Cartographies, from 1989, and marks what 
Watson (2009) points at being his ‘return to Freud’ via a rather cryptic 
formulation of energetics. Central to his argument is the understanding that 
Freud’s early texts gave more emphasis to the ‘energetic’ factor of an essential 
‘libidinal energy’ that was side-lined in his second topography. In this sense, what 
Freud’s project envisaged, writes Guattari, was “to establish passageways 
between sexual libido and effects of meaning […] [in] his initial hypothesis of an 
 
54 Being very precise, we could accept that the ‘phallus’, as it is delineated in Lacanian 
teachings appears as this mythical and at the same time empty signified that demarcates 




energy whose effects were simultaneously physical and psychic” (Guattari and 
Rolnik, 2007:394). However, such energy metaphors (which Guattari found in the 
pre-psychoanalytic texts and letters to Fliess) were lost in the second model of the 
psyche, resulting in what Guattari diagnosed as “the psychoanalytic movement 
never stop[ping] submitting the concept of libidinal energy to a wide variety of 
treatments in order to try to dominate the theoretical scandal of which it is the 
vehicle” (Guattari and Rolnik, 2007:394). Freud, post-Freudians and also Lacanian 
structuralism thus committed to “nothing more nor less than its [libidinal 
energy’s] virtually total liquidation in the form of a chain of signifiers” (Guattari 
and Rolnik, 2007:394). The Symbolic order, charged with social, subjective and 
epistemological constructions of the colonial patriarchal arrangement, gives 
consistency to a clinic that is founded upon a surplus – the unconscious – yet 
articulated through the very motor that subsumes the rupture, or the potency of 
the flux of becomings of this very excess.  
 
The principles of their schizoanalysis and a conceptualization of desire as 
production broke away from the psychoanalytic focus on the ‘individual’, 
favouring a “collective economy, collective assemblages of desire and of 
subjectivity that can be individualized in some circumstances or some social 
contexts” (Guattari and Rolnik, 2007:343). This intrinsically political view of 
desire, the unconscious and subjectivity, therefore was fruitful to feminist 
thinkers. Feminist scholars have dug into the work of Deleuze and Guattari and 
their schizoanalytic model to challenge the psychoanalytic understanding that 
language, or the Symbolic, was structuring. Bracha Ettinger, for instance, presents 
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an affirmative, or generative, matrix for subjective variation in her 
‘metramorphosis’ (Ettinger, 2006) alive in her painting and clinic. Elizabeth Grosz 
and Rosi Braidotti, on the other hand, flesh out the philosophical underpinnings 
to an affirmative understanding of desire in debates on the ontological, ethical and 
political concepts that permeate subjectivity, materiality, ‘scientific’ biological 
discourses and technology (Grosz, 2008, 2017; Braidotti, 2017).  What I propose 
here, as a small gesture into this debate, however, is to go back to Spinoza, the 
Dutch seventeenth century philosopher who influenced Deleuze and, later 
Guattari, greatly in their understanding of the body and affect. What I intend is to 
map the possibilities that Spinoza’s monism offers to Lygia Clark’s full-void, 
phantasmatic, ‘vibrating body’. More specifically, I will be looking for a possible 
transindividual connection in his Ethics, and a political or collective linkage of the 
understanding of affects, symptoms and subjective formation that is present in 
Spinoza’s ontology as a ground to think, with Lygia Clark, of what is the horizon-
beyond the Plane.  
A zigzag of subject, affect and conditions of subjectivity framed by ideology in the 
social bond is present my psychosocial or critical reading of psychoanalysis. 
According to such approach, a ‘subjective truth’ occurs both in the dynamic of   
symptom formation and the singular function of symptoms. This, as seen in 
Chapter 3, is Lacan’s clear contribution to clinical work: situating the subject and 
symptoms, by identifying their function within a particular cartography he called 
the Symbolic. Yet, beyond a structural focus on meaning and deciphering of the 
symptom, Freud’s very early ‘energetic’ grounds for a bodily source of anxiety sees 
anxiety as an affect of surplus, as seen in Chapter 2: it emerges when something in 
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the material experience of the body or in the realm of ‘ideas’ limits the flux of the 
libidinal energy that characterizes the life of the body (in a Bergsonian sense of a 
‘life’ being a tendency that  “‘unfolds’ that which is folded in matter” (Grosz, 
2007:295)).  
Spinoza’s conception of nature, human existence and the mind are detailed in his 
Ethics, where a view of an infinite substance (which he calls God) that is constantly 
modified and has different attributes, opens a way for the debate on possibility 
and flux of said substance and the differences in such attributes. In Part I, 
Proposition V, Spinoza states that “there cannot exist in the universe two or more 
substances having the same nature or attribute.” In this sense, nature is 
understood for its differential values, not of different substances as such (as put 
in a Note to Proposition X, Part I “there is but one substance in the universe, and 
that it is absolutely infinite”) but of its different modes. Whilst God is an infinity of 
possibility, a body is a ‘finite mode’ of expression of this substance (Part II, Def. I.). 
This focus on ‘differential values’ and, thus, a disequilibrium as a structural 
necessity, is what allows Spinoza to shed light on this complicated relation 
between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ (Kordela, 2007). His monism did not simply clear the 
slate of any difference; rather, it speaks of ‘thoughts’ and ‘bodies’ as different in 
attributes and nature, thus, in ‘value’.  A surplus in this differential arrangement is 
evident in the following passage from Part I, Definition II “A thing is called 'finite 
after its kind' when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for 
instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. 
So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by 
thought, nor a thought by body.”  In this sense something of the existence of the 
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body cannot be grasped by thoughts in the same way that thoughts do not find 
total representation in the body.  This very simple conceptual interpretation of a 
‘surplus’ when it comes to the subject as a ‘being’ of concomitant dissonant values 
speaks to the Freudian earlier conception of anxiety as an excess that finds no 
grounds in either the ‘body’ or the ‘mind’. 
This conception of surplus here also brings another layer of complication to that 
notion of ‘excess’ immanent to language, or to the Symbolic in Lacan’s early works. 
Lacanian scholars, and noticeably Žižek (1992), stress how psychoanalysis should 
not take the patient’s complaint at face value, following Freud, a fair and radical 
point, especially in regards to therapeutic practices that reject the unconscious 
and serve well the hegemonic ideology of the contemporary late-capitalism. 
Instead, psychoanalysis would then look for the ‘excess’ of meaning in what the 
patient comes to say, or the “surplus of what is effectively said, not the intended 
message, but the message in its true, inverted form” (Kordela 2007:7). This 
version of the Real, in Lacan’s terms, aside from being contested by contemporary 
literature on his later teachings (Miller, 2003; Soler, 2014 and Schuster, 2016), 
still ascribes psychoanalysis to a mode of interpretation of symptoms that can be 
radical as a “new mode of semiotization of subjectivity” inaugurated by Freud’s 
work with patients diagnosed as hysterics, but still needs further breaks “with the 
universes of reference” (Rolnik and Guattari, 2007) it reproduces. Going beyond 
‘interpretation’ (as Clark did in Structuring of the Self) means, for Guattari, going 
beyond the ‘power’ of an analyst and also of ‘words’ within their universal 
referential (Other), meant to embark on ‘analytic revolutions’ that break away 
with predetermined or pre-inscribed “stratified modes of subjectivation” not 
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solely bound to the clinical encounter. He writes of this radical commitment with 
the surplus as being part of “modes of asignifying rupture, which appeared 
simultaneously in literature, Surrealism, painting, and so on” (Guattari and Rolnik, 
2007:381). Instead of a ‘rest’ to what we can ‘think’ of, this excess in anxiety could 
be thought of in relation to what Guattari calls ‘chaos’. Chaos, as we will see in 
these last parts of this chapter, speaks closely to the full-void, addressing precisely 
a horizon-beyond the abyss-within.  
To Guattari, ‘a body’ is a reality that presents itself in constant tension between 
the ‘chaotic’ accumulation and flux of libidinal energy and what harnesses it, either 
allowing new conjunctions to emerge or posing a limit (Berardi, 2015). The 
contour of a body marked by words, words of a Symbolic realm structured within 
a colonial patriarchal modus operandi, would suggest a circularity of the 
repetitions under the logic of the Death Drive (Khanna,2003).  For such libidinal 
flow evident in Freud’s very early texts, so cherished by Guattari, to carry an 
affirmative character, what needs to be redefined is precisely the mythical pre-
subjective state that Lacan (and not Freud) granted to be a ‘negativity’ (at least in 
early and mid-life works, as seen in Chapter 3).  It is Hegel’s influence in the 
accounting of time and history that fostered the privileging of a Symbolic that 
could not change effectively, and so limited the very notions of creativity, 
singularity, potency and affirmation (Braidotti, 2017).  Contrary to superficial 
readings, the Spinozist twist of Deleuze and Guattari’s project was not offering a 
view of the subject as having a ‘reservoir of positivity’ to start with that is then 
‘lost’ as we encounter the mad-bad-sad Oedipal Capitalist order. In Guattari’s 
elaboration on the notion of ‘chaos’ in Chaosmosis, 1992 and in the collection 
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Chaosophy, 1995, we see this ‘libidinal energy’ that Freud observes to be floating 
through the body in the earlier texts on anxiety not as an ‘originative beginning’, 
but as a middle, a flux that breaks with the duality body/word and focuses on the 
‘threshold’, the ‘frontier’. As such, this frontier, the a-signifying ruptures of the 
unconscious should not be interpreted out of such reservoir, rather, they should 
be mobilised into poiesis. 55  A tension, a threshold, a zone of inventiveness, 
transformation, and creativity is, in this sense, of the level of ‘chaos’. 
Spinozist lenses here reveal then that the ‘affirmation’ is a matter of difference, of 
the surplus generated in the ‘middle’, as life goes on rather than a power that was 
there and is then ‘lost’ by our entrance into culture. In this sense, thinking of 
 
55 Poiesis has an interesting route in the thinking of Guattari all the way into 
contemporary feminist Post-human thinking that is worth mentioning. Guattari presents 
in The Three Ecologies and also in Chaosmosis – the 1992 compilation where Guattari is 
influenced by the biological theory of Francisco Varela – the notion of ‘autopoiesis’.  
Varela and Maturana, Chilean philosophers, proposed in the early 1970s that cells and 
the life that extends from this minimal ‘machine’ operate through a process of 
continuous self-production, or an autopoiesis. Cells are not a given, rather, they are 
production.  In his clinical work at La Borde, Guattari sees a continuous production of 
subjectivity unfolding, writing that “we are not confronted with a subjectivity given as 
in-itself, but with processes of the realization of autonomy, or of autopoiesis (in a 
somewhat different sense from the one Francisco Varela gives this term)” (Guattari, 
1995a:7). However, he pushed Varela’s ideas further, subverting them in an important 
manner by calling for a ‘collective’ autopoiesis, or for a subjective production “beyond 
Varela’s characterization of machinic autopoiesis as unitary individuation, with neither 
input or output” (Guattari, 1995a:42), proposing rather “a more collective machinism 
without delimited unity, whose autonomy accommodates diverse mediums of alterity” 
(Guattari,  1995a: 42). Rosi Braidotti (2006a) is also attuned to this detail, interpreting 
that Guattari paid attention to “the non-human parts of human subjectivity, which is not 
an anti-humanist position but merely the acknowledgement that subjectivity does not 
and need not coincide with either the notion of the individual or that of person” 
(Braidotti, 2006a:125). The production, actualization and invention in this process, 
concerns the subject beyond itself, in a constant, meaning that “autopoiesis is processual 
creativity” (Braidotti, 2006a:126). More recently, Donna Haraway (2016) thinks of 
poiesis under the prism of the Gaia hypothesis as proposed by Lynn Margulis, adding the 
nuance of ‘sympoiesis’ over the term ‘autopoiesis’ to stress the becoming-with 
characteristic of life in its collectivity rather than individuality. Poiesis (co/auto/symp) 




anxiety as the affect of affirmation (thus, difference and transformation rather 
than repetition and resistance) also speaks to the trope of finding in melancholia 
and therefore in ‘failed mourning’ an identification with what is lost as a way to 
resist power. Butler’s (1997) work in The Psychic Life of Power (which draws the 
line between Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud and Foucault) presupposed some linearity 
of time even if in an ‘ideal’ form.  Also radical in its critique of identitarian 
oppression, the focus on ‘loss’ –either of what was there and then was lost or even 
pushing it into the loss of what ‘could be there’ but was not allowed to – does not 
break with the transcendental universal of the Other and time in its struggle for 
recognition. In this sense, it will also not break away from the pre-eminence of 
language as located in the Other, or the patriarchal-colonial Symbolic and the 
consequent dialectics of recognition therein inscribed. 56 To put it differently, 
following the vocabulary of my engagement with Lygia Clark, we will still be 
 
56 Butler’s (1997) work, as well as the work of Jessica Benjamin (1998), Amy Allen 
(2015) and other contemporary feminist theorists who engage with Critical Theory, 
powerfully situates not only gender but political subjectivity in the cracks of a Hegelian 
negativity and dialectics. Psychic life here is modelled onto a frame that is in line with an 
Idealist transcendental, posing in the unconscious, sexuality, the drive and the Real (the 
psychoanalytic sites of ‘rupture’) a potency for movement and emancipation. In this 
sense, performativity and becoming align in their opening to something new, to 
transformation (Tuhkanen, 2009). However, if the clinic, as most of Lacan’s early and 
mid-life works encompass, remains at the level of a dialectical enunciation and 
recognition via interpretation, rupture does not yet foster any affective novel modes of 
living and relating; rather, it alleviates suffering by alleviating its pressure onto the 
status quo. ‘Spitting on Hegel’, to me, entails a fundamentally decolonial effort to 
multiply universalising transcendentals into plural immanent matrices. Transformation, 
in this sense, still locks possibility on the eyes of the hegemonic discourse, rather than 
unfolding materiality beyond a system of ‘two’, and the consequential Oedipal 
inscription of the drive, desire and demand, as clinical reality often presents as a 
necessity. The ‘transversal’ clinic, as Guattari (2015) practiced at La Borde aimed to 
mobilise chaos precisely into an ‘assemblage’ that is collective and situated (as I 
mention in Chapter 5).  
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harnessing multiplicity and the full-void into the realm of the One of Sameness.  
An exploration of what lies beyond the logic of patriarchy, thus, an ‘excess’ that is 
produced by the difference of the ‘middle’ that is alive in the affect of anxiety 
proves to be more fruitful to thought.  
To connect this differential production of the ‘middle’ with the libido of early-
Freud’s ‘energetic’ flows, another core concept from Spinoza’s Ethics is helpful: 
conatus. From the Latin for a tendency to ‘strive’, Spinoza defines it as “Each thing, 
as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (Proposition VI, 
Part III). Not simply carrying on ‘being’, or self-preservation, but also having their 
‘power of action increased’, is what Spinoza defines for the conative quality of 
bodies.  This ‘affirmative’ tendency is necessarily ‘shared’ or ‘collective’, relational 
instead of self-referential, once it is related to the increase or decrease of the 
capacity to be affected and to affect other bodies. His ontology thus proposes that 
we share the same substance which is in the world in different and differential 
modalities.  In sharp contrast with the negativity of desire (not to mention its 
connection with a ‘need’ and ‘demand’ that subscribe it to the phallic function in 
Lacan’s early teachings), what moves our lives is not a repetition of negativity, but 
an affirmative tendency to produce difference anchored in this ‘surplus’ that is an 
excess of the order of experience.  In this sense, conatus is more akin to Freud’s 
early texts that attribute value to such libidinal energy that is ‘converted’ into 
various symptoms or into anxiety.  
For Berardi, the answer to this ethical riddle is in co-poiesis, creating together 
something new and of the order of sensibility. Here, echoing Lygia Clark’s method 
in Structuring of the Self very beautifully. Poetry can attune subjectivity to the 
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order of Chaos, or “an environment that is too complex to be decoded by our 
available explanatory frames, an environment in which fluxes circulate too quickly 
for our minds to elaborate” (Berardi, 2018:39). Such a definition of chaos, for 
Berardi, makes explicit the rhythmic encounter with the ‘vibration of the world’, 
whilst “poetry is an attempt to tune into this cosmic vibration, this temporal 
vibration that is coming and coming” (Berardi, 2018:17). 
‘Difference’ and ‘antagonism’ are two philosophical notions of particular 
importance when mapping the Clark’s full-void ‘vibrational body’ in relation to 
surplus. A vibrational body, thus, connotes a surplus beyond the limits of Symbolic 
language in its Oedipal foundation, a surplus at stake in the formulations of anxiety 
seen both in Freud and Lacan, but which I am trying to mobilise psycho-politically 
(also out of a Modern humanist and patriarchal matrix). Surplus, in a Spinozist 
understanding, presupposes difference (such as the full-void). So instead of 
thinking of an ontology of the subject in which affirmation is without ‘antagonism’ 
(as Žižek, 2010, would put it in a bold critique of post-Deleuzean materialism, as 
mentioned previously), the very constant production of surplus is plenty 
antagonistic, and it is this complication of a conative differential conception of the 
subject, nature and the body that makes life move ‘forward’. 57  This mode of 
continuity is also necessarily singular and creative as it will not repeat in 
negativity but transform in rupture. The chaotic rupture Guattari attributes to 
what is beyond language can be traced back to the experience of anxiety at the 
same time as it also informs the contemporary debate around a ‘preservation’ of 
 
57 In the next chapter, Deleuze and Guattari’s Body without Organs will be addressed as 
their name for this encounter of differences which are rerouted into something new. 
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sexual difference as an antidote to neoliberal capitalism. In very simple terms, a 
cartography of this logic could be mapped as such: it is only by ‘going on’ existing 
and living that the difference between the different attributes of substance is 
accumulated as a surplus. Surplus is this chaotic ‘libidinal energy’ that Freud 
observed as trying to find escape, in order to affect and be affected by other bodies, 
to move and in its detours is experienced as anxiety; it is the anxiety in the centre 
of Lacan’s Borromean Knot, akin to a Real that is not entirely attached to the 
Symbolic.  
In this sense, it is not simply or solely sexual difference as ‘structuring’ of the 
subject that can guarantee singularity – the route, as mentioned before, Zupančič’ 
defends in What is Sex? (2017b) for a critique of gender and queer theories which 
she sees as harnessed in the Imaginary.  There is something of the order of the 
affective (affecting and affected) body, as it is experienced, that is excessive. This 
surplus generated in the difference between the full-void, phantasmatic, ‘vibrating 
body’ and ‘consciousness’ as such that reveals singularity and creativity in 
subjectivity is what is present in anxiety and, thus, fruitful to a non-Oedipal 
reading of Freud and Lacan. Anxiety, as an affect of rupture, from the perspective 
of the reading presented in this chapter, brings up a body in flux, open to 
actualizations that are not bound to thought or symbolisation, thus a marker of a 
‘full-void, affective vibrating body’, as inspired by Lygia Clark. Anxiety, in Freud’s 
pre-1920s texts, cannot be subsumed in words, or interpretation and meaning. 
Anxiety, in this sense, is ‘meaningless’ but it is transformative as it insists and 
pushes the libidinal energy that is ‘Life’ onto the materiality of the body. This 
chaotic rupture, in its overwhelming presence, resonates what is described by 
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‘attacks’ of anxiety, or anxiety with all its deafening loud volume. At the same time, 
Lacan’s ‘lalangue’, this poetic enjoyment of the order of the body, this unique, 
singular, inventive mode of speaking is also part of such ‘chaos’.  In this light, 
anxiety marks a territory of tension, this threshold between the relation to the 
Law (and by extension the patriarchal arrangement) and all that exists beyond it, 
the chaos that is in flux through the body and cannot be captured by language or 
words. 
 
 Chaos, vibration and the clinic  
 
Why insist on psychoanalysis, if it reproduces exactly what Clark moved beyond, 
namely, the Plane? Because not only can psychoanalysis denounce patriarchy by 
describing its operations and effects (Mitchell, 1974), but it may stop prescribing 
it, as long as it turns more chaotic, and less ‘dividualising’. Following the trail of 
Clark, we can find clues for destabilising problematic anchors of psy-care 
practices, which limit the clinical treatment of rupture into an Oedipalised frame. 
More precisely, the ‘full-void’ of Clark’s vibrational body proposes a subjective 
creation that starts from where there is no subject: in the void, there is fullness. It 
dismantles the necessity of subjective reproduction in accordance with the 
cultural echoes passed on by the colonial and patriarchal Symbolic as structured 
by the Phallic Law that is so pervasive in psy-practices. 
Affect, symptom, noise and vibration. A body speaking in the world and an ecology 
that allows some sort of radical, resisting and transformative poietic existence is 
what I see in Lygia Clark’s series Structuring of the Self.  Her work invites us to 
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Spinoza, whose “conative bodies are also associative or (one could even say) social 
bodies, in the sense that each is, by its very nature as a body, continuously affecting 
and being affected by other bodies” (Bennet, 2010:21). This ontology thus 
proposes that we share the same substance which is in the world in different and 
differential modalities – akin to entangled ‘differences without separability’, as the 
epistemological and political turn proposed by Ferreira da Silva (2016).  In sharp 
contrast to the negativity of desire analysed in Chapter 3 (not to mention its 
connection with a ‘need’ and ‘demand’ that subscribe it to the phallic function in 
Lacan’s early teachings), what moves our lives is not a repetition of negativity, but 
an affirmative tendency to produce difference anchored in this ‘surplus’ that is an 
excess of the order of experience that vibrates chaotically and creatively the ‘full-
void’. In other words, Clark’s ‘full-void’ beyond the Plane, operates as a metaphor, 
or a poetical wording of an understanding of affect as differential. This nuance is 
the reason why her practice is also specifically fruitful to my project that aims at 
re-orienting the psychoanalytic clinic of anxiety. It enables me to think-with 
Braidotti’s ‘nomadic subjectivity’ in the clinic of this affect that is, ultimately, an 
affect of rupture, and thus being, claims space beyond a psychoanalytic clinic 
grounded on interpretation and its Oedipal foundations.  
Guided by Clark’s chaotic vibration – her full-void beyond the Plane; her 
sensations of the unconscious – we can think through what happens to the ‘body 
in/of the world’ and to the ‘world with/of bodies’ through the potency of a 
subjective full/void that vibrates independently from any Other. Here, the 
sinthôme Patricia Gherovici (2017) rescued in Lacan as a queer solution, as per the 
previous chapter, is expanded into collectivity – instead of working out one’s 
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excesses alone, Clark teaches us that what is beyond the Plane needs to be 
mobilised together, in co-poiesis. This collective nature of affect is exactly where I 
will zoom in in the next chapter, where I travel to the foundations of the concept 
of ‘vibration’ in Deleuze and Guattari and take it with me to the clinic.  In this 
chapter, thinking-with Lygia Clark in alliance with Deleuze, Guattari, Braidotti, 
Rolnik and Spinoza has taken us to the fullness of the frontier, the novelty of chaos: 
In chaos we avoid the total reign of language and identity as well as materialist 
biological reductionism of experience. We meet chaos in the frontier of the 




CHAPTER 5 THE TRAIL OF VIBRATION  
 
 
After mapping ‘vibrational moments’ in both Freud and Lacan (Chapters 2 and 3) 
as possible entries into ‘becomings’ versus a dividualising ‘being’ as the clinical 
paradigm of anxiety (in Chapter 4, after Chapter 1), this chapter will dive deeper 
into the concept of vibration and its genealogy in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. 
I will cross their theories of affect and subjectivity in order to find grounds for a 
‘vibrational clinic’.  Building on the co-poietic method of the artist Lygia Clark in 
her later works, and especially Structuring of the Self series, as seen in the previous 
chapter, I will map the model of clinical assemblage in Guattari’s ‘transversal’ take 
on anxiety. The difficulty and at times contradictions of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
varied and rich work already featured in the previous chapter, where their Anti-
Oedipal approach anchored my alliance with Lygia Clark as a horizon-beyond a 
view of anxiety that is reduced to an abyss-within (or an enigma of the body of the 
order of sexuality as organised under the phallic paradigm).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari have offered important critiques of psychoanalysis in the 
second half of the twentieth century as part of their philosophical, political and 
clinical enterprise. Together and separately, they have questioned the model of 
repression and negative repetition in symptoms, the centrality of a subjective 
organization structured under the Oedipal model and the form of an ‘ego’, as well 
as the clinical relationship framework based on a dual transference that, to them, 
“modelled itself after the contractual relationship of the most traditional 
bourgeois medicine: the feigned exclusion of a third party; the hypocritical role of 
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money, to which psychoanalysis brought farcical new justifications” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983:84). The psychoanalytic frame perpetuated and practiced by the 
establishment also relied on “the pretended time limitation that contradicts itself 
by reproducing a debt to infinity, by feeding an inexhaustible transference, and by 
always nursing new ‘conflicts’” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:84). To use Deleuze’s 
(1992) own word, psychoanalysis wished to propose a life in touch with the 
unconscious but remained ‘dividualising’ or alienating and modulating 
subjectivity through a stiff ideological mechanism and onto-epistemic foundation. 
 
Their work has been influential in the field of critical theories, new philosophical 
interventions and the arts.  However, within the clinical landscape (from 
psychoanalytic training programmes to institutional practices in mental health 
care), their concepts have been largely ignored or swiftly brushed off in defensive 
accusations of mis-reading Freud and Lacan – for example, in their famous critique 
to the psychoanalytic privileging of a neurotic subject (David-Menard, 2014). Save 
for a very limited array of attempts to question the potentialities of the body, affect 
and the limits of language as a tool of interpretation and punctuation (Suely Rolnik 
and  Monique David-Menard being two important examples, in Latin America and 
in Europe), their ‘schizoanalysis’ is mostly discussed in theoretical works that 
dispute the concept of ‘desire’ (Schuster, 2016) and the discrepancies between the 
philosophical approaches of Hegel and Spinoza (Moder, 2017).  In this thesis, I do 
not wish to pursue an in-depth investigation on the possibilities of ‘correcting’ 
psychoanalysis with Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas. Neither do I wish to call in a 
psychoanalytic ‘authority’ over Deleuze and Guattari’s writings (Felman, 1982), 
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which would be to denounce their naiveté facing ‘real’ suffering or even their 
theoretical alliance to a kind of postmodern neoliberal affirmation without 
necessary antagonism (as addressed in Chapter 4; Žižek, 2010, 2017).  Rather, in 
this part of the thesis, my aim is to find in their theory and practice, respectively, 
points that can illuminate the knots on Freudian-Lacanian conceptions of anxiety 
in an attempt to establish a common ground between these two theoretical 
approaches and clinical practices that bring about an eco-feminist ethics in light 
of the contemporary psychosocial context – namely, the possibilities for 
interdependence rather than domination as the matrix of relation to others 
instead of with the Other – which I do so by following Rosi Braidotti (1994; 2006a; 
2006b;2011; 2013; 2017; 2019)58. My way into this complex endeavour is via the 
formulation of the concept of ‘anxiety as vibration’ and the guiding compass is the 
search for affirmative and differential nuances in the psychosomatic (or psychic 
and somatic) experience of the affect of anxiety. Informed by the clinical and 
conceptual ‘dividualisations’ reproduced in psychoanalysis and by the potency of 
its critique in Lygia Clark’s ‘full-void’ vibrational body, in what follows, I trace the 
‘trail’ of vibration in Deleuze and Guattari’s work in relation to affect, possibility 
 
58 By holding on to vibration, I am also stressing the unconscious factor of such 
‘commons’, agreeing with and complementing Stacey Alaimo’s posthumanist concept of 
transcorporeality. Alaimo (2014) proposes that “we are entangled with multiple 
material agencies, flows and processes that connect human bodies, animal bodies, 
ecosystems, technologies, and the wider world. As the material self cannot be 
disentangled from networks that are simultaneously environmental, economic, political, 
cultural, scientific, technological, and substantial, what was once the ostensibly bounded 
human subject finds herself in a swirling landscape of uncertainty where practices and 
actions that were once not even remotely ethical or political matters suddenly become 
so” (Alaimo, 2014:17). 
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and the friction between ‘being’ and ‘becomings’, as a ground that moves the 
rupture of the affect of anxiety from an abyss-within into a horizon-beyond.  
 
Vibration between Ontology and Ethics 
 
Deleuze’s ontology is centred on difference. His thinking is heavily influenced by 
his original reading of Nietzsche, Bergson and Spinoza, as well as Leibniz and 
Simondon, all of whom had been extremely unfashionable during the 1950s and 
1960s in France, where the ‘three Hs’ (Hegel, Heidegger and Husserl) reigned in 
Philosophy departments, according to Dosse (2010).  Deleuze takes from Spinoza 
the idea that an ontology that works against the notion of the transcendent in 
favour of immanence (in general terms, accepting that there is just one substance, 
God and nature being this same substance) is the basis of an ethics. It is with shy 
irony that Deleuze points out in his course on Spinoza, delivered in Vincennes, that 
Spinoza did not call his seventeenth century monograph 'Ontology', rather, he 
named it his ‘Ethics’.  In what touches Deleuze’s critique of psychoanalysis, 
especially Lacanian psychoanalysis and the absorption of the Freudian concepts 
of the resolution of the Oedipus Complex into a structuralist model, as I started 
addressing in the last chapter, this detail assumes particular relevance.  
 
To start the examination of the concept of vibration, we could consider this ethical 
and ontological dispute as follows. Culturally specific, and perhaps culturally 
hegemonic, language/Symbolic structures take the transcendental ‘One’ (the 
phallic father inscribed in the Oedipal myth) as a necessity or even a ‘given fact’ in 
‘reality’, informing thus several aspects of our subjective inscription, such as the 
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potential and possibilities for life under or outside the ‘Law’. In this sense, here we 
situate Lacan’s Other and the Law-of-the-Father as anchors of the Symbolic 
register and towards which a subjective structure is directed, revealing a 
particular inscription of transcendentalism in Lacan – seeing that the fundamental 
structuring of the subject relies on preconditions external to it, a definition of 
‘transcendental’ offered by Jean Wahl (1944(2016)).59  Neurosis, perversion or 
psychosis are then seen as the only possible outcomes of this necessary relation. 
Under the ethical and ontological approach proposed by Deleuze and by Guattari, 
there is something more primordial to the ‘subject’ as framed in ‘culture’ as such 
that pertains to the relation of the unique ‘substance’ that appears in the world 
only in different intensities, as Spinoza posits in his Ethics. These intensities, in 
Spinoza, and as rescued by Deleuze in his first book on the Dutch philosopher from 
1968 (Spinoza et le problème de l'expression), the second from 1981 (Spinoza - 
Philosophie pratique) and the Vincennes lectures, compose what is called ‘affect’. 
An interesting definition of affect from Deleuze’s lecture in Vincennes on the 24th 
of January, 1978, reads: “Every mode of thought insofar as it is non-
representational will be termed affect” (Deleuze, 1978). 60This relation between 
affect and thought and their logical, intrinsic and extrinsic differences is unpacked 
in this particular lecture of his Sur Spinoza course, a difference crucial to my 
 
59 In Human Existence and Transcendence (1944) Jean Wahl defines the transcendent as 
in one side what transcends the human (the divine in religious terms) and in another 
side the movement of the human reaching beyond itself.  
 






research, as we will see in what follows. Not only the non-representability of 
affect, but its collectivity, the point that it does not feature in the Symbolic and the 
connection it holds with the body are the basis for the ‘vibrating’ ability of such 
intensities that cross bodies, which constantly affect each other.  Affect, in this 
model, also resists the need for a transcendental ‘third’ or ‘power’ anchoring it, it 
does not need an ‘Other’ with capital ‘O’.61 Affect is, for Spinoza, “the power to 
affect and be affected” (Massumi, 2015:ix), rather than a ‘substance’ or ethereal 
potion travelling through bodies like electricity as other affect theorists will 
mistakenly interpret.62 Affect, for Deleuze is more of an ethical capacity beyond 
universal frames of representation than an ‘electric current’ behaving like a 
contaminating virus across bodies. 
 
In Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, first published in 1981, Deleuze famously 
affirms that “sensation is vibration” (Deleuze, 2003:45).  In this piece, Deleuze 
writes about how Bacon was trying to paint ‘sensations’ rather than figurative 
representations when painting bodies. I find this a useful analogy to approach this 
question of language and of the ‘representability’ of things, taking us on a journey 
to think how words are charged with affect but also to meet, in clear 
 
61 Whilst I reference Brian Massumi, I am not necessarily aligning myself with his 
thought, once it is relevant to mention that feminist theories of affect such as that of Sara 
Ahmed (2004) or Emily Martin (2013) have found his work to be problematic for it 
ignores the social sphere completely. Ahmed’s (2004) claim for emotion and affect to be 
grounded in relationality is not too dissimilar in its ethics to what Guattari goes on to 
elaborate in his actual clinical practice of transversality, as I will address in the last part 
of this chapter.  
 
62 Silvan Tomkins’ interpretation of Deleuze would lead into Paul Ekman’s extremely 
controversial theories of affect and feelings beyond cognition which, not surprisingly, 
led him to collaborate with the CIA and the FBI (Tomkins and Smith, 1995).  
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psychoanalytic terms, the limits of identification (Imaginary identification being 
the frame of anxiety, as per Lacan in Seminar X; and it is based on the principle of 
‘Sameness’ grounded over the idea of the ‘One’, as  proposed by Braidotti, 2006a, 
and addressed in the last chapter). Deleuze’s work on sensation presents us with 
a view of a body that is ‘beyond’ language, is vibrating, and is also in movement as 
it affects and is affected by other bodies. We must, however, be careful to see in 
this non-representability an ethical stance rather than a mystical ‘feeling’, 
‘emotion’, ‘electric current’ or a production of the body beyond words that gets 
transmitted through bodies. Honing into the matter of affect and exploring this 
ethical ontological project, started by Deleuze and carried on through his 
encounter with Félix Guattari and scholars influenced by them since, will take us 
to a questioning of what is representable according to Freud and Lacan and how 
have both psychoanalytic models accounted for what is not. The Lacanian Real, 
which is carefully sculpted through the decades of his teachings, is the central 
contrast with the model of ‘sensation’ that we find in Deleuze. As the last part of 
this chapter will rescue, across their work and very clearly in Guattari’s sole 
writings, the matter of ‘representability’ versus ‘non-representability’ is diffracted 
further into the notion of ‘polyvocity’ (Genosko, 2002) that is central to what I 
identify here as Guattari’s theory of anxiety.  
 
A longer definition of ‘affect’ in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza invites us to consider 
‘variation’ and ‘possibility’ as elements of affect that resonate a further excursion 
into Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘vibration’. Deleuze’s lesson on Spinoza in 
Vincennes in late January 1978 elicits the ethical and ‘relational’ character of affect 
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in its detailed difference from an ‘idea/thought’. Relational here, is not as a 
relation between similar ‘objects’, in a traditional psychoanalytic sense as per the 
British Tradition, for example, but of all ‘bodies’, thus nature as ‘all there is’, 
following Spinoza. Deleuze unpacks affect, first saying that we can differentiate an 
‘idea’ and an affect by considering that an idea is a mode of thought that represents 
something, whilst an affect is a mode of thought that represents nothing. This is a 
technical and nominal differentiation based on ‘external and extrinsic’ factors.  
The second layer of this differentiation Deleuze reads in Spinoza is more 
complicated:  whilst an idea has an intrinsic reality, “affect is the continuous 
variation or the passage from one degree of reality to another” (Deleuze, 
24/01/1978). 63  Beyond the nominal difference, we have now also a “real 
difference”, which opens up the ‘possibilities’ of a thing and not just its description.  
Affect, he continues, “it is the continuous variation of the force of existing of 
anyone” (Deleuze, 24/01/1978).64 The force of existing, as Spinoza outlines in his 
ethics, is named ‘conatus’ (as seen in Chapter 4); thus, affect would be this 
continuous variation of conatus. He completes: “insofar as this variation is 
determined by the ideas one has” (Deleuze, 24/01/1978).65 This ‘determination’ 
of affect by ideas and yet the irreducibility of affect to ideas is the conundrum 
Deleuze explores in the differentiation of Spinoza’s terms ‘affectio’ and ‘affectus’, 
 
63  My translation of French original: “l’affect, c’est la variation continue ou le passage 
d’un degré de réalité à un autre”. 
 
64 My translation of French original: “c’est donc la variation continue de la force d’exister 
de quelqu’un”. 
 
65 My translation of French original: “en tant que cette variation est déterminée par les 
idées qu’il a”. 
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Latin terms he claims were all mistranslated from the Ethics as ‘affect’, but which 
still carry a difference, and one interesting to psychoanalysis. Affectus would be 
‘affect’, and what we have described so far, whilst ‘affectio’ is ‘affection’, defined as 
the ‘mixing’ (mélange) of bodies and the changes or consequences that entails, the 
effects over the nature of these bodies.  Being in the world and the mélange of 
bodies resonates – affectio – on ideas (representational), which, in their turn, 
determine affectus, the non-representational kinds of thoughts. Affect, thus, seems 
to be not just transindividual but collective or ‘collaborative’ in essence, an ethical 
disposition. 
 
To summarise and clarify, Deleuze’s  take on Spinoza’s theory of affect has it that 
affect is not of the order of representation, it escapes it; affect has to do with the 
variations of one’s force of existing; and these variations will be determined by the 
effects of our encounter with other bodies – determined, not reduced to, neither 
represented by – which can only be grasped by our ideas of the consequences of 
such encounters (e.g. the sun on my skin, meeting someone on the street, etc.). The 
difficulty of these abstract lectures may be why Deleuze’s (as well as Guattarri’s) 
ideas have been so misinterpreted as it is easy to read affect as something quite 
‘magical’ and beyond words that happens when we meet others in the world.  
Deleuze here reminds us of another layer of Spinoza’s oeuvre that is essential to 
keep in mind: his view of the limitations of our repertoire of ‘ideas’, our experience 
of grasping reality through ideas one after another vis-à-vis the passages of one 
degree of reality to another, which is the character of affect, as we have just seen. 
Drawing on Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (published posthumously in 
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1677), Deleuze points out that to him we are fabricated as spiritual automatons, 
with ideas succeeding one another all the time in us, determining our potentiality 
of acting or our force of existing in a continuous line. Spinoza sees the ‘soul’ as a 
machine of ideas, immanent and self-determined. Catherine Malabou (2016) in 
fact adds to the Deleuzean reading of the Ethics, by arguing that Spinoza’s Treatise 
functions between the duality of transcendence and immanence, proposing a 
theory of the origin of the Symbolic (in the Spinozean monist version of God/the 
sacred) with no reference outside of itself.   Here we reach a paradox in relation to 
psychoanalysis, for, if anything, words and ideas are in Lacan necessarily crossed 
by the field of the Other, or Symbolically arranged, and a rupture in this crossing 
would indicate the side of psychosis. What Deleuze draws from Spinoza and what 
goes on to influence so much of his work with Guattari and the thinkers influenced 
by them to present day (such as Rolnik and Braidotti, as I engage with closely 
across this thesis)– the notion of desire as immanent and of affect as an excess to 
representation that travels in encounters – disputes the central Structuralist and 
Post-Structuralist tenets of Lacanian psychoanalysis that see in a Symbolic 
arrangement the net in which subjectivity is constructed, either through meaning 
or gaps in meaning, nonetheless determined by symbolisation. Here, again, we 
find an interesting alignment with what I called Freud and Lacan’s ‘vibrational 
moments’ as well as with Lygia Clark’s vibrational ‘full-void’: there is scope for an 
immanent production of affect which does not cross or is not reduced by its 
relation to the Oedipal Other and the Symbolic as such. Rather, we find here 
sustenance for a view of the sinthôme as an articulation of the Real into novel 
Imaginaries – as Lacan (1975) proposes in his Seminar XXIII, being a creative 
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solution that does not call for interpretation; rather, as Lygia Clark proposes and 
I hold onto here, calling for a communal, collective construction, a co-poiesis. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari work through this ethical-ontological muddle throughout 
their lives.  In what concerns psychoanalysis their quest could be translated, as I 
read it, in simple terms, by asking “how much of me is left beyond representational 
ideas?”; “what are the qualities of what is left?”; and “can we think of an ethical 
and political landscape of these excesses?”.  In Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus they try, in more direct psychoanalytic terms, to meditate through libido, 
the Real, the drive, the body and language. They go beyond the sources that 
founded psychoanalysis and of psychoanalysis itself to think through these ethical 
possibilities, contextualising the psychoanalytic discourse as pertaining to a 
context of capitalism and repression, binarism and patriarchy. An ethical capacity 
beyond the dualism of representation would open the way for the invention of 
new worlds and novel forms of living – or a sprout/seedling of the world that lives 
in us, ‘gérmens de mundo’ (Rolnik, 2019), an opening of the ‘paradoxical body’ 
(Gil, 1998) would be mobilised in this affective turn.  Such co-poietic processes of 
reinvention would start with the body (in affects, symptoms, ruptures) and create 
new words and worlds, invoking a collectivity without crossing the field of the 
Other as a subordinate. In other words, it is from affects that ‘being’ can be 
extended into ‘becomings’.  
 
For Brian Massumi, “the concept of affect is politically oriented from the get go” 
(Massumi, 2015: viii). Massumi is part of a generation of theorists dedicated to 
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‘affect’, an early-2000s theoretical trend known as the ‘affective turn’, which 
counts with diverse names such as Rosi Braidotti, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Silvan 
Tomkins and Elizabeth Grosz.  Ideas proposing that affects vibrate, especially in 
relation to the body, which is an archaic, pre-linguistic, transindividual body, and 
of the level of a ‘body knowledge’ (Massumi, 2015:210), are relevant to my  
delineation of ‘anxiety as vibration’, and  require that we go through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work in more detail, stressing Guattari’s realm of ‘chaos’ rather than the 
paradigm of a ‘repository’ as Massumi (2015) seems to propose. The confusion 
and the danger of thinking of what is not of the order of representation – or what 
is beyond the Plane, in Clark’s words, seen in Chapter 4 – and that leaves traces on 
the body as a kind of ‘magical substance’ has been pointed out by several critics of 
the affect theorists for the risk of a lack of ethical possibilities when focusing on 
states beyond cognition/consciousness (Hemmings, 2005; Leys, 2017). We could 
think of this as simply the ethical possibilities of the unconscious, and, more 
precisely, as the ethical possibilities of the ‘body whilst unconscious trace’, much 
as contemporary Lacanians work with the idea that the speaking-body is the 
twenty-first century unconscious (Miller, 2014), or the ethics of the Real (Brousse, 
2007).  I take this question as central to my thesis once it is necessary to account 
for the process of ‘dividualisation’ and estrangement from anxiety that I 
delineated in Chapter 1. Being able to mobilise possibilities that further the subject 
reduced to a dividual would be the ethical and political necessity of a 
contemporary ‘couch revolution’ that is truly faithful to Freud’s project in light of 
contemporary epistemological demands (Preciado, 2020) – namely, ecological, 
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social, political changes and urgencies that challenge the epistemology of 
alienation found in the psychoanalytic dividualising Oedipal abyss-within. 
 
Deleuze’s philosophical project, which starts with the 1953 publication of 
Empirisme et subjectivité: Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume and ends with 
the 1993 publication of Critique et Clinique, can be understood in the context of his 
engagement with a particular version of empiricism and a critique of 
transcendentalism in philosophy, from which he will thus enter the field of 
psychoanalysis along the way, alone and with Félix Guattari.  For Deleuze and 
Guattari in What is Philosophy, published in English in 1994, philosophy was an 
empirical project insofar as it involved ‘conceptual creations.’ They write: 
“philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994:2) and this creation is done without appeal to a transcendental 
illusion.  Deleuze writes in the preface to the English edition of Dialogues that he 
always considered himself to be an empiricist thinker, by which he means he is a 
‘pluralist’. In this rich short introduction to his dialogue with Claire Parnet, he 
explains that, for him at least, empiricism involved accounting for multiplicity 
without resorting to a universal or eternal in order to explain the “conditions 
under which something new is produced (creativeness)” (Deleuze, 1987:vii), 
without abstracting the totalities of the One, the Whole or the Subject, rationalist 
traps that, as he sees it, psychoanalysis has fallen into. Empiricism, or his 
philosophical endeavour, starts by “analysing the states of things, in such a way 
that non-pre-existent concepts can be extracted from them. States of things are 
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neither unities nor totalities, but multiplicities” (Deleuze, 1987:vii).  This idea of 
multiplicity is important to comprehend; it:  
 
“Designates a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one 
another. Every ‘thing’ is made up in this way. Of course a multiplicity 
includes focuses of unification, centres of totalization, points of 
subjectivation, but as factors which can prevent its growth and stop its 
lines.[…] In a multiplicity what counts are not the terms or the 
elements, but what there is ‘between’, the between, as set of relations 
which are not separable from each other. Every multiplicity grows 
from the middle, like the blade of grass or the rhizome. We constantly 
oppose the rhizome to the tree, like two conceptions and even two very 
different ways of thinking”(Deleuze, 1987:vii- viii).   
 
 
Psychoanalysis, under this logic is at first ‘empiricist’ enough, but it surrenders to 
the rationalist (and typically modern, colonial and patriarchal) illusion of totalities 
and loses its political potency. Freud, for Deleuze, at first sees the multiplicities in 
the polymorphous perversion of the “skin as a collection of pores, the slipper, the 
field of stitches” (Deleuze, 1987:viii), yet he “constantly fell back on the calmer 
vision of a neurotic unconscious which plays with eternal abstractions” (Deleuze, 
1987:viii). Klein, “even Melanie Klein” he writes, granting her special respect, also 
succumbs to the same logic for her “partial objects still refer to a unity, even if it is 
lost, to a totality, even if it is to come, to a subject, even if it is split” (Deleuze, 1987: 
ix).  What Deleuze strives with his philosophical project, and the collaboration 
with Guattari, is to create concepts that engage with multiplicity, as a means to 
imagine novel possibilities of being. He writes: “It seemed to us [him and Guattari] 
that politics is at stake as well and that in a social field rhizome spread out 
everywhere under the arborescent apparatuses” (Deleuze, 1987: ix). The 
 
 222 
conditions for the emergence of such novelty is the kernel of a possible “couch 
revolution”, that a feminist and Deleuzian-Guattarian critique of psychoanalysis 
calls for (Preciado, 2018). 
 
The way Deleuze starts engaging with such multiplicities is by his reading, 
interpretation and creation of concepts from the works of Spinoza and Bergson 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994), mainly, as they allow him to consider a ‘radical 
empiricism’ through the idea of a ‘plane of immanence’. Such a plane, Deleuze and 
Guattari write, “does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject 
and individualised in that which belongs to a self. It presents only events, that is, 
possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions of possible worlds 
or conceptual personae” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994:47-48).  This ‘plane of 
immanence’ is, as they write, “surrounded by illusions” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994:49): the illusion of transcendence, the illusion of universals, the illusion of 
the eternal and the illusion of discursiveness (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). These 
illusions lock possibilities and erase multiplicity condemning it into a relation to a 
referential and transcendental One (interestingly resonating Lygia Clark’s 
Nostalgia of the Body essay, studied in Chapter 4).  Here we can see their resistance 
to tracing concepts by a traditional genealogy that stays firmly closed to a tradition 
of history of philosophy, as the historical is a taming of the potentiality of 
multiplicity and invention of new modes of being – which they call an ‘event’. They 
write: 
“Philosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it 
continually wrests itself from this history in order to create new 
concepts that fall back into history but do not come from it. How 
could something come from history? Without history, becoming 
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would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, but becoming is 
not historical. Psychosocial types belong to history, but 




In this sense, we cannot reduce an ontology (conceptual personae) to history as 
we will then be simply describing what exists under the agreed universal 
conditions –or illusions – rather than opening up possibilities of the order of the 
plane of immanence. In other words, “psychosocial types are historical, but 
conceptual personae are events” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994:110).  The question 
of their relation to the plane of immanence and a critique to the transcendental 
takes us back to the question of ‘affect’ and how affects cannot be reduced to 
‘opinions’ or pre-arranged set-ups; rather, they should be allowed to be 
recombined, coupled, to vibrate and to ‘create’ or ‘become’.  Discussing literature, 
art and psychoanalysis, they point at the limiting of ‘opinion’ or ‘ideas’ over affects, 
of imposing ‘knowledge’ over an affect and thus classifying it and mapping 
preconditioned futures to such affective possibilities and ‘becomings’.  
 
Psychoanalysis, philosophy, literature and art should engage with such 
immanence instead of being limited to the transcendental ‘tree’ of universal 
referential conditions such as the ‘Other’ and the ‘Law’. Psychoanalysis should 
then, according to this logic, account for the possibility of vibrations – of affect 
recombination, creation and a political ontology that is in tune with contemporary 
epistemological, ecological and political demands that stem off the epistemology 
of alienation and the logic domination – rather than map and reproduce 
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psychosocial historical subjects.  With this motivation in mind, I embark on a 
search for vibration.  
 
In order to dive fully into what Deleuze and Guattari mean by ‘vibration’, and to 
prepare the ground to my thinking of ‘anxiety as vibration’, I follow below with a 
cartographic genealogy of the concept of vibration, discussing how it is crucial to 
the understanding of notion of ‘sensation’ and of ‘affect’ within this tradition of 
thinking.  My reading method is cartographic-rhizomatic, meaning that I follow 
the word “vibration” across key texts from Deleuze and Guattari, opening up into 
their conceptualisations of the body, affect and an ontology in the dynamic genesis 
of language and its relation to the limits of the Symbolic (not to forget, a Symbolic 
that is, for them, Oedipally framed and thus charged with the Eurocentric 
colonialist patriarchal and capitalist subjective mode within the epistemology of 
alienation and domination), pausing and digressing as ‘vibration’ leads.  
 
The trail of Vibration  
 
When discussing the oeuvre of Bergson, who will, along with Spinoza, prove to be 
a fundamental influence in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological model, in the book 
Bergsonism, first published in 1966 in French, Deleuze delineates the materialist 
monism of Bergson in relation to perception, time (duration) and what extends 
‘beyond us’ or our experience beyond the individual as per Bergson’s monograph 




“At each instant, our perception contracts “an incalculable multitude 
of rememorized elements”; at each instant, our present infinitely 
contracts our past: “The two terms which had been separated to 
begin with cohere closely together… What, in fact, is a sensation?  It 
is the operation of contracting trillions of vibrations onto a receptive 
surface [my emphasis]. Quality emerges from this, quality that is 
nothing other than contracted quantity” (Deleuze, 1991:74).  
 
 
Perception and memory, or recollection, become ‘one’ in Bergson under this 
energetic metaphor of quantity of vibrations from the ‘outside’, or beyond the 
body, into a sensation where it can turn into a ‘quality’, in what I read to be similar 
to what in Spinoza and in Deleuze will be called affect. As Deleuze writes, “Matter 
and Memory recognizes intensities, degrees or vibrations in the qualities that we 
live as such outside ourselves and that, as such, belong to matter” (Deleuze, 
1991:92). According to Elizabeth Grosz (2007), Bergson’s influence on Deleuze 
allows him to think not in terms of vitalism (even though Bergson speaks of an 
élan vital) that would presuppose finality or a total, rather in terms of life as a 
process, or affirmation since for Bergson “life assumes a continuous, never ceasing 
relation of change” (Grosz, 2007:294). To think in terms of intensities that vibrate 
takes Deleuze away from other dominant modes of thinking about life and the 
body, moving away from organicism and from phenomenology once “each places 
the functional or experiencing body as a given rather than as the effect of 
processes of continual creation, movement or individuation” (Grosz, 2007:289). 
For Grosz this ecological ontology that we see in Deleuze’s collaboration with 
Guattari – and very clearly in Guattari’s solo work such as The Three Ecologies, 
from 1989 – can be traced to the influence of Bergson, since, as she writes it is 
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Bergsonism that contributes with “an understanding of individuality as a kind of 
dynamic integrative absorption of an outside that is always too much, too large, to 
be ordered and contained within life alone, but which extends life beyond itself 
into the very reaches of the inorganic” (Grosz, 2007:288-289). 
 
In Difference and Repetition, first published in French in 1968, Deleuze speaks to 
psychoanalysis very closely as he offers a unique reading of Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle.  The question of primary repression and of the origins of the 
unconscious is tackled by invoking terms from philosophy and literature to think 
of ‘habit’, ‘memory’ and what is it that makes repetition repeat. Deleuze, already 
in this piece, forces a reading of repetition against the model of repression: “I do 
not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat, I forget because I repeat. 
I repress, because I can live certain things or certain experiences only in the mode 
of repetition. I am determined to repress whatever would prevent me from living 
them thus: in particular, the representation which mediates the lived by relating 
it to the form of a similar or identical object” (Deleuze, 1995:18). Repetition is seen 
as a positivity, it is akin to a rupture, or a gap, that is central to the conflict of the 
drives (Eros and Thanatos, as he takes from Freud). Rather than being a 
characteristic of a ‘glitch’ of the conscious system, it entails difference or new 
qualities each time we repeat.  In this book, on the first page, Deleuze uses the 
word vibration for the first time in relation to the unconscious. He does not 
develop this idea in the book at all, but the meaning it bears here, of a 
reverberation of a conative (in Spinoza’s terms) character of the body remains 
important. Deleuze writes: “To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in 
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relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. And 
perhaps this repetition at the level of external conduct echoes, for its own part, a 
more secret vibration which animates it, a more profound, internal repetition 
within the singular” (Deleuze, 1995:1). The positive and differential unconscious 
emerges through the movement of the drive, it vibrates in repetition. If what is 
repressed, primarily, are not representations – as Deleuze puts it, ‘presentations’ 
are the material of the Freudian primary repression (Deleuze, 1995) – but what, 
as we can interpret, is not of the order of representation, therefore affect, then 
affects constitute the core of such ‘founding’ elements of the unconscious.  In a 
way, this does not take us very far from Freud’s theories of the drive as this 
encounter of psyche and soma – which is not all psy nor all soma, but a ‘body’ of a 
‘different order’ that appears in the drive.  
 
Deleuze follows this line of thought in Logic of Sense, published for the first time 
in the following year, 1969. One of the most interesting aspects of this piece, in 
what concerns this research, is his exposition and critique of the psychoanalytic 
theories of Melanie Klein. The drives and what ‘moves’ this encounter of psyche-
soma in her theories of a fragmented body form his central arguments about 
language, or ‘sense’ as it is ‘written over’ the body. This book tackles a variety of 
philosophical and literary ideas to explore the genesis of ‘sense’ (and nonsense), 
arriving at the conditions of sense being, necessarily, outside of what is ‘meant’ by 
any proposition, “the expressed makes possible the expression” (Deleuze, 
1990:186). Meaning, thus, is transcendental and relates to what Lacan calls the 
Symbolic order, as we can interpret from this part of the book. The second part of 
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the book will come closer to this research and is more attractive to readers less 
familiar with analytic philosophy and logic (resources strongly pulled together in 
the first part) as it will then explore the conditions of the genesis of language from 
a rather unique interpretation of Klein, sounds, expression and the body.  Despite 
not speaking about ‘vibration’ directly in this book, Deleuze discusses intensities 
that cross the infant’s body in fragmented and chaotic manners borrowing from 
Daniel Stern and Melanie Klein as well as Artaud, inaugurating his theorising of 
the ‘Body without Organs’ here. 
 
In his account, infants are born into bodily noises, sounds and primary affects. 
These sounds from the ‘depths’ will be mobilised into language and the production 
of sense/nonsense thereafter. He writes: “When we say that the sound becomes 
independent, we mean to say that it ceases to be a specific quality attached to 
bodies, a noise or a cry, and that it begins to designate qualities, manifest bodies, 
and signify subjects or predicates” (Deleuze, 1990: 187). He is interested in the 
‘surface’ that is produced as language happens, curious about the “depth-surface 
distinction [which] is, in every respect, primary in relation to the distinctions 
nature-convention, nature-custom, or nature-artifice” (Deleuze, 1990:187). Again, 
there is quite a remarkable departure already from Lacan’s view that even before 
birth we are already immersed in the Symbolic, even though the subject emerges 
from a mythic pre-subject represented by the delta at the bottom of the Graph of 
Desire (as seen in Chapter 3). Deleuze criticised Klein’s assumption of the two 
different positions of the unconscious (paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions), “for the very theme of positions implies the idea of the orientations of 
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psychic life and of cardinal points; it also implies the idea of the organization of 
this life in accordance with variable or shifting coordinates and dimensions, an 
entire geography and geometry of living dimensions” (Deleuze, 1990:188). The 
‘abyss’ of the ‘bottomless depth’ of oral and anal drives do not enter an equilibrium 
via introjection and projection of ‘good objects’ as Klein suggested; rather, what 
Deleuze reads as being what the schizoid position opposes is “an organism 
without parts, a body without organs, with neither mouth nor anus, having given 
up all introjection or projection, and being complete, at this price” (Deleuze, 
1990:188). The ‘abyss’ of bodily depth enters into a relation facing a ‘body’ that is 
‘complete’, or of no depth, a body of surface.  It is, for Deleuze, at this point in his 
work, at this moment when “the tension between id and ego is formed. Two depths 
are opposed: a hollow depth, wherein bits whirl about and explode, and full depth” 
(Deleuze, 1990:189). The question of a superego, the tensions between ego-id, and 
the question of depth-surfaces are aligned with Deleuze’s understanding of the 
body and its generative sounds that will be transformed into language.  This 
‘creative’ delineation that Deleuze offers to Klein’s work, inspired by Stern and his 
view of infants as ‘full’ of life potency rather than ‘lacking’, also establishes a 
curious ethics to this ontological model and his genealogy of sense. He writes: “The 
superego does not begin with the first introjected objects, as Melanie Klein says, 
but rather with this good object which holds itself aloft. Freud often insisted on 
the importance of this transference from depth to height, which indicates, 
between the id and the superego, a total change of orientation and a central 
reorganization of psychic life” (Deleuze,1990:189).  Between id and superego, as 
Deleuze reads, there is a difference in mode, since “depth has an internal tension 
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determined by dynamic categories – container-contained, empty-full, massive-
meagre, etc.” (Deleuze, 1990:190) all the while “the tension proper to height 
[meaning the superego here] is verticality, difference in size, the large and the 
small” (Deleuze, 1990:190).  He seems to be talking about different intensities or 
qualities, one of depth and one of the surface. The superego and the conflict it 
inaugurates in psychic life are, therefore, of another quality to the conflicts of 
depths, of the body without organs or, in a simple sense, of the drive.  
 
To Deleuze, there are no such things as ‘good objects’, rather, there is an 
internalised superego acting as good object which the ego identifies with. 
Identification is, according to this view, a mechanism of surface.  The level of the 
depressive position would then put into a halt the flux of introjections and 
projections, of dynamic exchanges, and substitute for it ‘identification’ with both 
internal objects and with the “object of the heights” (Deleuze, 1990:192). In this 
sense, the ‘voice from above’ is the basis of ‘morality’, or the ‘compass’ of psychic 
life that is taken in, as it enters into a surface-depth relation towards the exploding 
tension of the drives.  
 
For Deleuze, when Freud speaks of erogenous ‘zones’ there is already an external 
‘mapping’ onto the body, as such zones are not ‘natural’ to its chaotic nature, but 
rather, are inscribed and delineated. “The erogenous zones are cut up on the 
surface of the body, around orifices marked by the presence of mucous 
membranes. When people note that internal organs are also able to become 
erogenous zones, it appears that this is conditional upon the spontaneous 
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topology of the body” (Deleuze, 1990:197). What is most important in Logic of 
Sense, therefore, is Deleuze’s creative alternative to the quality of affects and the 
drives, interweaving body and language in a more complex, more materialist 
matrix than in a ‘classic’ Freudian or Lacanian version.  Guattari, in Chaosmosis, 
from 1992, will pick up on such theory of the genesis of sense and the relation of 
the body, the unconscious and an expanded notion of the possibilities of 
signification. Guattari, as a clinician, proposes a “movement towards a polyphonic 
and heterogenetic comprehension of subjectivity” (Guattari, 1995a:6).  
 
Žižek (2004) considers Logic of Sense to be Deleuze’s most important piece of 
writing, whilst dismissing Anti-Oedipus in his book Organs Without Bodies 
precisely because in this piece Deleuze works at this limit of tension between 
materialism and idealism, abandoning the latter altogether in favour of the former 
in his Capitalism and Schizophrenia series with Guattari. Following these two 
moments (Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus), Deleuze dives into an ‘abandonment 
of sense’ and writes about the logic of ‘sensation’.  
 
The piece in which Deleuze’s exposition of sensation and, thus, vibration is more 
clearly connected to what matters in this thesis appears in Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation, originally published in French in 1981, after meeting Guattari. 
The book, as the title suggests, goes beyond the tradition of representation in art 
history and finds an anchor in the work of the English painter, Francis Bacon, on 
the exploration of sensation. Ideas about the body, the body without organs, and 
of the ‘potency’ of depth rehearsed in the second part of Logic of Sense can be 
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found here again, with additional emphasis. About the body and sensation (and 
vibration), Deleuze’s poetic, difficult, yet summarised definition is the following:  
“The body without organs is opposed less to organs than to that 
organization of organs we call an organism. It is an intense and 
intensive body. It is traversed by a wave that traces levels or 
thresholds in the body according to the variations of its amplitude. 
Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. 
Sensation is not qualitative and qualified, but has only an intensive 
reality, which no longer determines with itself representative 
elements, but allotropic variations. Sensation is vibration [my 
emphasis]. […] It is a whole nonorganic life, for the organism is not 
life, it is what imprisons life. The body is completely living, and yet 
nonorganic. Likewise sensation, when it acquires a body through 
the organism, takes on an excessive and spasmodic appearance, 
exceeding the bounds of organic activity” (Deleuze, 2003:45). 
 
 
The notion of the ‘bWo’ as we can see in the above quote, by this point, is 
affirmative and sensorial. It is contrasted with the organism, marking a ‘body’ that 
is not of the order of the Symbolic but it also has trouble fitting into the Imaginary, 
aligned more with resonances of the Real. If we rescue the ‘vibrational moments’ 
in Freud and Lacan’s work on anxiety, identified in Chapter 2 and 3, namely the 
excessive, the libidinal, the Id-perceptions and the Real that is not anchored in the 
Symbolic resonate with the ‘bWo’. Deleuze, in his collaboration with Guattari, will, 
in fact, twist the unconscious from the perspective of the Real (Sauvagnargues, 
2016), delineating possibilities for subjectivity and political life accordingly. The 
shared plane in which the unconscious is open to an immanent and ethical 
positioning along others is named an ‘assemblage’, a mode of togetherness in 
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which “objects constitute themselves in a transversal, vibratory position, 
conferring on them a soul, a becoming ancestral, animal, vegetal, cosmic” 
(Guattari, 1995a:102). Their ontological and ethical proposition, therefore, 
accounts for the possibilities of the unconscious beyond not only an individualist 
or family-centred model, but also beyond a human-exceptionalism framework. 
Vibration assumes the function of   an ethical and political utopia in Guattari’s ‘To 
Have done with the Massacre of the Body’, from 1973: “We want to open our 
bodies to the bodies of other people, to other people in general. We want to let 




Deleuze and Guattari: vibrating together 
 
Rather than focusing on the ‘castrations’ Oedipal models perceive as structural in 
the unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari, working together in the difficult and 
experimental Capitalism and Schizophrenia titles, published between 1972 and 
1980, see the unconscious as a space of positive desire production, a space for 
expansion rather than a place for lack and neurotic limitations. Instead of the 
Mirror Stage and the realms of the Symbolic and the Imaginary – which give rise 
to a desire anchored in the Other and aiming at recognition, as proposed by Lacan 
– they see the unconscious as ‘rhizomatic’ and desire as a creative force. Rejecting 
the ‘arborescent’ structure defended by psychoanalysis (a vertical, centralised, 
one-way model) they put forward the opposite to it: the rhizome, which 
undermined the very notion of structure, proposing an unconscious which is not 
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fixed, instead multiple and fluid (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). The rhizome is 
defined in a passage at the beginning of A Thousand Plateaus, which reads: “unlike 
trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its 
traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play 
very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987:21). Rhizomes are also ‘acentered’, not coming from one specific point 
neither going to any single direction. This multiple nature allows rhizomes to 
ceaselessly establish “connections between semiotic chains, organisations of 
power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:7), an idea that seems to expand the Lacanian 
premises of the Imaginary and the Symbolic as having to work with their 
delineating limitations, granting one another the capacity to fulfil itself.  
Rhizomatic subjects engage with all the potentiality that ‘vibrates’ around them 
(also in them, through them, and so on), in a way “that is totally different from the 
arborescent relation: all manner of ‘becomings’” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:21). 
Desire, emerging from ‘desiring-machines’ through desire-production “is at work 
everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:1). For them, the meeting of desiring-machines 
(which derive from a non-distinctive classification between humans, nature, etc.) 
allows for a ‘coupling’ from which the interruption of one flow of desire generates 
another flow, in another direction, forming a rhizomatic cartography which is, 
inherently, multi-directional (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983). When flows of desire 
are interrupted, a Body without Organs emerges, presenting its “smooth, slippery, 
opaque, taut surface as a barrier” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:8), subverting any 
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notion of bodies being ‘hermetically’ organised. The BwO is an all-encompassing 
version of the organism, comprising the ‘virtual’ affective potentialities that a body 
carries with it – in a sense similar to what Lacan suggests with the Real towards 
the late phase of his writings (as a register which is ‘unbound’) – only by the 
engagement with this ‘machine’ of desire-production. A ‘becoming’, as described 
in Anti-Oedipus, happens when this realm of virtual potentiality is activated, in the 
meeting of “the process of production of the desiring-machines and the 
nonproductive stasis of the body without organs” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:8). 
Without veering away from this archival tracing of ‘vibration’, it is worth 
mentioning that such proposition of becoming in relation to the BwO takes us back 
to Lygia Clark’s vibrational body and its openness to co-poiesis in her practice.  
 
Both in Anti-Oedipus and in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘vibration’ appears as part of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s lexicon, often-times relating to their writings on art, music 
and literature and their potency in engendering new worlds and new aesthetic 
paradigms. In a passage of Anti-Oedipus where they critically engage with the 
Freudian understanding of love, sexuality and libido, vibration operates as a non-
situated, collective and connecting quality of libido. To hold onto this, I will 
fragment this specific passage in more detail. They start by positioning 
psychoanalysis within a specific modern tradition that is particularly 
conservative, claiming, with humour, that “psychoanalysis has not made its 
pictorial revolution” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:352), thus, is still attached to an 
‘old’ aesthetic reference. The Freudian framework of Oedipus therefore modulates 
libido and the body within a specific political economy: 
 
 236 
 “There is a hypothesis dear to Freud: the libido does not invest the 
social field as such except on condition that it be desexualized and 
sublimated. If he holds so closely to this hypothesis, it is because he 
wants above all to keep sexuality in the limited framework of Narcissus 
and Oedipus, the ego and the family. Consequently, every sexual 
libidinal investment having a social dimension seems to him to testify 
to a pathogenic state, a "fixation" in narcissism, or a "regression" to 
Oedipus and to the pre-oedipal stages, by means of which 
homosexuality will be explained as a reinforced drive, and paranoia as 
a means of defense. We have seen on the contrary that what the libido 
invested, through its loves and sexuality, was the social field itself in its 
economic, political, historical, racial, and cultural determinations: in 
delirium the libido is continually re-creating History, continents, 
kingdoms, races, and cultures. Not that it is advisable to put historical 
representations in the place of the familial representations of the 
Freudian unconscious, or even the archetypes of a collective 
unconscious” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:352). 
 
Collectivising this modulation by extending its symbolic “essentialism”, in a 
Jungian manner, alternatively, is not the solution either, as they hint above. Rather, 
they argue, libido is a matter of encounters with others, indexing social relations 
that cannot be reduced to ‘history’ (or a transcendental connecting illusion), but 
harnessed into a ‘geohistory’ (or a cartography of relations). Opening libido to the 
level of vibration would thus do away with the necessity of a subjectivity that is 
modulated within the political economy of the modern and Oedipal family, 
organised by its binary and phallic sexual difference. For them, “our choices in 
matters of love are at the crossroads of "vibrations", which is to say that they 
express connections, disjunctions, and conjunctions of flows that cross through a 
society, entering and leaving it, linking it up with other societies, ancient or 
contemporary, remote or vanished, dead or yet to be born” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1983: 353). Libido, through the perspective of a vibrational body, thus, has an 
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affective character and it is harnessed in the socius in a way of encounters that 
extend beyond the limits of a historical (and Symbolic) delineation of reality.  In 
Anti-Oedipus, therefore, we can find the path contrary to the modulation of desire; 
or a rescuing of the early-Freud libido (as per Chapter 2) as harnessed to the 
collective rather than the socius. They write: 
“But flows and codes of socius that do not portray anything, that 
merely designate zones of libidinal intensity on the body without 
organs, and that are emitted, captured, intercepted by the being that 
we are then determined to love, like a point-sign, a singular point in the 
entire network of the intensive body that responds to History, that 
vibrates with it” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 353) 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus, vibration appears as synonymous to ‘becomings’ in the 
‘plane of consistency’. We can move beyond the early-Freud libidinal excess 
theory into finding here resonances to what Lacan hints without theorising in his 
later conceptualisation of the Real (as per Chapter 3). Instead of operating in a 
logic of ‘two’ (as the planes made possible by, for example, the modulating libidinal 
economy of psychoanalysis), multiplicities are kept alive in what they call a ‘plane 
of consistency’, defining that:  
“Far from reducing the multiplicities' number of dimensions to two, the 
plane of consistency cuts across them all, intersects them in order to 
bring into coexistence any number of multiplicities, with any number 
of dimensions. The plane of consistency is the intersection of all 
concrete forms. Therefore all becomings are written like sorcerers' 
drawings on this plane of consistency, which is the ultimate Door 
providing a way out for them. This is the only criterion to prevent them 





It is at this level, of the plane of consistency, that the “imperceptible” can be “seen 
and heard”, that vibrations are located. Vibration, therefore, is a quality of affect. 
If we return to the first pages of this chapter and Deleuze’s course on Spinoza and 
affect, the collective and non-representational aspects of affect are again rescued 
in ‘vibration’. Vibration, accordingly, resonates affectively, opening up to what is 
not known, which is not divided in two, keeping multiplicity alive. It is also “where 
the imperceptible is seen and heard”, when the body is open to sensation, even the 
most subtle ones.  
 
Interestingly, the body in its materiality and capacity for sensation versus a 
cognitive self-consciousness will again be linked with vibration in their last co-
authored book – risking slight dualistic undertones, they still extrapolate the 
complex entanglement between concept and matter, echoing Deleuze’s reading of 
Spinoza’s theory of affects as still relational, as mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter. The final account of the pair Deleuze and Guattari on vibration appears 
in What is Philosophy?, first published in 1991. In this piece, again, vibration is 
utilised in relation to music, philosophy and art, but there is one specific passage 
that connects vibration with the materiality of the ‘I’, the brain and nervous system 
and the field of the ‘other’. They write: 
 
“It is the brain that says I, but I is an other. It is not the same brain as 
the brain of connections and secondary integrations, although there is 
no transcendence here. And this I is not only the "I conceive" of the 
brain as philosophy, it is also the "I feel" of the brain as art. Sensation 
is no less brain than the concept. If we consider the nervous 
connections of excitation-reaction and the integrations of perception 
action, we need not ask at what stage on the path or at what level 
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sensation appears, for it is presupposed and withdrawn. The 
withdrawal is not the opposite but a correlate of the survey. Sensation 
is excitation itself, not insofar as it is gradually prolonged and passes 
into the reaction but insofar as it is preserved or preserves its 
vibrations” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 211) 
 
 
It is clear that the I, or the subject of consciousness and enunciation, speaks to that 
level of subjectivity which is not only conscious but which is actualised through 
language.  What I find particular compelling about their addition to vibration and 
sensation here is how it echoes yet again what Freud hinted at in his ‘An Outline 
of Psychoanalysis’, from 1938, namely the quality of the Id as being capable of 
perceptions that extend beyond the ego and consciousness (as per Chapter 2). 
Here, then, it becomes clear how vibration is an unconscious sensation.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, as this genealogy of the notion of vibration makes very 
clear, subjectivity extends to the level of ‘sensation’, or the level of ‘vibration’.  
Their final definition of vibration addresses precisely this almost ‘materiality’ of 
the unconscious; or, as contemporary Lacanians would express it (as per Chapter 
3), how the unconscious is the speaking-body: 
 “Sensation contracts the vibrations of the stimulant on a nervous 
surface or in a cerebral volume: what comes before has not yet 
disappeared when what follows appears. This is its way or responding 
to chaos. Sensation itself vibrates because it contracts vibrations. It 
preserves itself because it preserves vibrations: it is Monument. It 
resonates because it makes its harmonics resonate. Sensation is the 
contracted vibration that has become quality, variety. That is why the 
brain-subject is here called soul or force, since only the soul preserves 
by contracting that which matter dissipates, or radiates, furthers, 





In their complex cosmologic assemblage, vibrations of the world are constant, 
captured by ‘sensation’, which is a capacity of the I that goes beyond ‘knowledge’ 
and beyond ‘feeling'. If we add a Lacanian layer to this, we can place ‘sensation’ at 
the level of an affective Real, rather than the Symbolic (knowledge) or the 
Imaginary (feelings).  
 
Vibrating the clinic  
 
Guattari’s solo meditations and theoretical production were as ambitious and 
consistent as those he imparted with Deleuze in Capitalism and Schizophrenia. His 
writings reflect the onto-epistemic twists proposed by Deleuze, as seen earlier in 
this chapter, and focuses on what he calls ‘schizoanalytic cartographies’ and a 
‘diagrammatic’ mode of thought. The kernel of his contributions, especially in 
what touches this thesis, relates to the possibilities of a ‘vibrational’ Real.  
 
The Real in Guattari is not confined to the margins of representation, as a negative 
of the ‘phenomenological’ Thing, as a structuralist-minded understanding of early 
to mid-life Lacan insists on, and late-Lacan perhaps leaves open ended. Guattari 
worked on a detailed transdisciplinary project of semiotics, metamodeling and 
expression in his solo writing before, during and after his encounter with Deleuze.  
He sought inspiration in the linguistic theory of ‘Glossematics’, from the Danish 
linguist Hjelmslev and his semiotic matrix of polyvocality, which, differently to the 
Saussurean model of linguistics that inspired Lacan, offers scope for the 
expression of a-signifying ruptures, rather than confining them as a negative to 
the ‘bivocality’ of representation.  To Guattari, “the subjectivity produced in the 
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world of signification is a shut-in, a semiological shipwreck” (Genosko, 2002:168), 
in which “polyvocity becomes bi[uni]vocity” (Genosko, 2002:169). In his 
published personal notebooks The Anti-Oedipus Papers (2006) and in A Thousand 
Plateaus, co-authored with Deleuze, several references to the question of 
expression beyond the possibilities of representation are made. Guattari’s model 
of the subject also expands Hjelmslev’s linguistic ideas to ‘matter’/’substance’, 
including not only the social and the political as well as the ecological and the 
biological into a common matrix of affectability, or into a metamodeling of the 
‘machine’.  Janell Watson, a scholar of Guattari’s complex diagrammatic thinking 
writes that “the political potential of Guattari’s semiotic matrix lies in its refusal to 
let go of the real, as does Lacan by focusing on a signifier which cannot possibly 
even ‘represent’ the real. Guattari’s matrix can include the real because it does not 
confine itself to the domain of representation—in other words, the small ellipsis 
of language” (Watson, 2008, para.44). Such ‘diagrammatic’ thought, moving 
beyond the possibilities of representation and non-representation shake 
completely the Lacanian primacy of the Symbolic for subjective formation, which 
is implied in Lacanian topological models (until the 1970s, at least, as seen in 
Chapter 3). As such, “forging a path of access to the real opens up political 
possibilities, whereas blocking out the real shuts down politics. The capitalist and 
psychoanalytic politics of signification which upholds the tyranny of the signifier 
in turn preserves the domination of the ruling classes” (Watson, 2008, para.44). 
This dense theoretical twist has powerful clinical implications – it opens space for 
a ‘nomadic ethics’ (Braidotti, 2006a), or for ‘becomings’ rather than ‘beings’ in the 




The clinical model practiced by Guattari on the back of his collaboration with 
Deleuze and his connection with the Institutional Psychotherapy movement in 
France (known as schizoanalysis), is, thus a practice of ‘becomings’ (Robcis, 2021).  
For them, when dealing with the unconscious, “it is not the lines of pressure that 
matter, but on the contrary the lines of escape” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:338), 
lines of flight, of movement. Instead of a clinic focused on the power of repression 
(and foreclosure and disavowal, as the psychotic and perverse core mechanisms 
in the Lacanian clinic), schizoanalysis works with the power of the ‘lines of flight’. 
For them “the unconscious does not apply pressure to consciousness; rather, 
consciousness applies pressure and strait-jackets the unconscious, to prevent its 
escape” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983:338). Thus being, the lines of flight, the 
moments of inventiveness and creativity not only in the symptom but in the 
sinthôme, is what keeps one alive and is the key to a clinic of becoming (Biehl and 
Locke, 2017). As a clinical practitioner,  ‘thinking-with’ (rather than ‘against’) 
these theorists, enables me to move beyond discursivity in what concerns the 
‘grammar of suffering’ in the case of anxiety (Dunker, 2015), thinking of the 
materiality of the body, and life, in light of the ontological turn in medical 
anthropology (Mol, 2002; Biehl, 2005). Unconscious ‘lines of flight’ meet a 
‘common’ (Federici, 2019, 2020) ‘nomadic affectivity’ (Braidotti, 2006b).  
 
 
For this reason, the influence of Deleuze and Guattari in the Brazilian Psychiatric 
Reform, for example, is notorious. Aside from the historical fact that Guattari 
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visited Brazil during the period of re-democratisation after the Military 
Dictatorship relinquished in the early 1980s, taking part in critical psychiatric 
meetings, the schizoanalytic model finds, to this day resonances in the public 
mental health care system (Amarante and Nunes, 2018).  As asylums started to be 
closed, following an international trend of psychiatric reform in the 1980s, 
outpatient ‘psychosocial support centres’ (CAPS) were established nationally after 
the year 2000. The centrality of music and art therapy, as well as the importance 
of community care and psychosocial work in ‘territories’ in Brazilian public 
mental health is frequently justified ‘schizoanalytically’.  Arriscado Nunes and 
Siqueira-Silva (2016) argue that this schizoanalytic appropriation in the Brazilian 
Psychiatric Reform confers a decolonial quality to its practices, once suffering, 
ruptures and the production of meaning are bound to the community and to a local 
temporality, rather than enclosed within hegemonic (and colonial) psychiatric 
frames or psychoanalytic models.  Accordingly, the clinical reverberations of 
schizoanalysis are also present in the ontological turn observed within medical 
anthropology (Mol, 2002), challenging universalising dominant health 
epistemologies that offer little or no space for the multiple performances and 
experiences of illness, suffering, health and the body. 66 
 
 
66 The Brazilian CAPS model of community mental health care features in a very recent 
report on Global Mental Health issued by the World Health Organisation in June 2021 
that is the result of an effort to promote person-centred and rights-based approaches in 
the heavily over-medicalised and still violent field of mental health care (WHO, 2021). 
This model, albeit precarious in reality, is anchored in co-production, active 
participation of service users in all decision-making, the right to choose and negotiate a 
treatment alongside a multidisciplinary team and a strong local community support 
system of networks of care.  
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The ruptures characteristic of psychic suffering and ‘madness’ (psychoses, more 
often) need, according to the schizoanalytic model, to be supported with grounds 
of expression that are not enclosed to individual psychotherapy and psychiatric 
care (in other words, not forced into the limits of being, but open to multiple 
becomings). Rather, the expression of such unconscious ruptures needs to be 
collective and territorialised in the community, crossing aesthetic, sensorial and 
political zones of affect (Lancetti, 2015). That is what Guattari (2015) called a 
clinical model of ‘transversality’.  The transversal moves the centre of the axis of 
enunciation from the subject and their triangular relation with the Other and the 
analyst, challenging the power structure (or colonising violence) sustained by the 
classic transferential relation in psychoanalysis. Instead of relying on the fixity of 
psychic structures (neurosis, psychosis and perversion) – which stems off Lacan’s 
linguistic logic (and the representation versus non-representation binary of this 
linguistic model) –  or on the function of interpretations that are Oedipally-
inscribed (with sexual difference, the family drama and castration at its core)– a 
plural and situated clinic is proposed. Whilst there is significant literature on the 
influence of Deleuze and Guattari in the Brazilian Psychiatric reform in relation to 
psychosis (similarly to the legacy of French Institutional Psychotherapy, see 
Robcis, 2021), little is offered in relation to the potential of the schizoanalytic 
model in the clinic of anxiety.  What the archival mobilisation realised in this 
chapter allows us to do is to extend the clinical value of unconscious ‘lines of flight’ 




In Guattari’s practice, the commitment to the ‘lines of flight’ is apparent in the 
institutional mobilisation of what we can call now the ‘full-void’ into co-poiesis. 
Guattari (1998) has offered a rich account of how such power relations were 
challenged in practice at the clinic of La Borde in his essay ‘La Grille’. The ‘grid’ of 
activities and function was fundamental to the emergency of ‘deregulation frames’ 
(cadrer le dérèglements) that would act as a system of articulation of all the 
patients, staff and space, allowing for the ‘invention of a [new] language’. The set 
of relations and their non-hierarchical arrangements of the clinic were 
fundamental to the treatment to mostly cases of psychoses at La Borde. In 
defending this model of clinical practice psychosocially, the question to be worked 
out is not just of the macropolitical effects of the ‘pimping of life’ (Rolnik 2019), 
but of its ‘molecular’ dynamics, as Guattari (2000) argues in The Three Ecologies. 
Following Denise Ferreira da Silva (2016),  who proposes that such an ethico-
political project does not entail simply tracing  ‘differences’ and the effects of 
difference for what they are (a strategy of thinking she calls ‘critique’), even when 
providing an intersectional feminist critique; rather, it is matter of moving beyond 
‘separating’ estrangements and proposing ‘entanglements’ instead. 67   In other 
 
67 Denise Ferreira da Silva writes: “Why not assume that beyond their physical (bodily 
and geographic) conditions of existence, in their fundamental constitutions, at the 
subatomic level, humans exist entangled with everything else (animate and in-animate) 
in the universe). Why not conceive of human differences – the ones 19th and 20th century 
anthropologists and sociologists selected as fundamental human descriptors – as effects 
of both spacetime conditions and a knowledge program modelled after Newtonian (19th 
century anthropology) and Einsteinian (20th century social scientific knowledge) 
physics, in which separability is the privileged ontological principal. Without 
separability, difference among human groups and between human and nonhuman 
entities, has a very limited explanatory purchase and ethical significance” (Ferreira da 




words, clinically engaging at the molecular level means not only speaking of the 
‘effects’ of the logic of the Same/One across human multiplicities; nor does it 
involve thinking radically through a psychoanalytic archive whilst still 
succumbing the Real, ruptures, a-signification and affects, such as anxiety, to the 
limits of universalist signifiers and a corresponding Symbolic structure. 
 
As such, going back to Guattari’s polyvocal Real, we can trace what I am gathering 
as Guattari’s ‘theory of anxiety’. The ruptures of a vibrational Real add a particular 
nuance to Guattari’s understanding of anxiety, a conceptualisation he does not 
develop in detail but that he insinuates in various moments.  Guattari places 
‘anguish’ within the domain of the ruptures – beyond the limits of bivocality – 
which, in his critique of psychoanalysis and ‘Integrated World Capitalism’ – his 
own vocabulary for neoliberal capitalism – is prevented from operating its 
‘surprise’. He writes:  
“Everything that pertains to the domain of rupture, surprise, and 
anguish, but also desire, the will to love and to create, somehow has to 
fit into the registers of dominant references. There is always an 
arrangement ready to prevent anything that might be of a dissident 
nature in thought and desire. There is an attempt to eliminate what I 
call the processes of singularization. Everything that surprises, 
however mildly, has to be classifiable in some area of framing or 
reference” (Guattari and Rolnik, 2007:58-59).  
 
The psychoanalytic (and, we can add, the psychodiagnosis that extended through 
the twentieth century, as explored in detail in Chapter 1) modus operadi is, to 
Guattari, one of such frames that modulates anguish and its ruptures under the 
Modern shadow of subjectivity. Affects and anguish are contextually modulated 
and our relation to them is indicative of our cartographical positioning, Guattari 
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writes: “every individual and social group conveys its own system of modelising 
subjectivity; that is, a certain cartography – composed of cognitive references as 
well as mythical, ritual and symptomatological references – with which it 
positions itself in relation to its affects and anguishes, and attempts to manage its 
inhibitions and drives” (Guattari, 1995a:11). Anguish, or anxiety, by being situated 
within the domain of a-signifying ruptures are not reduceable to the binary 
(representability versus non-representability) logic of the Symbolic as anchored 









Guattari makes this argument clearer in a note entitled ‘Of Anxiety, the Phallic 
Object and Interpretation’, part of his Anti-Oedipus Papers. There Guattari places 
anxiety as “the intermixture of two intersecting drives: - Faithfulness to polyvocal 
remainders (the mother) (adhesion to the remainders, adherence to the Lacanian 
‘a’). – Desire for bi-univocal oedipal normality” (Guattari, 2006:103). In a diagram 
I am calling ‘Guattari’s Graph of Anxiety’ (Fig.2, p.247), Guattari maps ‘eros’ (or 
affect, jouissance, libido, for him) as extending beyond the death-drive that 
anchors attachment to bi-univocality. The unconscious (Eros) is anchored by 
polyvocality – or multiple possibilities of enunciation, expression or 
representation that do not fit into any Symbolic structure or arrangement. What 
this implies is that the affect of anxiety is not reducible to interpretation, nor 
indexed to a relation to the Phallic Law-of-the-Father, Oedipus and the Other that 
anchor the Symbolic. What this diagram, followed by this study on vibration, 
enables us to map is that Guattari offers a complementing theory of anxiety that 
Freud and Lacan only hinted at (as per Chapters 2 and 3) but were not able to 
clearly delineate. What we see here is the potency of anxiety in a clinic that 
encounters the subject anxious, at the edge of their being, but not yet open to novel 
becomings.   
 
 
As demonstrated in this chapter, which followed the trail of ‘vibration’ through the 
oeuvre of Deleuze and Guattari, affect is an ethical disposition that is collectively 
produced. Affect vibrates beyond the confines of an individual and the Symbolic 
frame that modulates one’s experience of such affects.  In this chapter, I have 
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arrived at this ethical framing of the subject in Deleuze and Guattari by pursuing 
a cartographic genealogy of the concept of vibration, discussing how it is crucial 
to the understanding of notions of ‘sensation’ and of ‘affect’ within this tradition 
of thinking.  Anxiety, as an affect of rupture, exceeds the modulation of the 
bivocality of possibilities assumed by the psychoanalytic model and, as such, is 
inscribed in the plane of the ‘commons’, following Federici (2019, 2020); or of a 
nomadic ethics’ (Braidotti, 2006a) instead of a logic of ‘difference with 
separability’ and domination (Ferreira da Silva, 2016). In other words, 
possibilities for ‘becomings’ rather than ‘beings’ in the psychoanalytic clinic. 
 
 
Returning to the critique presented in Chapter 1– which point at a process of 
‘dividualisation’ (Deleuze, 1992) in the process of diagnosis and treatment of 
anxiety, extending such alienation to a psychoanalytic orientation that is 
restricted to the possibilities of ‘being’, rather than of ‘becoming’ – what proves 
necessary is an encounter between the common,  the affective, collective, ethical 
disposition rescued in the concept of ‘vibration’ (as per Chapter 5), and 
psychoanalytic possibilities. How can we conceive an understanding of anxiety in 
psychoanalysis that is not dividualising? Can psychoanalysis work with an 
unconscious that vibrates? This is what I move into arguing in the next chapter, 
shifting from anxiety and its estrangement, as the thesis set out in the beginning, 
to a possible entanglement, as it will conclude. 
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The field of psy is drenched in subjective ideals of cure, treatment, pathology and 
normality.  The ideological compass orienting the function of the clinic reveals, 
accordingly, political consequences implied in epistemological and ontological 
foundations of clinical praxis.  As Nikolas Rose puts it, “the idea of the norm, as it 
came into use in the late nineteenth century, linked together the ideas of statistical 
normality, social normality and medical normality: the norm was the average, the 
desirable, the healthy, the ideal and so forth” (Rose, 2018:9). In this sense, 
“normality – of what it is to be normal, to think of oneself as normal, to be 
considered as normal by others – leads to a set of rather profound questions” 
(Rose, 2018:9).  As such, the pathologisation of anxiety and the enquiry over what 
anxiety is all about, what is telling us and what are the grounds of its emergence 
have met, in the previous chapters of this thesis, the question of ‘what can anxiety 
do?’.  In this final chapter, I explore the question of what psychoanalysis can offer 
to the treatment of anxiety and why this is a path still worth pursuing, whilst 
considering the many ‘dividualising’ aspects of the psychoanalytic discourse itself 
discussed in this research. 
 
The matter of the ideological foundations of treatment in the field of psy is dealt 
with philosophically with my proposal of ‘vibration’, situating my research in 
relation to the limits of ‘being’ and possibilities of ‘becoming’ in the experience of 
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anxiety.  To do so, I have investigated the psychoanalytic unconscious in the 
understanding of the affect of anxiety, which lead us to a point of ‘excess’, and this 
is what I tour in more detail through a discussion on the foundations of ‘negativity’ 
in psychoanalysis of the Freudian and Lacanian orientations in this chapter.  As 
this thesis demonstrated (in Chapter 1) an increased focus on biological, 
behavioural and individualised aspects of psychological distress in contemporary 
understandings of anxiety was made evident. In psychoanalysis, conversely, 
unconscious, relational and contextual elements frame distress and symptoms.  
 
 
The Normal, the Pathological and the Unconscious 
 
 
During the twentieth century, several scholars and practitioners have questioned 
psychiatric hegemony and the socio-political implications of ‘normality’. From the 
works of Thomas Szasz and Erving Goffman in the United States, to David Cooper 
and R.D. Laing in Britain, as well as Robert Castel and Franco Basaglia in France 
and Italy, the myths and makings of mental illness have integrated what is 
understood as the (still polemic) field of critical psychiatry and psychology 
(Middleton and Moncrieff, 2018). In France, during the 1940s and 1950s, Georges 
Canguilhem was closely associated with the radical clinic of Saint-Alban, where 
Tosquelles, Jean Oury and Franz Fanon also lived and worked, taking Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic ‘return to Freud’ into the institution and furthering its potencies 
in the treatment of psychoses (Robcis, 2021). For Canguilhem, in On the Normal 
and the Pathological, from 1943, what characterises a form of suffering that is 
‘enough of a problem’ to be considered a ‘pathology’ appears always in contrast 
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with an idea – or ideal – of normativity that frames the subject ideologically 
through ranking possibilities of recognition of such suffering.   As such, and 
building from the movements of pathologising and diagnosing anxiety, we can 
agree that there is neither a ‘normal’ nor a ‘pathological’ in itself, rather, there are 
only these qualifications within the relation between an organism and the 
environment. Social context and the context produced by the qualifications 
generated by the psychologies (and in an ample manner, the psy- field) are crucial 
elements of any interpretation of ‘suffering’.  In short, what Canguilhem proposes 
is that the characterisation of what is to suffer ‘normally’ or not is a producer of 
this very suffering too.  This ideological matter and its consequences have been 
examined in detail through the ‘grammar’ of anxiety. Still, if psychoanalysis is to 
offer anything different to this grammar, we must look at it closer and answer: 
why does psychoanalysis matter for a research on anxiety, whilst also keeping in 
mind a clinically viable understanding of this affect? 
 
In the essay ‘What is Psychology?’, from the late 1950s, Canguilhem adds a further 
layer to his critique of the ‘sciences’ of psyche, asserting that “it is inevitable that 
in presenting itself as the general theory of behaviour, psychology will incorporate 
some idea of Man. Hence, it is necessary that we allow philosophy to question 
psychology about where this idea comes from, and whether it may not be, 
ultimately, some philosophy” (Canguilhem, 2016:202). We can unpack this 
problem in two different manners. First: the context producing and qualifying 
suffering as well as the ideological normativity implicated when assessing this 
suffering are not neutral. These initial points are fundamental to inquiring about 
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this affect in a non-normative manner and asking what is the role of both diagnosis 
and cultural discourses in the contemporary understanding of anxiety. That is, 
how do diagnosis and culture produce our relation to this affect at an individual 
level?  Second: there is an idea – and again, an ideal – of subjectivity predicted in 
the very object of psychology, and by being so, questions brought by philosophy 
cannot be dismissed. In other words, psychology operates within an ontology 
epistemically situated, or an understanding of the subject bound within a scientific 
discourse. Therefore, if ever speaking of an ‘anxious self’ or ‘anxious subject’, it is 
necessary to make it clear what this notion of self in question is and how it is 
produced. This movement of contextualising the conditions of subjective 
production and reproduction is, in particular, one that permeates the psychosocial 
studies field in which my research is situated. 
 
In both elements of Canguilhem’s critiques, there is something that sets 
psychoanalysis apart from other psychological practices, especially those in 
evidence in the present time (such as CBT, Positive Psychology and biological 
psychiatry). To follow this argument, we can return to Foucault, who questions in 
Mental Illness and Psychology (from 1954) the limits between what is considered 
a ‘pathology’ of the organic /physical domain and the ‘mental’, or more subjective 
realm. These two realms are, in Freudian psychoanalysis, as Foucault sees it, 
worked through a complementary psyche-soma that extends beyond a simple or 
linear ‘cause and effect’ relation.  As an illustrative example we could think of the 
early texts on hysteria in Studies on Hysteria, in which psychological phenomena 
implicate the body and are implicated by the body enigmatically, rather than 
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linearly.68 More clearly, in the Freudian notion of the drive  (pulsion, Trieb, first 
mistranslated as ‘instinct’ into English), a complex interrelation of mind/body, 
without necessarily privileging any part over the other is at stake. As a contrast, 
an example of   a cause/effect and a dualism between body/mind can be found in 
the organicist psychiatric discourse that attempts to locate suffering in the brain 
and treats mental ‘malaise’ through a rebalancing of chemical substances, natural 
or not to the human organism. Psychoanalysis, accordingly, sits in between the 
organic-medical discourse and a philosophical understanding of the self/subject 
that amplifies the understanding of a self beyond the physical body yet not 
transcending it completely. Psychoanalysis however, moves over from a soul 
versus flesh pre-modern narrative that  nineteenth century psychology set as the 
line between religion and science (Guéry and Deleule, 2014).  In psychoanalysis, 
materiality and discursivity are intertwined in a subject that is intrinsically 
political; therefore, suffering is never completely alienated from its context, 
neither is it totally absorbed by it. Suffering operates instead as this point of 
tension between the singular and the contextual. 
 
To all psychologies, and to psychoanalysis too, and perhaps here being a different 
project than that of philosophy or of social sciences, questions of method or object 
are superseded by one matter that seems to have greater importance, that is of the 
clinical ‘efficiency’ or ‘probity’ in ‘treating’ a patient and their psychic suffering. 
Rather than a neat theory, psychologies and psychoanalysis are grounded in the 
 
68 Several scholars engaged with the discussion about hysteria and the body ever since. 
See: David-Menard (1989), Mitchell, (2000) and Webster (2018).   
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clinic.  Canguilhem reminds us that to free itself from the ‘unscientific’ rancid 
aftertaste of being the ‘science of the soul’, “in 19th and 20th centuries, the 
psychology of reaction and behaviour thought it made itself independent by 
separating itself from all philosophy, that is to say, from the kind of speculation 
that looks for an idea of Man beyond the biological and sociological facts” 
(Canguilhem 2016:212). However, this system of verification of reality – let alone 
the classification of the possibilities of reality seen in the following diagnostic 
manuals for instance – led to an artificial doubling up of the reality of the 
‘classifier’, or the psychologist, over the reality of the ‘classified’, the ‘mentally ill’ 
patient.  As he puts it, the behavioural focus of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century – and even, we could propose, its contemporary twist in Cognitive-
Behavioural Therapy – “could not prevent the recurrence of its results in the 
behaviour of those who obtain them” (Canguilhem 2016:212). In other words, the 
power relation established between the expert and the patient actualises 
diagnoses (Proctor, 2008), echoing what Marcuse (1969) calls a ‘corporealisation 
of the superego’, or a symptomatic embodiment of authority.  By separating itself 
from any ‘unscientific’ subjectivism that would be possibly questioned by 
philosophy, this behavioural pattern classification system and a focus on the 
‘organicist’ body of medical sciences, the field of psy “forbids philosophy from 
furnishing the answer, [to] the question “What is psychology?” [Which] becomes 
“In doing what they do, what do psychologists hope to accomplish?” (Canguilhem 
2016:212).  According to Guéry and Deleule (2014), psy-discourses are not just an 
ideological reflection of a capitalist mode of production. Rather, they become an 
indispensable gear in the social machinery that moves such ideological 
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mechanisms. Ideology and pathos, in psychopathology, are deeply intertwined, 
with its foundations evident both in the subject assumed as normal and the subject 
assumed as ill, as well as in the aims of the therapeutic treatment (Federici, 2020).  
 
Whilst the ‘cure’ and ‘ease of suffering’ may be the core aim of much, if not all, 
clinical practice, and the fact that such a foundation to the clinic can be at times an 
indisputable debate, the very understanding of what is suffering and why it needs 
to be ‘eliminated’ or even ‘cured’ carries with itself a heavy ideological charge.  To 
this, Canguilhem offers an ironic yet relevant comment: “It is rather vulgarly, then, 
that philosophy poses to psychology the question: tell me what you aim for so that 
I may find out what you are?” (Canguilhem 2016:212). Here, then, the contextual 
debate over what is suffering and how it accompanies the discourses of normality 
and pathology are also a point in which psychoanalysis offers its unique approach 
through the psychoanalytical understanding of the symptom – not isolated, not 
universal, but particular and yet, in relation to a wider social, political and 
discursive context.  
 
Beyond a Cartesian dualism, and far from being monistic,  Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis then offer to the field of psy the innovation of speech and the 
performative aspect of the narration of one’s own experience, as well as an 
understanding of the symptom as relating to demands of recognition that are 
always produced through the social bond (Dunker, 2015). The early term of 
‘deferred action’ (Nachträglichkeit) introduced by Freud in the ‘Project for a 
Scientific Psychology’, in 1895, when discussing the case of Emma, already brings 
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attention to the weight of the narrative and speech over psychic reality, stressing 
how history, and poignantly one’s own history, can be constructed retroactively. 
Such a movement marks a crucial component of the psychoanalytic view of 
subjective formation, much evidenced in the Lacanian use of the term ‘parlêtre’, 
the speaking-being, in which the lived experience is harnessed on a body that 
speaks, this being the condition for subjectivity.  Joel Birman (2003), a Brazilian 
psychoanalyst and scholar, offers a simple insight into the contributions of 
Freudian psychoanalysis to philosophy and, as a consequence, what can be its 
contributions to the field of the psy. Birman (2003) speaks of three core ‘de-
centrings’ brought in by psychoanalysis to the world of thought and, specifically, 
to philosophy. I find Birman’s reading useful when thinking, psychosocially, ‘why 
psychoanalysis?’, and will move into incorporating his views into my argument 
that follows.  
 
Since Freud, it is in the unconscious – or in what lies beyond a conscious Ich – that 
psychoanalysis is anchored.  The unconscious is, for Freud (1923) the first 
‘shibboleth’ of psychoanalysis, “the fundamental premise of psycho-analysis; and 
it alone makes it possible for psycho-analysis to understand the 
pathological processes in mental life” (Freud, 1923:13). The unconscious, as 
Freud suggests as early as 1894, repeating it in 1915, 1919 and explicating in 
1923, “does not coincide with the repressed” (Freud, 1923:18). Rather, “it is still 
true that all that is repressed is Ucs., but not all that is Ucs. is repressed” (Freud, 
1923:18). There is, as Freud repetitively reminds us, a part of the ego that is 
unconscious and not related to repression or meaning; it is an “I” beyond itself.  A 
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clinic that operates with a subject of the unconscious is, therefore, a clinic that 
works through the repetitions and pains, as well as the possibilities on the 
horizon, of such an “I” beyond itself.  In other words, psychoanalysis is, or can be, 
as I will move into arguing, a creative practice between ‘beings’ and ‘becomings’.  
 
The more general contributions of psychoanalysis to both philosophy and the 
sciences of the ‘psy’ (psychiatry, psychologies as well as neurology and 
neurosciences) are, according to Birman (2003), fundamentally: 1) the 
unconscious activity and 2) the manifestations of such activity.  Within these novel 
paradigms it is not solely a ‘divided subject’ that emerges, which earlier 
philosophical texts were already proposing in their different approaches; for 
example from the Cartesian to the Kantian subjects, human ‘wholeness’ had been 
demystified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Rather, it is the 
production of desire (the potentialities, the complexities of symptoms and 
structures, etc.) in the ‘being in the world’ of an individual that is then understood 
through a systematic mapping of the psychic and subjective dynamics.  In ‘An 
Outline of Psychoanalysis’, written in 1938, Freud starts off addressing this very 
point at which his psychoanalytic works were arriving. Freud writes: 
 
“Psychoanalysis makes a basic assumption, the discussion of which 
is reserved to philosophical thought but the justification for which 
lies in its results. We know two kinds of things about what we call 
our psyche (or mental life): firstly, its bodily organ and scene 
of action, the brain (or nervous system) and, on the other hand, our 
acts of consciousness, which are immediate data and cannot be 
further explained by any sort of description. Everything that lies 
between is unknown to us, and the data do not include any 
direct relation between these two terminal points of 
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our knowledge. If it existed, it would at the most afford an exact 
localization of the processes of consciousness and would give us no 
help towards understanding them” (Freud, 1938:144-5). 
 
Here Freud acknowledges the idea of consciousness assumed by his work and that 
it also runs along the side of, if not against, a scientific tradition that tends – as it 
already did in the late 1800s – to localise acts of consciousness in the brain and, at 
that time, in the nervous system. Psychoanalysis brings to light the psychic 
apparatus and, with it, is able to raise questions that are particular to knowledge 
after psychoanalysis, different to other forms of divided subject or of subjectivity 
as carved through the social bond that could be proposed without this 
psychoanalytic ‘mapping’.69 Freud was not a philosopher, “but he ended up by 
constructing psychoanalysis as a new field of knowledge, which formulated new 
presuppositions in regards to subjectivity. His thought is directly linked to 
philosophical thought through the problems psychoanalysis posed to philosophy” 
(Birman, 2003:16). 70 In ‘Lecture XXXV The Question of a Weltanschauung’, part of 
the New Introductory Lectures, Freud (1933a) opposes psychoanalysis to 
philosophy.  Psychoanalysis, unlike philosophy was not for Freud a 
Weltanschauung, the German term to which Freud offers a careful simple 
explanation as “an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our 
 
69 For example, in the fields of social and political sciences, the phenomenon of racism can 
be unpacked through psychoanalytic lenses; whilst in the clinical setting psychoanalysis 
would find unconscious marks of symptoms that have brought the patient into any 
particular care setting or analytic space. Fanon (1952) and the Brazilian black feminist 
Lélia Gonzales (1984), for example, were pioneer scholars of the unconscious 
reverberations of racism and coloniality in the Freud-Lacan tradition. 
 




existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, 
leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its 
fixed place” (Freud, 1933b:158).  Freud points out that this ‘view of the universe’ 
was not the intention of psychoanalysis, since just by being a branch of 
psychology, psychoanalysis was, rather, more justifiably to be subjected to the 
‘scientific’ Weltanschauung; yet, this ‘scientific’ view of the world was not really 
appropriate to the psychoanalytic cause. And that is “due to the procedures 
present in the scientific discourse, psychoanalysis would turn itself over the 
research of circumscribed objects, whilst philosophy had endeavoured always 
towards the totality of the being and of the real” (Birman, 2003:9). Such a 
conception of philosophy is naturally debatable, but it marks one of Freud’s later 
understandings of the status of the psychoanalytic discourse as something ‘else’.  
Psychoanalysis is not a philosophy, nor can it be ‘only’ a psychology.  
 
Upon this last point, the extract of Freud’s ‘An Outline of Psychoanalysis’ quoted 
above reveals a conversation with the scientific status of psychoanalytic work.  
Freud is clear when arguing that even if more advanced scientific work enabled 
the localisation of consciousness ‘inside’ the brain, the experience of 
consciousness and of the unconscious would not change. And along with this, the 
‘point’, or the ‘justification’ of psychoanalysis also does not change.   And that 
would be because psychoanalysis, differently to neurosciences, ‘deals with 
something else’:  psychoanalysis is not trying to produce a theory of the world and 
life and it also should not be bound to the medical-scientific discourse. That is, as 
mentioned previously, it may be the narrative offered to experience and the 
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performative aspect of subjectivity that matter in the analytic experience, more 
than any ‘verifiable’ or ‘arguable’ reality.  
 
Even when not particularly endeavouring to trace a whole new system of 
meanings, truths or theories about the universe or anything in it, Freudian 
psychoanalysis still was capable, under its due limitations of being first and 
foremost a clinical practice, of shaking if not shifting certain paradigms around the 
conception of a self (Ricoeur, 2008). With the psychoanalytic unconscious, a shift 
from the ‘conscious I’ to what lays beyond it and the drive become the regulators 
of psychic experience. Birman lists the three different meanings of the 
paradigmatic de-centrings inaugurated by Freud as: “1) from consciousness to the 
unconscious; 2) from the ‘I’ to the other; 3) from consciousness, the ‘I’ and  the 
unconscious to the drive” (Birman, 2003:60).  What psychoanalysis adds to theory 
and to the clinic, and where it diverges from other mainstream clinical practices 
is precisely an account of the psyche-soma that puts consciousness and 
individualism in question.   To this list, following the ‘vibrational moments’ 
identified across Freud and Lacan’s theories of anxiety and a Guattarian-feminist 
critique of psychoanalysis via Lygia Clark, I add: 4) from the Other to the 
vibrational, affective ‘full-void’ Real. 
 




The manner in which psychiatry deals with psychic suffering through the 
twentieth century can be characterised as a ‘descriptive psychopathology’ Berrios 
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(1996). Biology and individual causality are at the heart of the efforts of the DSM-
III, IV and V (Rose, 2018), where the affect of anxiety is divided, listed and 
pathologised accordingly. This debate involves complex philosophical and 
ideological assumptions that permeate wider discourses in psychiatry, 
psychologies and psychoanalysis that meet precisely at the complicated, yet often 
oversimplified, definition of what is normal and what is pathological in affective 
life. In other words, the riddle of quantifying and qualifying ‘how much anxiety is 
too much?’, as I explored in detail in Chapter 1, is the backbone of a contemporary 
dividual, estranged from anxiety. 
 
Eighteenth and early-nineteenth century medical literature discussed what were 
considered both ‘subjective’ (fear, phobia, etc.) and ‘objective’ (digestive, 
respiratory, etc.) aspects of what was later combined into the understanding of 
‘anxiety’ disorders or symptoms as unrelated phenomena that were formative of 
other illnesses and of madness.  In other words, “by the mid-nineteenth century, 
the term anxiety was used in medical writings to describe a mental state that fell 
within the range of normal human experiences but was able to cause or lead to 
disease, including insanity” (Berrios, 1996:266). Bodily and psychological 
experiences were, therefore, bound in anxiety. Yet, it was only in the later decades 
of the nineteenth century that the prominence of a ‘nervous’ system, or a 
ganglionar system, gave rise to an understanding of anxiety as having something 
to do with an excessive production of some sort from within the body and a link 
with perception – or what was being sensed from outside.  This focus on the nerves 
and neurology in the works of physicians such as Xavier Bichat, Bénédict Morel 
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and chiefly George Miller Beard (Shorter, 2005) both in the USA and in Europe 
would see the diagnosis of ‘neurasthenia’ grow in popularity, containing 
symptoms of what we would now understand as anxiety or even an anxiety or 
panic attack (Berrios, 1996).  In the context of such diagnoses of a ‘weakness of 
the nerves’ and of the social and medical enigma of hysteria, psychoanalysis 
emerges as a clinical approach that accounted for the unconscious traces and 
logics at the heart of symptoms.   The psychoanalytic emphasis on anxiety can be 
found in a very early theoretical proposition written by Freud, ‘On The Grounds 
for Detaching a Particular Syndrome From Neurasthenia Under The Description 
“Anxiety Neurosis”’ (1894). Anxiety neurosis was here being called as such 
“because all its components can be grouped round the chief symptom of anxiety, 
because each one of them has a definite relationship to anxiety” (Freud, 1894:91). 
Freud, in this paper, recognises the potential similarities in diagnosis of cases of 
neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis, but he moves on to clarifying the difference 
between the two as lying precisely in the specific sexual origins of anxiety neurosis 
– the sexual can be interpreted with a more contemporary inflection as libidinal 
or concerning what Lacan names jouissance, an enjoyment beyond the scope of the 
subject. 71 
 
Freud also defends the psychoanalytic method as – at least in contrast with 
neuropathological methods – the only one capable of providing in-depth enough 
interpretations that would not only prove his theory of anxiety neurosis right as 
 




really unveil symptoms since “it is impossible to pursue an aetiological 
investigation based on anamneses if we accept those anamneses as the patients 
present them, or are content with what they are willing to volunteer” (Freud, 
1895b:129).72 In other words, we cannot take presented symptoms or narratives 
of complaints at face value, once they are not the ‘full picture’, once consciousness 
is not sufficient to depict the grounds of psychic suffering. The unconscious marks 
a division among methods, interpretations and treatments in the field of psy, 
wrapping symptoms around it. 
 
In psychoanalysis, as delineated in Chapters 2 and 3, anxiety is defined as an affect, 
mobilising therefore ‘body’ and ‘mind’ equally. Anxiety “includes in the first place 
particular motor innervations or discharges and secondly certain feelings; the 
latter are of two kinds—perceptions of the motor actions that have occurred and 
the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say, give the affect its 
keynote” (Freud, 1917:395). In other words, the affect of anxiety situates the 
subject in relation to what is beyond oneself, stretching both perception and 
feelings that are both bodily and psychological, of one’s position in the world – 
challenging thus the dividualising foundations of mainstream psychiatric and 
psychological care.  This move or encounter with an abyss-within or a  horizon-
beyond oneself is at the centre of the unsettling, overwhelming but also creative 
 
72 It is worth mentioning how this statement seemingly leaves the power of being the 
‘archaeologist’ of the mind and the holder of knowledge on the side of the analyst, 
similarly to the logic described in Chapter 1 of the prototypical models of diagnosis in 
psychiatry. Lacan displaces this position by considering the analyst the subject 
‘supposed to know’ rather than the one who actually knows in the transference. Co-
poiesis thus expands on being ‘supposed to know’ by encouraging a horizontal 
collaborative production in the clinic.  
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potential of this “exceptional affect” (Soler, 2014) that marks an appearance of 
what Lacan named the register of the Real. 73  What makes anxiety really 
compelling also theoretically is how both Freud and Lacan have cast it as an affect 
of ‘excess’, as my close study of their work on anxiety revealed.  For Freud, as per 
his 1917 Introductory Lecture on Anxiety, anxiety is an excessive affect that 
escapes the ego’s attempts of repressing or representing a libidinal vicissitude – 
castration anxiety points thus to the threat an overwhelming libido poses to the 
ego, which, in its turn acts as a psychic gatekeeper of stability in Freudian 
topology.  
 
Post-Freudians, in particular Melanie Klein, interpret and modify Freud’s 
topological model, which, after his publication of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, 
in 1919 and ‘The Ego and the Id’, in 1923, shifts his theories of anxiety to the 
workings of the Ego, Id and Super-Ego. Klein’s work places anxiety at the centre of 
the psyche, with an idea that babies are born ‘full’ of this overwhelming intensity, 
which, towards her later writings she saw as a manifestation of the death drive.  
In ‘The Theory of Anxiety and Guilt’ (1948), Klein writes: “My contention that 
anxiety originates in the fear of annihilation derives from experience accumulated 
in the analyses of young children” (Klein, [1948] 1988:29). Anxiety, for her is 
centrally connected to guilt, which, in turn, fuels the shift from an early paranoid-
schizoid position, where “hatred and persecutory anxiety become attached to the 
frustrating (bad) breast, and love and reassurance to the gratifying (good) breast” 
 
73 In Chapter 3 I offered a detailed account of Lacan’s writings on anxiety, where I 
expand upon these remarks.  
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(Klein, [1948]1988:34). Some states of transitory integration between the good 
and the bad part-objects give rise to a “synthesis between love and hatred […] 
which gives rise to depressive anxiety” (Klein, [1948] 1988:34). This transition 
towards the depressive position, where reparation becomes possible, is formative 
of the ego, which, in development would be able to handle both what she called 
‘persecutory anxiety’ and ‘depressive anxiety’, equipped with the necessary 
defence-mechanisms to experience both anxieties. In her words, such a 
mechanism is “the ego’s capacity of evolving adequate defences against anxiety, 
i.e. the proportion of the strength of anxiety to the strength of the ego” (Klein, 
[1948]1988:40). Klein forged her own theory of anxiety, with much creativity; 
carving her original reading of the function of this affect, she writes: “An optimum 
in the interaction between libido and aggression implies that the anxiety arising 
from the perpetual activity of the death instinct, though never eliminated, is 
counteracted and kept at bay by the power of the life instinct” (Klein, 
[1948]1988:42). In Klein’s clinical technique, and similarly in other Object 
Relational traditions that would follow in the twentieth century, the analyst works 
through the transference and countertransference envisaging offering a 
therapeutic reparation (Rustin, 2015) through introjections of qualities from the 
relation with the analyst and interpretations that act to uncover and symbolise 
unconscious phantasies. 74 
 
 
74 For a lengthy discussion of the similarities and impossible differences between the 
psychoanalytic approaches of Klein and Lacan, and their followers, see Borossa, J., 




Lacan was rather sceptical of the techniques employed by Klein in the clinic and 
the belief in the possibility of full-symbolisation of a phantasy, as well as of  
prospects of life under a strong and stable ego, as, to him, the ego, especially as it 
was formulated by the Ego-Analysts in the United States, pertained to the register 
of the Imaginary. The Imaginary in Lacan can be summarised as the function that 
offers coherence to the world ‘outside’ through the ‘image’, or the mirage of the 
subject.  Its limits, the limits of this anchoring ‘mirage’ and ‘subjective coherence’, 
are particularly relevant to understanding anxiety, as in anxiety the fictional 
character of this subjective mirage becomes evident – or better, the mirage is 
under threat, the abyss comes near (Lacan, 1960). For Lacan, it is in anxiety that 
the Real makes an ‘apparition’, since “anxiety highlights how much of the subject 
is not captured by language, or how much is left over after the most exhaustive 
attempts to encapsulate or represent the subject in words” (Gallagher, 1996:5). 
Because of its relation to the Real, anxiety points at a failure of fantasy, and this 
theoretical relation is developed in detail throughout Lacan’s Seminar X on 
Anxiety, delivered between 1962 and 1963. Fantasy functions as a cover up for a 
fundamental ‘structural fault’ of the subject, and it fails to provide this efficient 
covering up in the moment of anxiety. This fact alone alludes to something beyond 
symbolisation, something that fails and in failing is unique to each subject that is 
evident in anxiety. In other words, the mirage of the subject is destabilised in 
anxiety. The curtain is lifted, a veil evaporates. 
 
The psychoanalytic view of anxiety reiterates the psychoanalytic understanding 
of the symptom and diagnosis. This means that it goes against the logic of 
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contemporary hegemonic discourses in psychology and psychiatry, in which 
anxiety is treated as a generator of ‘disorders’ in its own right or as an isolated 
symptom to be ‘cured’ or ‘managed away’. For Lacan, as much as for Freud, anxiety 
is not ‘the problem’, let alone ‘a problem to be eliminated’ in the search of some 
‘cure’.  What the trail of anxiety reveals to us in the psychosocial analysis of its 
journey in and out of the clinic from the mid to late twentieth century until the 
current moment is an affective-politics, or an affective domination, that steers the 
subject away from any possibility of living with their anxiety, their affects or 
conceiving life beyond the curtain or the veil of fantasy. Working with anxiety as 
an affect of ‘excess’, however, is not a conventional or unproblematic position 
psychoanalytically, especially when it touches the very onto-epistemic 
foundations of Freudian and Lacanian thought.  And that is so in relation to the 
function of what frames such excess (fantasy, defences or Oedipal-identifications) 
in the model of subjectivity that informs a psy praxis. 
 
 




Lacan’s elaboration of the subject through (post-)structuralist lenses has made 
clear a certain ‘politicisation’ of the psychoanalytic subject, smashing, in the words 
of Rosi Braidotti, “any illusion of atomized individuality by embedding the subject 
in the thick materiality of a symbolic system of which language is the most 
available source. [Allowing] for subtler analyses of the interaction between self 
and society and among different selves than liberal, ego-based psychology” 
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(Braidotti, 2006a:18).  Yet, an integral part of the model of subjectivity proposed 
by Lacan comes with ‘negativity’, or a ‘lack’ as its anchor.  The debate around the 
centrality of lack in psychoanalysis is not new in feminist theory (see Brennan, 
1989); whilst a clear contrast with an ‘affirmative’ model of the subject takes 
shape through the theoretical influence of Deleuze and Guattari to the fields of 
psychoanalysis, philosophy, the arts and humanities in more general terms.   
 
Both ‘negativity’ and ‘affirmation’ – or ‘immanence’ of desire – may carry radical 
politics within themselves as conceptual frames through which we can think 
subjectivity, the psyche and, as is my concern here, the status and potencies of 
anxiety. Such radical potential should not be brushed off in search of a ‘neat’ 
philosophy of psychoanalysis (even if then remaining very faithful to Freudian or 
Lacanian teachings); that is an approach to knowledge Lacan famously rebuked in 
his Seminar XVII The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (delivered between 1969-1970), 
one that he called the discourse of the ‘master’. In this thesis, my aim has been not 
to stretch a detailed argument for or against negativity, for or against affirmation 
of desire as many scholars have done (from David-Menard, 2014 to Schuster, 2016 
or Nedoh and Zevnik, 2018).  That would be a theoretical exercise of value, 
especially to philosophy, but one which can turn easily ideological and sour – a 
way of approaching psychoanalysis that according to Guattari, in The Three 
Ecologies, from 1989, ‘tends to the ornamental garden of psychoanalysis.’ Rather, 
I remain faithful to psychoanalysis’ radical potential, which to me means the 
impossibility of ‘total’ knowledge of either oneself or the other; which can be 
translated as an ethics of the encounter that is not reliant on ‘intersubjectivity’ in 
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the object relational sense but on the challenges of relations among divided 
subjects and how this plays out in the clinical setting. Following Frosh (2006), I 
hold on to the value of  the ‘critique’ of totalising models present in Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, once “what is preserved in the Lacanian critique of the 
object relational tendency of most contemporary psychoanalysis is one of the 
more radical elements of psychoanalytic thought: a pessimism concerning the 
possibility of positive knowledge as against negative knowledge, or critique” 
(Frosh, 2006:20). Being truthful to this spirit means to constantly rethink 
psychoanalytic ideas, theories and practice in light of an always changing – and 
plural, multiple – world (or worlds). This is an effort Braidotti (2013) has called 
‘creativity’; or the production of new systems of reference, opening to the creation 
of new repertoires of worlds, rather than an attachment to (a stunningly male and 
white) dialectics of desire as lack in the heart of subjectivity and the notion of 
‘critique’. 
 
In the clinic we encounter vibrant examples of negativity: from symptoms that 
repeat, unhealed losses that act as magnets of pain, traumatic excesses that drain 
and spin like a washing machine to the nonexistence of a ‘sexual rapport’, 
imaginary fantasies, a satisfaction that never comes and enigmas of the body that 
challenge the medical dictionaries but still, for all the suffering these generate, are 
able to sustain life in some way, resisting domination. A domination such that can 
stem both from the power of a disciplinary society, as described by Foucault 
(2008b); and from a discreet and pervasive society of control, as elaborated by 
Deleuze (1992) as well as embodied external perpetrators, internalised super-
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egoic punishments or even collective disasters. Yet, even at the heart of ‘negativity’ 
there is something ‘positive’ that keeps going –or some ‘difference’ in ‘repetition’, 
as Deleuze (1995) would argue in the late 1960s.  
 
Following Lacan’s very early teachings, specially Seminars I and II, and his ‘beef’ 
with ego-analysts and post-Freudians at the time, we can be convinced to accept 
the non-adaptability of the subject, which relies on a singular Real that cannot be 
reduced to any Imaginary delineation nor any Symbolic frame (Ruti, 2012). 
Identification with the analyst and a strengthening of one’s ego defences towards 
better ‘adaptability’ to reality was, to Lacan, in these early seminars, an ideological 
misinterpretation of the Freudian revolution. Insisting, therefore, in the non-
adaptability of the subject (Van Haute, 2002), Lacan proposes the divided subject 
anchored on a ‘negativity’ of desire. This model of ‘negativity’ in Lacanian 
teachings, especially in the very early ones, as reflected in texts published as part 
of his Écrits, is heavily influenced by Kojéve’s course on Hegel, which relies on the 
negativity of Desire as a guarantor of ‘Self-Consciousness’ or an I/Being. Kojéve 
starts his course on Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of the Spirit with the contentious 
affirmation:  
“Man is Self-Consciousness. He is conscious of himself, conscious of 
his human reality and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially 
different from animals, which do not go beyond the level of simple 
Sentiment of self. Man becomes conscious of himself at the moment 
when – for the “first” time – he says “I”. To understand man by 
understanding his “origin”, is, therefore, to understand the origin of 




This ‘Man’ revealed in speech as ‘self-consciousness’ comes through a negativity 
in desire, for Kojéve and Hegel. Lacan takes this model onboard in his Seminar V 
Formations of the Unconscious, delivered between 1957 and 1958, where a 
dialectics of desire gives consistency to subjectivity beyond ‘consciousness’. In 
Lacan, the ego will essentially be a ‘misrecognition’ or a mirage of the subject; a 
subject also crossed by discursive/social/political forces and by an excessive Real. 
It is in this founding ‘negativity’ of desire that ‘action’ and thus transformation of 
reality can happen (a formative part of Kojéve’s course on Hegel taken in by 
Lacan). Alenka Zupančič (2012) calls this negativity that founds ‘being’ a ‘gap’ of 
‘with-without’. She does this by thinking through Freud’s essay ‘On Negation’ 
(1925a), which famously carries the possibility of a presence in absence in speech.  
Negativity is not then an empty hole but an airy void, or a ‘gap’ that makes 
subjectivity possible.  
 
Thus, as discussed by Frosh (2006), in light of Rustin (1995), thinking of 
‘negativity’ and ‘positivity’ (as well as affirmation, immanence and nomadism) as 
markers of psychoanalytic approaches and politics is one of many forms of 
politicising psychoanalysis. Frosh writes: “Differentiating between ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ traditions in psychoanalysis is only, of course, one possible take on the 
variety of ways in which the psychoanalytic field can be divided up” (Frosh, 
2006:21). And completes: “Nevertheless, it is a powerful one, reflecting the 
complexity of the critical positions taken up by psychoanalysis and the alternative 
possibilities of different attitudes towards therapeutic, political or cultural 
change” (Frosh, 2006:21). In such a non-adaptability of the subject (Van Haute, 
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2002), which is the cornerstone of Lacanian psychoanalysis, ‘negativity’ and 
‘positivity’, or rather, ‘affirmation’ and immanence, meet and, in my thesis, I stay 
with this trouble by thinking of the Real as an ‘excess’, or a beyond-the-subject 
that is affective, entangled and collective, as proposed by Guattari (1989, 2007). It 
is in one’s excess beyond oneself that affirmation insists, according to feminist 
post-humanist critiques, such as that of Braidotti (2006a; 2006b; 2017), as she 
unpacks the modern humanist (and colonial-patriarchal) logic behind the 
constitution of a relation to reality, knowledge and being that German Idealism 
(Hegel and Kant, as her critique goes) produced and psychoanalysis still 
reproduces. Following this logic and when situating psychoanalysis 
epistemologically, historically and politically, such a ‘lack’ doesn’t hold. Rather, 
negativity becomes the mark of a situated neurotic (European, male, etc.) 
ontological delineation (Ettinger, 2019).75 Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, from 1972 and 1980, addresses exactly this problem, offering an 
explosion of psychoanalysis from within (from the triangular Oedipus to 
rhizomatic thousand plateaus). Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of the Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia series, can be considered an extension of the Lacanian 
endeavour, taking his critiques to mainstream psychiatry and psychoanalysis 
even further (Dosse, 2010).  
 
If we consider Canguilhem’s critiques of psychology, touching both on the 
theoretical ‘idea of Man’ – the philosophy and anthropology of any psychology – 
 
75 Chiara Zamboni (2004) furthers the debate between transcendence and immanence 
as an artificial and specifically patriarchal philosophical dichotomy that feminism – and 
the pratica di partire da sé, of Italian feminism – does away with in its ethics.  
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and the matter of ‘what it hopes to achieve’, which extends beyond an ontological 
question and engages with enquiring about the therapeutic direction of the 
treatment, ideas of normality and pathology and cure, we may think of this riddle 
of affirmation versus negativity differently. Whilst the ontological grounds 
between negativity and affirmation can be contrasted vividly, in the praxis, 
especially if we follow Freud, Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari from beginning to 
end, through their journeys, exploring potentialities of radical non-normative 
elements of their traditions, there is more opportunity of encounters, 
convergences and a possible thinking-with rather than a tired thinking-against. 
Neither Freud, Lacan nor Deleuze and Guattari were interested in maintaining 
paradigms of normality or corresponding with psychiatric dogma. In their own 
way, the singularity of their encounters in the clinic was their main compass.  
Psychoanalysis reinvents itself in each new session, yet, as Guattari argues in 
Chaosmosis, the “Freudian Unconscious has itself evolved in the course of its 
history: it has lost the seething richness and disquieting atheism of its origins and, 
in its structuralist version, has been recentered on the analysis of the self, its 
adaptation to society, and its conformity with a signifying order” (Guattari, 
1995a:10). In this sense, holding on to the conceptual framework that anxiety is a 
vibration beyond the sheer subjective knotting that can act as indicator of possible 
new references or worlds, adheres to the reality of repetitions and the possibilities 
of multiplicity in the clinic (Guattari and Rolnik, 2007).  When asking what does 
psychoanalysis hope to achieve, the creative production of new possibilities of 
living is what brings together these theoretical and clinical approaches that have 




It is fundamental to acknowledge Lacan’s rejection of ‘adaptation’; and I see the 
project Deleuze and Guattari began – one carried further by feminist, 
post/decolonial thinkers and contemporary philosophers such as Suely Rolnik, 
Rosi Braidotti, two of my key interlocutors in this research – as ethically attuned 
to the Lacanian spirit. At the end of the day, Lacan subverted mainstream 
psychoanalysis and revised his own understandings of it from the late 1930s until 
the late 1970s. When ‘negativity’ in its Hegelian sense is criticised by Braidotti 
(2011;2019) or Deleuze and Guattari, what is being proposed is not an 
‘affirmative’ version of psychoanalysis that is based on adaptability and the ego 
(thus a ‘non-antagonistic’ model as Žižek (2010) loves to point out in his rejection 
of Deleuzean ideas). Quite the contrary, the immanence of desire and an ethics of 
affirmation – when accounting for the unconscious, the realities of the clinic and 
suffering as well as for the modern humanist onto-epistemic foundations of Freud 
and Lacan – is a ‘non-adaptability’ of a constantly creative potency taken to its 
possible limits (Perci Schiavon, 2019).  
 
Whilst repetition, suffering and a general sense of being stuck as well as paralysed 
by anxiety are often the reasons why people seek psychoanalysis – confirming the 
pull and gravity of the death drive – difference, production or affirmation lace the 
creativity of being, or the ‘becomings’ present in post-Deleuzean thinking. The 
creativity of living, the creativity of symptoms, the creativity of the enigmas of the 
body and, ultimately, the creativity to keep-on-living at times against many odds 
cannot but be witnesses to a plane of immanence, a desire that is production and 
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affirmation that post-Deleuzian and Guattarian thinkers call ‘Life’ (Biehl and 
Locke, 2017). This juxtaposition of life and death, affirmation and negativity,  
critique and creativity, and the potency of engaging with this trouble is what I 
rescue in my thesis of anxiety, following the non-adaptability of the subject, the 
mistrust in the mirage of the ego and the Imaginary that are so fundamental to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, but also keeping the ‘Life Against Death’ (to use Norman 
Brown’s  1958 book title on Freud and Spinoza) character of the affect of anxiety.  
 
Freud’s description of Eros and Thanatos, or the libidinal ‘life’ of affirmation and 
the repetitive, destructive Death Drive are paradoxes that follow his own complex 
journey of establishing a theory of the psyche with clinical preoccupations, 
cultural and political endeavours, and an ‘ontologising’ of suffering (one of his 
accomplishments but also pitfalls – Deleuze and Guattari (1983) view Freud’s 
ontology as one of the neurotic European man, trapped in the Oedipal drama). For 
Freud, “only by the concurrent or mutually opposing action of the two 
primal instincts—Eros and the death-instinct—never by one or the other alone, 
can we explain the rich multiplicity of the phenomena of life” (Freud, 1937:243). 
The Freudian writings on anxiety accompany his journey of making sense of this 
libidinal excess – of life, death, this beyond ‘me’ – as both connected to negativity 
and to affirmation. From his early letters to Fliess in the late 19th century, to the 
1930s ‘New Introductory Lectures’, with his last theory of anxiety, this paradoxical 
version of the subject vis-à-vis libido, the body, affect and the conflict of the drives 
remains operative. Alenka Zupančič, arguing that both Deleuze and Lacan were in 
a sense very faithful to Freud’s discovery, notices that “for both Lacan and Deleuze 
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repetition is essentially related to the death drive as the fundamental matrix of the 
drive” (Zupančič, 2017a:166). Looking at Deleuze’s writings in Difference and 
Repetition, from 1968, and comparing his reading of Freud’s ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’ with that of Lacan, Zupančič (2017a) also aligns them from the angle of 
an ‘excess’ that articulates or is articulated through repetition and one, as she 
reads it, that mobilises the affect of anxiety. She writes:  
“Both Lacan and Deleuze insist that the excess (of excitation) does 
not exist somewhere independently of repetition, but only and 
precisely in repetition itself and through it. In other words, the thing 
in defence against which repetition mobilises anxiety exists only 
through the repetition itself. Repetition is to be found on both sides 
of this movement: repetition is what brings in the excess ‘bound’ by 
anxiety through repetition. The death drive already involves 
repetition, so that the repetition itself could be seen as split, or two-
sided” (Zupančič, 2017a:167) 
 
Anxiety, as my research argues, situates the subject precisely in the failure of this 
repetition, the ‘failure’ or the mirage of the Imaginary-Symbolic knotting that we 
call the subject, which keeps the Real at bay. Anxiety, therefore, not only comes 
through in the defence against such excess as it is, even in strict Lacanian terms, 
an encounter with the Real, or an encounter with an excess. Lacan, in his radical 
project of re-reading Freud against the mirage of the ego, gives more emphasis to 
death, calling all drives a ‘death drive’76. Whilst Lacan follows Hegel and Kojéve to 
 
76 As Lacan writes in ‘Position of the Unconscious’, “Speaking subjects have the privilege 
of revealing the deadly meaning of this organ [the libido, which  he is calling here an 
organ, naming it lamella], and thereby its relation to sexuality, This is because  the 
signifier as such, whose first purpose is to bar the subject, has brought into him the 
meaning of death. (The letter kills, but we learn this from the letter itself.) This is why 
every drive is virtually a death drive” (Lacan, [1964]2005: 848). This deadliness is 




the letter by assigning to negativity the condition of Being, it is in affirmation that 
one finds the possibilities of  ‘becomings’, or of living and creating new repertoires 
of worlds, new Imaginaries that don’t need to cross the structure of the Symbolic, 
rather, new Imaginaries that stem off the Real. 77  Guattari reverses Lacanian 
psychoanalysis from the logic of the Real (Sauvagnargues, 2016). Yet, still in Lacan, 
towards his later teachings, we can find if not open doors, at least some windows 
ajar for the possibilities of ‘becoming’. 
 
Being and becomings 
 
Lacan’s most complicated concepts such as the Real, the objet a and jouissance are 
wrapped in his theories of anxiety, leaving the possibilities of ‘affirmation’ hidden 
in the corner. Interestingly, towards his later teachings, when Lacan was working 
with what is known as the ‘Borromean’ Clinic or a Clinic of the Real, a Real that is 
no longer situated within the constraints of the Symbolic starts to appear. This 
later stage of his work, contradictory and complicated as all that preceded it, 
articulates the logic of ‘Lack’, which was the question of the Symbolic as not 
foundational to the subject anymore, whilst the body comes to the fore.  
 
In some Lacanian psychoanalytic circles, an idea that “the speaking body is the 21st 
century unconscious” has been debated in recent years. This concept, or 
expression, ‘speaking body’, can be found in Lacan’s later seminars and has been 
 
77 According to Jacques-Alain Miller (2000) in ‘The Six Paradigms of Jouissance’, until 
seminar XX, Lacan emphasises language as the bearer of jouissance, but after this 1972-
1973 seminar, jouissance gains some autonomy and a body that enjoys without 
language, without the Other, comes to the fore.  
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made popular especially after Jacques-Alain Miller referred to it in the speech and 
texts of the 2016 World Association of Psychoanalysis congress, that took place in 
Rio de Janeiro (Miller, 2014).  The ‘speaking body’ is an elusive term that does not 
refer exactly to the fleshy body, nor to an imaginary body, rather, it points at a 
body through which the subject can come into being and, therefore, produce 
symptoms and a sinthôme.  In this spirit, in the presentation of the Scilicet tome 
issued prior to this congress in Brazil, in October 2015, in which various 
interpretations and possible meanings of the term ‘speaking body’ can be found, 
an interesting definition of the potency of psychoanalysis is offered. It reads: 
“Psychoanalysis tends to make possible for each, according to one’s singularity, 
the invention of an alliance between one’s body and the resources of speech 
against the worst” (NLS, 2015).  Whilst anxiety is not specifically reformulated by 
Lacan in his later teachings, considering his reformulation of the Real and the 
move beyond the Oedipal paradigm, as I argued in this research, there is scope for 
rethinking the Lacanian theory of anxiety through these ‘vibrational moments’.78 
 
The body, according to these late-Lacanian teachings, becomes an affective site in 
which the Real and possible new ‘repertoires of worlds’ (an expression I borrow 
from Rolnik, 2019), can be articulated. Jouissance, this ambiguous Lacanian term 
that is akin to Freud’s libido but that translates from French as ‘enjoyment’, is 
central to such possible novel articulations.  Miller (2000) has identified six 
 
78 After Seminar XI, Lacan mentions angoisse only briefly, once in Seminar XIII; once in 
Seminar XIV; once in Seminar XVI; twice in seminars XVII and XXII and for one final time 




different paradigms of jouissance throughout Lacan’s teachings. The first ones still 
see jouissance as wrapped around language and the subject departing from 
language as such. The last of these paradigms appears in Seminar XX Encore, 
delivered between 1972 and 1973, where jouissance gains some autonomy, and 
from there onwards it is the jouissance of the living body that reorients the access 
to the Real – not the Symbolic, anymore – opening through lalangue the 
possibilities of an Imaginary. In the lesson on jouissance that opens Encore, Lacan 
says: “The habit loves the monk [alluding to a French idiom], as they are but one 
thereby. In other words, what lies under the habit, what we call the body, is 
perhaps but the remainder (reste) I call object a.  What holds the image together 
is a remainder” (Lacan, 1998:6). In this passage, the ‘rest’, or the excess from the 
subject’s idea of oneself that is the ‘body’ is the anchor of the ‘image’.  
 
Miller (2001) writes in his essay ‘Lacanian Biology’ of a movement in Lacanian 
teachings that establishes the relation between body and language as one of 
satisfaction, signification and back to satisfaction – the jouissance of the signifier 
on the body beyond signification – in the later works.  This movement is crucial to 
the matter of negativity and lack, as well as the riddle of affect and the body in and 
beyond Lacanian psychoanalysis.  The question of signification, more specifically, 
led to the ‘classic’ Lacanian clinic, where interpretation was a principal tool of 
intervention. By shifting its focus away from meaning and towards the Real 
inscribed in the body, technique changes towards the ‘cut’ (stopping the session 
precisely when the unconscious stems off, protecting it from being wrapped by 
further Imaginary ‘empty speech’ once more in the session) , or towards a skilled 
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use of punctuation, where adding meanings (or stretching the Imaginary through 
the Symbolic) is substituted by producing, together, new verses, new poems that 
bridge this Real of the body into an inventive use of words –what I call a co-poiesis, 
inspired by Lygia Clark and Guattari (as per Chapters 4 and 5).  From Seminar XX 
onwards, the end of analysis changes path, once interpretations “by introducing 
more signifying material in the treatment, in fact encourage meaning-making by 
bringing yet more water to the mill of the unconscious. By contrast, the cut isolates 
jouissance in speech and prevents the proliferation of meaning that makes analysis 
interminable” (Voruz and Wolf, 2007, xi).  In late Lacan, or from Seminar XX 
onwards, “Lacan downplays the Oedipus complex, seen as a mythical—and so 
imaginarised—version of unconscious organisation. And it is with the des-
imaginarisation of the Oedipus that the deciphering of the unconscious becomes 
less central in the analytic treatment” (Voruz and Wolf, 2007, x).79  Analysis, thus, 
becomes less of a matter of ‘finding out’ and adding meaning to a puzzle and more 
of a creative production of something else, of a new form of living, together.  
Through a rhythmic, poetic succession of constructions, a common ground is 
established.  Again, analysis becomes a locus of co-poiesis, of sprouting new 
worlds. Here is the possibility for thinking and treating ‘rupture’ in the clinic 
differently – rather than inscribing it into pre-defined frames based on Oedipal 
identification, castration and domination, there is a communing, there is creativity 
in a creation of new ways of speaking, similarly to what Guattari (1998) proposed 
and what Lygia Clark realised in her practice.  
 
79 ‘Des-imaginarisation’ is a neologism connoting a draining of the Imaginary or of 
fantasy in the treatment. In practical terms, it means moving beyond an analysis of a 




In this shift towards the Real in Lacan’s work, a similarity emerges with the 
‘affirmation’, the multiplicity and the creativity that Deleuze and Guattari assign 
to a ‘becoming’.  With the move beyond Oedipus, beyond the Symbolic and the 
Phallic Law and beyond interpretation, “the relation to meaning and truth is less 
valued, and for the Lacan of the later period the analytic treatment is oriented on 
a reduction of the symptom. The symptom has to be emptied of the jouissance 
procured through its articulation with the fantasy so that the subject can make use 
of his sinthôme to love, work, and desire” (Voruz and Wolf, 2007, x).  The symptom, 
which is what Miller (2001) rescues as a Lacanian ‘biology’, is the bodily, affective, 
excessive repetition, and to work through it in analysis, following such logic, is to 
find a poetic way out of the entrapments of such repetition that produces no 
difference into the horizon of difference and immanence.  
 
Contemporary Lacanians, mostly the groups of psychoanalysts connected with the 
World Association of Psychoanalysis (vulgarly known as ‘Millerians’, which is not 
always a compliment), have been directing their studies, events and practice 
towards the later Lacanian teachings, where the Real and affects gain another 
dimension beyond the constraints of the Symbolic. The focus on the ‘signifier’ as 
cutting the body up and marking enjoyment/jouissance without any 
signification/meaning, brings language back to its materiality.  For Miller and 
contemporary Lacanians, the Borromean clinic was Lacan’s attempt to formulate 
an Other for when there is no more Other, or what is the subject of the world like 
at the end of analysis (Chiesa, 2007). The Borromean knot was introduced in 
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Lacan’s teachings apropos of Joyce and his ‘creative solution’ in psychosis. Such 
theoretical interventions from the mid-1970s onwards see Lacan ceasing “to take 
his bearings solely from the differential clinic and introduces the perspective of 
the Borromean knots, with the consequent production of new statements on the 
symptom” (Brousse, 2007:83).  This means that thinking through the symptom 
solely through the differential diagnosis – the possibilities of structure of neurosis 
(hysteria, obsession and phobia), psychosis (paranoia, melancholia, 
schizophrenia) and perversion (sadism, masochism and fetishism) – crumbles, 
giving rise to a more ‘singular’ arrangement of the symptom.80 As Marie-Hélène 
Brousse writes, “Lacan even reverts to an ancient spelling, that of ‘sinthôme,’ to 
conceptualize what of the symptom cannot be reduced to structural 
determination” (Brousse, 2007:83).  The materiality of language, the Real of the 
symptom on the body and jouissance operate, as I argue, as indicators towards 
new ‘becomings’, where the Imaginary ‘is the body’ (Soler, 2014). Collete Soler 
(2014), writes about accessing such an Imaginary that does not rely on the 
structure of the Symbolic as a form of ‘knowledge’:  
“In contrast with science, in psychoanalysis we are dealing with the 
horror of the knowledge at play, which, for everyone, is nothing 
 
80 In the late-1990s, Miller (1999) proposed the clinical diagnostic category of ‘ordinary 
psychosis’ to address exactly the modes of subjective arrangement produced after the 
‘fall of the Name-of-the-Father’ (namely, the demise of traditional patriarchal culture). A 
polemic term adopted mostly by Miller’s followers, it has also been dubbed ‘untriggered’ 
psychosis (Redmond, 2014). Whilst this is worth mentioning, I find the diagnosis of the 
‘end’ of patriarchal culture very unsound and deeply Eurocentric and problematic. Also, 
the albeit nuanced pathologising of the end of the Name-of-the-Father, is unimaginative. 
Following my Guattarian-feminist critique, I hold on to the clinic of the sinthôme via the 
method of co-poiesis and the focus on ‘lines of flight’. Being so, the refused psychic 
alliance with Oedipus can be explored in the vibrational clinic of anxiety without 
necessarily subscribing to the differential clinic between psychoses, neuroses or 
ordinary psychosis.  
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other than knowledge—acquired with great difficulty—about his 
own unconscious, as real, and its consequences. Since Freud, the 
main consequence has a name: castration. This name is as 
suggestive as it is deceptive with its connotations of mutilation, 
which says—though not very well and invoking too much 
imaginary—that for the analysand this knowledge can only be 




Going through anxiety thus, as my thesis maps and argues, opens the possibility of 
creatively forging one’s sinthôme, or a new form of writing, speaking, dancing, a 
poiesis of Life. It is in this ambiguity of the affect of anxiety, which vacillates 
between ‘being’ and ‘becomings’ that I situate my research and my clinical 
practice. 
 
Whilst psychoanalysis – Freudian and Lacanian – is inscribed within an 
epistemological, ethical and scientific discourse of modern humanism (following 
Zaretsky, 2004; Foucault, 2008a, 2008b; Makari, 2008), it also destabilises 
philosophical and psychological/psychiatric assumptions and ideological dogmas 
about subjectivity, experience and suffering, as this thesis has demonstrated. 81 
One of its most radical features is that it accounts for the subject and their 
symptom in singularity, with an unconscious activity that is enigmatic and 
irreducible. Another factor of its radical and non-ideological potential is that “it is 
 
81 La Barre, for instance, in a quite universalist and colonial tone, argues that all 
anthropologists should read Freud and the classic texts of psychoanalysis once “the 
major premise of the analytically-astute anthropologist must necessarily be that nothing 
human can escape illumination from the penetrating, pan-human, and holistic 





a constant feature of the analytic clinic that it rapidly encounters the limits of its 
theoretical framework: a case of the real catching up” (Voruz and Wolf, 2007: vii).  
In this thesis, I locate the riddle of anxiety in the psychoanalytic clinic as situated 
between models of negativity and of affirmation in psychoanalytic, psychosocial 
and philosophical literature. This discussion was contextualised in the field of 
critical psychiatry and psychology, tacking the psychoanalytic usefulness to the 
clinic of anxiety. In order to address the ‘estrangement’ of the affect of anxiety in 
the dividualising dynamics of diagnosis and treatment of hegemonic practices in 
the field of psy through the last century, that I explored in detail in Chapter 1, I 
asked whether psychoanalysis can bring anxiety from estrangement into 
entanglement.  My answer is that it not only can but that it needs to. 
 
Aberrant psychoanalysis  
 
 
Thinking of the possibilities of ruptures and excesses within psychoanalysis, I 
propose to move beyond the realm of the abyss-within into the horizon-beyond.  
In doing so, I argue that anxiety (by being conceptualised as a vibration) must not 
be interpreted, rather it is to be worked through in the clinic by holding on to the 
situatedness of affective clues, identifying unconscious movements that 
collectivise and creatively travel beyond a structural and Oedipal circumscription 
of desire.  This is the destiny of the Real, of rupture, that my creative clinic 
proposes in closing this research; an aberrant psychoanalysis, a vibrational and 




Whereas the earlier Lacanian teachings focus on the process of subject formation 
as ‘transindividual’, or crossed by a shared Symbolic, organised by the Name-of-
the-Father (his renaming of the psychologised and allegoric Oedipus), 
guaranteeing a cut that institutes desire as a lack, his later teachings will move 
away from such a structured engine. In Lacan’s critique of the ‘unitary’ (or 
‘positive’ instead of affirmative) subject of post-Freudian psychoanalysis, I have 
argued that it is not the Symbolic that extends beyond oneself, but the Real, a 
resisting excess that grants the subject a non-adaptive quality. Guattari’s version 
of the Real encompasses affirmation rather than negativity or lack. The 
transcendent position of the Lacanian Law is put into context through the 
unveiling of its means of production. 
 
Poiesis would come about for Guattari through possibilities of expression of 
ruptures, or, what is done to the Real (the jouissance of the Symptom, Anxiety, the 
Real of the body) in the clinical encounter. Is the Real compost for novel 
germinations or is it displaced in pre-existing narratives of a subjective drama? In 
other words, what do we do with anxiety – this appearance of the Real – in the 
clinic? Do we expand the possibilities of expression, supporting poiesis, or do we 
trim it with interpretations so that they fit into a pre-arranged composition?  
 
According to Guattari, in The Three Ecologies, an ‘a-signifying rupture’ catalyses 
poiesis beyond the barriers of what the subject can grasp, or beyond our repertoire 
of worlds, as Suely Rolnik (2019) puts it.  These ruptures need however to be 
offered a platform of expression. Psychopathological repetitions and anxiety are, 
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for Guattari, rooted in the danger of such ruptures losing consistency and 
remaining passive to these moulds of repertoire of worlds (2000:45). What Rolnik 
(2019) calls a ‘repertoire of worlds’, is an Imaginary-Symbolic arrangement that 
gets reproduced through pre-existing narratives, structures and psychoanalytic 
interpretation – the focus of Deleuze and Guattari’s criticisms towards 
psychoanalysis. In his Dialogues with Claire Parnet, from 1977, Deleuze 
summarises his and Guattari’s objections towards psychoanalysis in one sentence: 
“we only said two things against psychoanalysis: that it breaks up all productions 
of desire and crushes all formations of utterances” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987:77). 
Interpretations that fit or dissolve such ruptures, the Real, this excess, into a pre-
existing Imaginary-Symbolic frame are, therefore, the counter-poietic element of 
psychoanalysis, according to them, neutralising, normalising, reducing or 
stopping any poiesis of new repertoires of the world, of situating the subject as 
part of a common of multiple others. Such interpretations operate instead by 
insisting on totalising universals that echo the humanist, modern, patriarchal and 
colonial roots of the Imaginary-Symbolic knot that situates psychoanalysis within 
an epistemology of a world in decline, or an ‘anthropo-phallus-ego-logo-centric’ 
[antropo-falo-ego-logocêntrica] (Rolnik, 2019) anchor of the capitalist colonial 
unconscious. Such a process has been called by Rolnik (2017) “the pimping of life”. 
 
Whilst I agree with Guattari and Deleuze in their critique of psychoanalysis, it 
sounds to me that they were talking to the most conservative side of 
psychoanalysis, omitting especially within Freudian and Lacanian teachings, the 
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potentiality for a radical poiesis, or a practice of transformation. 82  I see it 
differently. To me (as per Chapter 3), it is clear that in Lacan’s later Seminars there 
is a shift away from the ‘totality’ of an Other, away from the Name-of-the-Father 
and away from structuralism.83 The changes brought by his Borromean clinic or 
clinic of the Real address much of the critiques of Deleuze and Guattari: we find a 
clinic that works with punctuation and even some poetry, promoting the sinthôme.  
The sinthôme is poiesis.  
 
My argument of ‘anxiety as vibration’ consists in first having mapped the 
vibrational possibilities in Freud and Lacan, taking in Guattari’s ecosophical 
ethico-aesthetic demands towards a possible co-poietic practice of 
psychoanalysis. In the affect of anxiety, as I traced in my thesis, an affective Real 
that extends beyond the subject and which is always in flux, produced at every 
encounter with humans and non-human forms, touches the limits of the 
Imaginary-Symbolic arrangement or of the repertoires of world that delineate the 
subject. This intensity, this excess, vibrates beyond the subject, calling for a 
 
82 Historically, in the 1970s both in France and Italy, psychoanalytic groups were set up 
by feminist collectives, deriving from Lacanian groups, such as the ‘psychanalyse et 
politique’, of Antoinette Fouque, part of the women’s liberation movement in France. In 
Italy, the Gruppo Pratica Dell’Inconscio, also emerged with the necessity to speak, listen 
and work through the singularities within the women’s movement that was so potent in 
Milan at that time. Psychoanalysis was seen as part of this liberation, allowing for a type 
of speaking and listening that would liberate colonised desires. 
 
83 This movement is more evident starting, for example, very clearly in Lessons 6, 7 & 8 
of Seminar XVII, addressing ‘Oedipus from myth to structure’, and passing through the 
writings on sexual difference in Seminar XX, where we could see Lacan describing 
patriarchal universalism and idea of One-ness, and reaching his later topological 
attempts to wrap the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real in the body and the 




germination of new worlds (Rolnik, 2019). Such an intensity is experienced as 
anxiety; it signals dangers to the subjective mirage, it dissolves Imaginary anchors, 
whilst it also pushes for things not to change. Anxiety vibrates the intensities of 
what is beyond the grasp of the subject, it destabilizes, overwhelms, paralyses.  In 
analysis, the production of the sinthôme, when it is not self-referential but affective 
(or ‘nomadic’ in Braidotti’s sense, as per Chapter 4), is a provisional delineation of 
the subject, a new Imaginary-Symbolic knot that is pushed by the affective Real, 
lasting just long enough. The co-poietic, affective sinthôme lasts until it is subtly re-
created in light of the intensities from the world in common. If the sinthôme is stiff, 
it will be no more than a neurotic symptom; if it is not there, life with others, 
creativity and connection are impossible.84 This ‘aberrant’ version of the sinthôme 




The creative clinic and anxiety as vibration 
 
 
Psychoanalysis, at its best, is a practice of ‘staying with troubles’. Conversely, at its 
worse, it is a practice that modulates collective horizons into an abyss within. The 
psychoanalytic landscape explored in this research entails developing a capacity 
of being able to stay with anxious troubles, crossing them, rather than brushing 
them off, resorting to quick-fixes. ‘Working-through’ in the treatment involves 
paying attention to symptoms, fantasies, excesses, repetitions but also 
 
84 Here, in the permeability, stiffness or wobbliness of this Imaginary-Symbolic knotting 
of the affective Real I situate the nuance of psychoses and neuroses, under this 
ecosophical model of anxiety as vibration I delineate in the thesis.  
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possibilities, creativities and new arrangements that germinate in the analytic 
journey.  In the case of the clinic of anxiety, in particular, moving from the edge of 
what gives consistency to the ego and exploring what ‘gaining unconsciousness’ 
(Tosquelles, 1992) can be like, without relying onto structural or Oedipally-
wrapped frames of interpretation, is the premise of creative clinic. In other words: 
Wo Es war, soll Ich warden. Where the vibrational unconscious is, there must I 
carry on becoming.  
 
The unconscious, writes Lacan, in his very last seminar– Seminar XXV ‘Le Moment 
de Conclure’ –“it is that: it is the face of the Real- perhaps you have an idea, after 
having heard me numerous times, perhaps you have an idea of what I call the Real- 
it is the face of the Real of that in which one is entangled” (Lacan, 10/01/1978).85In 
this thesis, anxiety has been studied in and out of the clinic, considering its double-
edge, as a paralysing and at the same time mobilising affect that exceeds a 
subjective delineation and its Symbolic-Imaginary anchors.  Envisaging an 
alternative to what has been called the ‘dividualising’ politics of affect observed 
within hegemonic psy discourses and practices over the last century, an 
affirmative take on anxiety has been composed. In this research, but also in my 
clinical practice, I am inspired by Braidotti, Guattari and Rolnik, into committing 
to an eco-feminist approach, which means taking seriously the ethical demands of 
the twenty-first century (crossing feminist, decolonial, environmental, medical 
 
85 “Et l'inconscient c'est ça, c'est la face de Réel… peut-être que vous avez une idée - après 
m'avoir entendu de nombreuses fois - peut-être que vous avez une idée de ce que j'appelle 
le Réel …c'est la face de Réel de ce dont on est empêtré” (Lacan, 10/01/1978) in Lesson of 
10th of January, 1978. Seminar XXV ‘Le Moment de Conclure’. 
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and epistemological debates) and the limits of psychoanalytic classic theories of 
Freud and Lacan when it comes to possibilities of an ethics of the Real, or of what 
extends beyond the subject. The challenge was to think about this excess 
characteristic of anxiety on the threshold of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, not losing sight 
of the clinical application of psychoanalytic ideas.   
 
Working with texts as puzzling archives, from Freud and Lacan, travelling through 
Lygia Clark and Deleuze and Guattari, the grounds and possibilities of affect have 
been unpacked. Affects (such as anxiety), are not reducible to Imaginary ‘feelings’, 
rather, encompass an ethical disposition to be produced by the affecting relations 
to others in a complex matrix that extends beyond 1) consciousness, 2) an 
Imaginary-Symbolic subjective delineation, 3) the Symbolic realm and 4) the 
binary of representation/non-representation and of sexual difference. By twisting 
the clinic of anxiety from the point of an affective Real, a subject of entanglement 
is welcomed into the couch.  
 
Instead of insisting on a dividualising onto-epistemic frame of interpretation, a 
creative clinic of anxiety (one that does not ‘dividualise’) operates as a platform 
for the production of relations, situatedness and a sinthôme that vibrates through 
such an eco-psycho-social matrix.  By conceptualising anxiety as vibration, the 
possibility of a creative clinic unfolds. It is not just a matter of finding what anxiety 





When encountering a patient or analysand suffering with anxiety, the expected 
path of the psychoanalytic treatment, as per what was developed in this thesis, is 
to place this anxiety and what it is signalling as the compass for the direction of 
the treatment. As a compass, anxiety takes us to the edge of failed fantasy. In doing 
so, my thesis has argued, considering anxiety as a vibration adds a subtle and yet 
powerful ethical nuance to this direction.  Instead of relying on interpretation, the 
function of identifications or of lack and castration; a technique of co-poietic 
constructions and punctuations will hold on to the ‘lines of flight’, or the 
‘creativity’ in becoming that is the rhizomatic unconscious. Affective assemblage, 
rather than the dialectics of enunciation anchor this approach to ‘rupture’. Instead 
of gluing together shattered pieces into a wonky old piece; this approach entails 
assembling fragments into a new montage. Commoning, collectivising, situating, 
rather than individualising, privatising and universalising.  What I have attempted 
to demonstrate in this thesis is, to put it differently, the eco-feminist ethical 
impossibility of re/producing an estrangement of anxiety and the urgency of 
affective entanglement. 
 
What Berardi (2018) calls the ‘reactivation of the erotic body’ through the tune of 
the vibrations of the world is what the direction of co-poietic sinthôme in the clinic 
can unfold. Anxiety is an affect, an affect that does not deceive, an encounter with 
the Real. As such, anxiety sits on the edge of being (as a signal) and possible 
‘becomings’ – accordingly, operating as a theoretical and clinical riddle that re-
orients Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis from a psychosocial perspective, acting, 
thus, between critique and creativity.  What can anxiety do, and what can we, as 
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clinicians, do with it?  Anxiety, as I have argued in this thesis is like a ‘bird tapping 
on the window’ (Guattari and Rolnik, 2008:328) and the work of psychoanalysis 
is to find in these birds “indicators of new universes of references” (Guattari and 
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